On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 8:26:35 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 12:40:27 PM UTC-4, freqflyer07281972 wrote:
>> Thanks Craig, you've articulated quite well a number of difficulties in
>> approaching the hard problem, IMHO. I was reading this article in the SEP
>> and thought of your approach:
> Thanks, cool
>> Look especially under his glossing of the idea of 'pure experience.' It
>> reminds me of your MR/PIP and seems quite congenial to it.
>> Whaddaya think?
> Yes, I agree his 'pure experience' matches my 'sense' in a lot of the
> important ways. I use the opposite assumption about it being 'MU' or
> 'nothing'. It is tempting to conceive of the limitation of our local
> experience and propose 'nothing' beyond it, but I think that it works much
> better when we invert it and suppose that beyond local experience is
> 'everythingness' and 'eternity'.
> I particularly recognize "Pure experience launches the dynamic process of
> reality that differentiates into subjective and objective phenomena on
> their way to a higher unity, and the recapture of our unitary foundation is
> what Nishida means by the Good."
> This is the same as my model, although I would say that the
> differentiation first diverges from pure experience to subjective qualia,
> where objective qualia emerge from the public intersubjectivity (quanta).
> His concept of higher unity is "Good" while mine would see good as only a
> particular measure of subjective 'likeness' and the actual higher unity I
> see as "Significance"...the reconciliation of diffracted sense as it is
> separated from the entropy of scaled distance and time.
>> On Monday, September 16, 2013 1:35:27 PM UTC-4, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>> The Hard Problem of consciousness asks why there is a gap between our
>>> explanation of matter, or biology, or neurology, and our experience in the
>>> first place. What is it there which even suggests to us that there should
>>> be a gap, and why should there be a such thing as experience to stand apart
>>> from the functions of that which we can explain.
>>> *Materialism only miniaturizes the gap* and relies on a machina ex deus
>>> (intentionally reversed deus ex machina) of ‘complexity’ to save the day.
>>> An interesting question would be, why does dualism seem to be easier to
>>> overlook when we are imagining the body of a neuron, or a collection of
>>> molecules? I submit that it is because miniaturization and complexity
>>> challenge the limitations of our cognitive ability, we find it easy to
>>> conflate that sort of quantitative incomprehensibility with the other
>>> incomprehensibility being considered, namely aesthetic* awareness. What
>>> consciousness does with phenomena which pertain to a distantly scaled
>>> perceptual frame is to under-signify it. It becomes less important, less
>>> real, less worthy of attention.
>>> *Idealism only fictionalizes the gap*. I argue that idealism makes more
>>> sense on its face than materialism for addressing the Hard Problem, since
>>> material would have no plausible excuse for becoming aware or being
>>> entitled to access an unacknowledged a priori possibility of awareness.
>>> Idealism however, fails at commanding the respect of a sophisticated
>>> perspective since it relies on naive denial of objectivity. Why so many
>>> molecules? Why so many terrible and tragic experiences? Why so much
>>> enduring of suffering and injustice? The thought of an afterlife is too
>>> seductive of a way to wish this all away. The concept of maya, that the
>>> world is a veil of illusion is too facile to satisfy our scientific
>>> *Dualism multiplies the gap*. Acknowledging the gap is a good first
>>> step, but without a bridge, the gap is diagonalized and stuck in infinite
>>> regress. In order for experience to connect in some way with physics, some
>>> kind of homunculus is invoked, some third force or function interceding on
>>> behalf of the two incommensurable substances. The third force requires a
>>> fourth and fifth force on either side, and so forth, as in a Zeno paradox.
>>> Each homunculus has its own Explanatory Gap.
>>> *Dual Aspect Monism retreats from the gap*. The concept of material and
>>> experience being two aspects of a continuous whole is the best one so far –
>>> getting very close. The only problem is that it does not explain what this
>>> monism is, or where the aspects come from. It rightfully honors the
>>> importance of opposites and duality, but it does not question what they
>>> actually are. Laws? Information?
>>> *Panpsychism toys with the gap*.Depending on what kind of panpsychism
>>> is employed, it can miniaturize, multiply, or retreat from the gap. At
>>> least it is committing to closing the gap in a way which does not take
>>> human exceptionalism for granted, but it still does not attempt to
>>> integrate qualia itself with quanta in a detailed way. Tononi’s IIT might
>>> be an exception in that it is detailed, but only from the quantitative end.
>>> The hard problem, which involves justifying the reason for integrated
>>> information being associated with a private ‘experience’ is still only
>>> picked at from a distance.
>>> *Primordial Identity Pansensitivity,* my candidate for nomination, uses
>>> a different approach than the above. PIP solves the hard problem by putting
>>> the entire universe inside the gap.
> Beyond the ambiguities, comp put the physical universe in the gap, when
> the gap is modeled by the logic "*" minus the logic not-"*".
Why just the physical universe though? Don't you think comp needs to put
itself in the gap too?
> I mean G* minus G, etc. In fact physics (should) appear in Z* minus Z, X*
> minus X.
G* and G don't show up in a Google search. I've never really understood
what you mean by that, but you're welcome to explain if you have time.
> Like I said, beyond ambiguities, what you say fits very often comp, except
> when you argue *from* what you say, that comp has to be false, of course.
Hehe, I can do what comp can't :)
> Consciousness *is* the Explanatory Gap. Naturally, it follows
>>> serendipitously that consciousness is also itself *explanatory*. The
>>> role of consciousness is to make plain – to bring into aesthetic evidence
>>> that which can be made evident. How is that different from what physics
>>> does? What does the universe do other than generate aesthetic textures and
>>> narrative fragments? It is not awareness which must fit into our physics or
>>> our science, our religion or philosophy, it is the totality of eternity
>>> which must gain meaning and evidence through sensory presentation.
>>> *Is awareness ‘aesthetic’? That we call a substance which causes the
>>> loss of consciousness a *general anesthetic* might be a serendipitous
>>> clue. If so, the term local anesthetic as an agent which deadens sensation
>>> is another hint about our intuitive correlation between discrete sensations
>>> and overall capacity to be ‘awake’. Between sensations (I would call
>>> sub-private) and personal awareness (privacy) would be a spectrum of nested
>>> channels of awareness.
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