On 20 Sep 2013, at 20:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:39:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2013, at 18:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:55:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 8:26:35 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
> <snip>
> Beyond the ambiguities, comp put the physical universe in the gap,
> when the gap is modeled by the logic "*" minus the logic not-"*".
> Why just the physical universe though? Don't you think comp needs to
> put itself in the gap too?

Here I model the gap by the difference between true and provable,
versus true and not provable.

That's not the gap I'm talking about though (I didn't know that was even a gab that was being discussed anywhere, tbh.). The Explanatory Gap,

Yes, thats the one.


That means nothing for me.

I'm referring to the particular use of the term "Explanatory Gap" in philosophy of mind literature.

Yes, me too.

is about what is experienced directly and what is experienced as present independently of our direct experience.

You mean memories?

No, memories I consider direct experiences, since they require only that we are conscious. Indirect experiences would be experiences which we can only detect using our body's sense organs. Indirect experiences are 3p, thus they are bodies in space, direct experiences are 1p, so they can contain any combination of imagined forms, thoughts, feelings, etc.

That is not enough clear for me. I can't figure out what you mean by indirect experience. I guess you mean experience (1p) occurring when you think about a theory (like there is something on the other side of the moon). That kind of things can mix a lot first and first person plural aspects. Keep also in mind that 'bodies in space' are first person plural notion, they are not 3p.

Direct experiences include those which seem true, experiences which seem provable, and experiences which seem unrelated to either proof or truth but are merely aesthetic, euphoric, qualitative, phenomena as sources of appreciation. Where does fiction fit into your gap?

In human imagination or delire, I guess. Not sure seeing any problem here.

But what makes imagination fictional in comp?

I don't see the problem here. The usual explanation should work in comp as far as it works in the mundane collective consciousness. Something is fictional if it is a construction of a mind, when not referring to an entity known (or believed) being there.

It amazes me at first that physics seems to appear only in the gap,
but then it is coherent with the idea that is is a first person plural emergence, and that is confirmed by Everett QM. If we look at the same
particles we do get entangled and share the foregoing history. That's
why Everett saves computationalism from solipsism.

I don't know that we are looking at the right thing in QM. Instead of particles, or waves which physically exist, we should focus on what gives physics the ability to cohere as 'particles' or 'waves' in the first place - what would make laws of nature manifest as 'forms', when they don't seem to do that in a pure computation (i.e. The Mandelbrot Set requires a graphic plot to visualize, it doesn't create graphics out of its arithmetic relation).

Yes it does. Graphic plots just make it easy, and pleasing, for humans to relate with them. The geometry is in the arithmetical relations.

Ah, see that's the problem. Why would humans be pleased by something different than what would please arithmetical relations? Why should any computation have a smell?

That's a difficult question, of course. I explain it through X* and X1*, but I cannot sum up it right now (but I have done that already, also).

But the point is for you: what is it in the smell that you find non computationally tractable. Smelling machines already exists. They might not have qualia, not because smell is not computable, but because they would not do the relevant self-reference as described by X*)

> I mean G* minus G, etc. In fact physics (should) appear in Z* minus
> Z, X* minus X.
> G* and G don't show up in a Google search. I've never really
> understood what you mean by that, but you're welcome to explain if
> you have time.

I have done this many times on this list,

I know, sorry about that. It hasn't sunk in yet for me.

OK. There are good books referred in the bibio of the book and papers, in my URL.


but I will explain it again
on FOAR soon, or later. But I can say to words. G is the modal logic
of Gödel's beweisbar (provability by PM, or PA, I mean Principia
Mathematica, pr Peano Arithmetic, or any Löbian machine).
In fact G correspond to the provability proposition that the machine
can prove about herself, and G* corresponds to the true, but not
provable by the machine, propositions.

Ohh, ok. This is the two poles of your version of the Gap (which is not explanatory at all, but merely provable).

Nothing in the gap is provable. true yes (trivially given that I limit myself on correct machines), but never provable by such machine. G* minus G = what is true but non provable.

Right, but truth, proof, and everything in between are not explanations, they are only an accounting of logical convictions. It is true that I ate pizza, but I can't prove it. That gap is not the same gap as the one which explains why chewing up a collection of organic molecules is associated with a particular phenomenon which we call 'tasting the flavor (of pizza)'.

That is why we have to consider the intensional nuances, of self- reference (Bp & p, Bp & Dt, etc.).

A machine can know everything about those molecules, far more than I can, but why would there be a "flavor" if, as you say, the geometry (of the molecules) is in the arithmetic relations? Why would arithmetic relations even use geometry to represent themselves to themselves?

For reason related to math. Why does x^2 + y^2 = z^2 admits a big structured space of solutions (with geometries) and x^n + y^n = z^n admits no (non trivial) solutions at all?
The answer is: because the arithmetical reality is like that.

G for a human might be, that they are in a hotel, but G* might be that they cannot prove which hotel they are in from inside of the room, but they know that the hotel is in Geneva. Or something like that.

The machine can still prove that if she is really in the hostel, then she cannot prove it.

Can she prove that her proof can be proven?


(Still, this has nothing to do with the Explanatory Gap.)

Indeed. That's about G, G* and G* minus G. The explanatory gap of cognitive science is more related to the X* minus X gap, or Z* minus Z (of X1* minus X1).

We're not really talking about the same things then. To me modal logic is only relevant to something which relates to logic, and that rules out the entire universe of aesthetically experienced physics.

On the contrary, modal logic is for application of logic to modal aspect of the human reality.

Are aesthetic experiences modal aspects of human reality? Is the flavor of pizza modal?

Some modalities can be used in theories referring to such flavor experience.

Not the judgements about the flavor of pizza, but the appreciation of the actual flavor.

Well, it is, accepting comp + some amount of the classical theory of belief, knowledge, etc.

If we were talking about a piece of music, the gap would be not between the notes on the page and the understanding of how to play the piece, but between the mechanics of the music theory plus acoustic physics and the non-mechanical aesthetics of giving and receiving the performance. The actual event, rather than the idea of an event-like data set.

OK. Indeed. No problem.

In my view modal logic has no way to access any kind of experience,

Modal logic is *about* that. It is not simply that.

Simply what?

Modal logic is not experience. Some modal logic can be used to build theories with such experiences as subject matter.

Treatises on planes cannot fly either.

Right but they cannot build planes either, unless someone who can read them has the materials and skill.

it assumes it from the start. It assumes a condition of 'provable' or 'true' as independent of experience rather than qualities which are abstracted from aesthetic comparisons.

But that exists, once you agree that 17 is prime, or not, independently of me and you.

Independently of me and you, sure, but not necessarily independent of sense-making itself.

In that case, it is trivially dependent, as the "whole arithmetical truth" can be considered as being connected.

You are putting 'me and you' in between the machine and arithmetic truth,

The machine is a part of arithmetical truth. You and me, too.

but I'm saying that arithmetic truth is between matter and sense- making in general, which is more primitive than matter or numbers.

I cannot conceive something simpler than numbers, and having such (Turing complete) spectrum of explanation. Sense-making is primitive in your theory, not with comp.

If I count five fingers, each one becomes an identical digit. If I count five leaves, it is the same digit of five. If I have just a digit of five however, it does not lead to an imagination of leaves or fingers unless I have experienced those prior to counting.

Yes, of course. But monkey's fetus seems able to dream of trees before seeing them, and with comp this is rather normal, as seeing is supported by brain activity. Likewise, arithmetic contains all such dreams.

Why would arithmetic have dreams, other than as formless arithmetic relations?

Why not?
If that was not the case, comp would be false.
I am not defending comp, I just work in comp. Then machine self- reference explains more than any other theory, especially those who assumed experience (or matter) as primitive, as comp explain both from less. Not completely, but the x*-x logics explains why.

Where is it getting the aesthetic sensations from, and why?

Even if comp can't explain this completely, taking them as primitive assumes them to be entirely not explainable. For me, this is like abandoning the search for an explanation at the start.

If we flip it the other way it works much better. Aesthetic sensations are the Absolute.

Where does that comes from. What is it? It looks like philosophy to me, when my point is that, comp (be it true or false) makes possible to do science and predictions.

But your theory makes non falsifiable negative statement (insult) about some entities (it makes my sun-in-law into a zombie).

Imagine that you succeed to convince everyone, except a bunch of computationalist working in the underground. Then you have a car accident, and die, except that some computationalist bring you in some underground computationalist hospital, and copy your brain into a digital computer, and imagine that comp is true, but now, you would be in the position of my 'sun in law' yourself, and understand that something was wrong with your "absolute".

You might be right, Craig, but we will never know, and I think that ethically it is preferable to assume too much conscious entities than not enough. I prefer more the naive than the cynical.

The problem is that you thought like if you were not doubting. That's a bit like "bad philosophers", with all my frankness.

I am not criticizing your phenomenology, but the fact that your theory entails some possible people would be treated like zombie.

From sense is derived a discernment between Absolute and subordinate, and that is the birth of quantitative sense. Arithmetic sense is the skeleton that sense uses to grow on, but it is not a presence or an awareness. The ubiquity of its truth comes from its timelessness and generality, not from authenticity.

In practice of course, as human beings, some of us are better suited to enjoy a life from the opposite perspective. Because of the symmetric nature of sense, it works with the tail end first as well for almost everything. Everything,. except consciousness. Consciousness cannot exist tail first. It cannot be conjured by figures, it can only be passed on directly through appreciation of sensation directly, without any computation.

Yes. It is the selector, picking a continuation of complex scenario and ascribing a reality to it. This in comp needs much *more* than a computation; it needs infinities of computation on which the selection will be done, indexically, by numbers having long histories.

Beyond that, it's more practical and more intelligent approach to use comp. Since we find ourselves operating within this narrow theater of spacetime, it's indeed imperative that we master the quantitative to the extent that we can in order to be able to control our circumstances locally. For those conditions that go beyond intelligence however, and into wisdom, it would be very dangerous to leave our worldview upside down. We'll end up being digital steaks and your 'sun in law's' restaurant.

I understand that fear. Comp would eventually transform us all into zombies.

But there are evidences that nature has already bet on it, more than once, and I doubt we can refrain the natural tendencies.

With some luck the planet Earth will become a museum of non comp, but we will go in the stars by (quantum) computational means.

Comp is a syntactical reduction, it has a corresponding semantical expansion. The more we are small, the more there are realties becoming accessible.

For example, take the (self) consistency proposition ~B f (I don't
prove the false). This is a typically true proposition (trivially for
the correct machines) but not provable by the machine. So you have G*
proves ~B f, but G does not prove it.

Does ~B f need to be proved, or is it just a given that something is conditionally 'truish', where truish = ~B f, true in the sense of it hasn't been disproved? It's not clear to me why ~B f needs G* to prove it.

It does need G*. G* came after, summarizing infinite conversation that we can have with Peano Arithmetic (say) about Peano Arithmetic. It is just a handy tool for us, notablmy to derive physics from number self-references.

Is the physics that is derived the physics of our universe, or more a general impression of physical pantomime? Do only our astrophysical constants drop out?

I define "physics" so that we can say that we get the whole of physics. What remains is geography and histories, which comp cannot predict, like it cannot predict if you will feel to be in Washington or in Moscow in the multiplication experience. I guess some physical constant will remain as such. Some might be number theoretical constant in disguise, other might be computer science theoretical oracle.

On the contrary, the sentence ~Bf -> ~B(~B f), which is the modal
translation of the second incompleteness theorem, (which says if I am
consistent then I cannot prove that I am consistent) *is* a theorem of
G, meaning that Löbian machine can prove their own incompleteness.

But can it prove that the proof of incompleteness isn't part of its completeness on another level?


Can its proof of its unprovable true hunch itself be a mistaken proof...one which is seems provable, but is not true.

It is the contrary. The proposition (Dt = ~Bf = "I'm consistent") is true but is not provable.

What the machine can prove is that Dt, if true, is then not provable.

Dt is true but not provable.
Dt -> ~BDt is true and provable.

That's basically what I think comp is - the inverted image of superstition. Where superstition might be overstating the significance of the unprovable beyond truth, then the overconfidence in comp leads to 'hypostition' or maybe 'empiritis': overstatement of the significance of the provable until *the truth is forced to lie*. This is what quantum mechanics and astrophysics has led us into - a state of hyperextended reliance on measurement that conjures its own self-referential mirage. Because both math and physics are not 100% authentic (they are both derived as second order senses), they have limits, beyond which they degenerate into confirmation bias. They are reduced to consistency for the sake of consistency; orderly voids.

That looks like your fuzzy and negative impression.

How does it know if it can prove anything? Why do we attribute an expectation of proof?

The same question arise in between humans. Why segregate the machine a priori. Kepe in mind that I *assume* computationalism.

But why do you assume computationalism?

It is the only lamp I know where I have a chance to find the key. Elsewhere only adds obscurity to obscurity.

Comp makes theology into beautiful and surprising mathematics.

And it is testable, when in company of some classical theory of knowledge, on which many philosophers agree since two millennia.

Comp is simple, elegant, and refutable.

> Like I said, beyond ambiguities, what you say fits very often comp,
> except when you argue *from* what you say, that comp has to be
> false, of course.
> Hehe, I can do what comp can't :)

Comp is not a person, and not-comp makes the life of my sun-in-law
miserable ... ;)

His life can't be miserable, because we can just peg some register in him to be happy no matter what.

Oh! You want my sun in law to forget his misery with artificial paradise?
Again, humans do that too.

Sure, but humans place a lower value on artificial paradise than aesthetic experience.

You can do that, but for my sun-in-law, having an artificial brain gives him both opportunity.
With your theory, both are disallow for him.

It is frowned upon to live in a garbage dumpster and smoke crack, but it is not at all clear that would be the case with your sun in law. You only slip out of it by saying that you assume he must be like us because you assume comp - but comp is wrong.


I don't just assume that it is, I understand exactly why it is.

Apparently, not in a communicable or justifiable way.

I understand why it is almost right as well, but ultimately, what arithmetic is based on is the imposter rather than the genuine, the representation rather than the presentation.

This is ironical. The machine first person says this too (Bp & p, S4Grz1), but she too can't believe in comp, nor even in any third person description of herself.
yes, comp needs an act of faith. It is a theology.

Comp (yes doctor) defends the right to say "no" to the doctor, but it explains such a "no" by the fact that it is consistent that the machine confuse Bp and Bp & p.

My wife was telling me a story of one of her flutists - an engineering grad student, who is Japanese and was expressing how tired he was from a particular class, which involved a lot of English conversation. She was asking about how hard it must be to have to translate the English into Japanese into Music and back into English. He said yes, and also that he had to keep the numbers straight too. “Numbers?” She asked… “Yes, while I’m playing I have to keep counting the numbers of the beat.”

My wife shocked him by responding that no, there are no numbers. There should be no language, because the music is already the language. You feel the beat, like this (taps his shoulder in 4/4 time). It was a revelation for him. She gave him homework to purge his mind of all language while practicing the flute over the weekend, and I got another interesting example of how feeling is more direct than counting. If you stop to think about it, if the brain were only a computer, why would we have to learn to count? It takes years to learn simple arithmetic but we come out of the womb with odd capabilities already online…we have a baby sense of humor, a baby sense of tragedy, etc. Why not 1+1=2, or binary code, eh? - See more at: http://s33light.org/post/61762401896#sthash.fOBaAJda.dpuf

He doesn't need a steak, because he's got steak equivalent data tables to eat.

We don't need steak either, we need only the sensation, and they are indeed provided by some relative arithmetical relations.

Why would they be? Why not just have the arithmetical relations without any sensation at all?

Because they are a consequence of arithmetical *truth*. They are unavoidable.

I can count the notes in a song on an abacus without the abacus turning into the sensation of music. It's a huge leap across the Explanatory Gap that you're taking

Yes. That's part of my point. The Church thesis makes this possible. We get very near inconsistency.

and you aren't even noticing a crack in the sidewalk.

Which crack? There is a crack only relatively to your assumption, but then we are different and incompatible theories, so that's hardly a defect of comp.

Again, why would an arithmetic relation have anything associated with it at all? Just use variables. If you beg for one miracle, I'll give you physics, but physics is only durable positions and locations. Why would there be a smell? How could there be?

Because relatively to us, there are good and bad molecules, and we have learn to evaluate them through a long history. Molecules are informatively very rich and variates entities. The brain emerged from investment in smell + self-moving.

Brain enacted them, in the relevant situation, but some dreams and drugs can provides them to.

Of course, but you're talking about the real non-comp world, and exporting our expectations from here back into the never never land of comp. There is no reason to expect that giving an arithmetic relation a drug will make it see or hear.

If comp is true, my brain is Turing emulable, and my brain + THC too, and the brain with salvinorin too, etc. All that will correspond to different diophantine polynomial equations. There are an infinities of such equations, and we cant know which one, but we can have ideas of the most probable. We can deduce that below the substitution level, they interfere.



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