On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:11, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/17/2013 1:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Sep 2013, at 19:54, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/16/2013 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
With computationalism, it is more easy and clear. What exists, at
the ontological level, is what make true a sentence like
"ExP(x)". So number exists, once we assume arithmetic or
combinators ..., because they make true Ex(x = x).
But this notion of 'exists' as 'satisfying a propositional
function' is completely different from "kicks back when I kick it"
existence.
Why? It kicks back too, like in credit carts.
My credit card is made of plastic - and all the processes that
depend on it's number are realized in stuff that kicks back too.
But that will do in the relevant way thanks to the abstract truth that
factorizing large number takes time. The plastic of the card plays
only a role of support.
And with comp it kicks back in making you dreaming of things
kicking back, sometimes in persistent way.
You say "number exists, once we assume arithmetic"; which is about
as useful as "hobbits exist once we assume middle Earth".
Not at all. Arithmetic asks for very few rather clear assumptions,
and it explains a lot, as all physical theories assumes it.
Arithmetic is a model of countable objects, but it's not that clear
that "every number has a successor" correctly models countable
objects.
?
Then with comp we need, nor can use anything more. Hobbits and
middle Earth assumes many things and explain nothing. I suspect you
are a little bit disingenuous, isn't it?
I naturally took an extreme example to make my point.
I do that often too, but here it weakened your point. Everyone (except
Sunday philosopher) agree on 0, and its successor. That is typically
not the case for Hobbits and Middle Earth.
Bruno
Brent
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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