Let us start at the end: David's conclusion upon Brent's (>)remark: ---------------------------- ... *> The advantage of > looking at a circle of 'reductions' > > NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS. > > is that it cautions one against this kind fundamentalism. Shall we take > perspectives as fundamental (Nietzsche), particles (Stenger), numbers > (Bruno),... In my view they are all models and one 'reduces' to a level you > can understand or manipulate, which will be different in different > circumstances.
That's nicely agnostic, of course. Frankly, it about sums up my own views most of the time. However, I appreciate Bruno's efforts to put some flesh on the bones of one particular departure from agnosticism. And I still deprecate those of an airily reductive persuasion who simply cannot see how they are doggedly assuming almost everything they wish to explain. **David** * *-----------------* I feel Bruno does not 'depart' from agnosticism: he remarked several time to be 'even more' agnostic than myself (a confessed all-agnostic). He just feels awe for his Platonistic base to adore numbers (especially the primes). I asked him several times to define them, because I cannot find 'single number relations" in the 'natural nature'. Only when numbers are already introduced ( - by human logic?). Those whom you call 'of an airily reductive persuasion' are regular conventional scientists (if...) who find it natural to 'explain' everything *they THINK they know* (or see, postulate in the 'model' of their reductionist world so far learned). IMO *"who give philosophers a bad name":* are the other philosophers (call them scientists). Motto (taken from a description of lawyers): 99% of philosophers give a bad name for the rest of them. JM On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 25 September 2013 19:42, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > > > I'd say the standard riposte is that the "first person facts" (qualia?) > are > > just inherent in the 3p model. There is feeling that goes with certain > > kinds of information processing (e.g. creating a personal narrative). > This > > is really implicit in Bruno's theory - that proving certain theorems in > > arithmetic necessarily entails qualia. > > Sure, but in my reply to Bruno I point out that whereas "information > processing" is an explicit theoretical aspect of comp, it has no > obvious role to play in reductive materialism. By the way, my critique > of "reductive materialism" isn't mean to imply a knock-down argument > against a future account of the first-person in terms of some final > physical theory. Rather my intention is to stress the often-overlooked > limitations of existing physical theory in this regard. What role is > "information processing" supposed to play if what exists is supposed > to be exhausted by some maximally-reduced material substrate? Is it > meant as a proxy for some underlying physical process? But then what > is this proxy supposed to consist of in addition to the process? > > As I remarked to Bruno, when one speaks of nations or sports teams (or > indeed universities, as Ryle famously pointed out, though apparently > without fully grasping the consequences) one has no difficulty > realising that all one is speaking of is human beings variously > arranged. I suppose one might call this reductive peopleism. But > apparently when one turns to "information processing" it is somehow > less clear that all one can be speaking of (according to reductive > materialism) is fundamental material entities variously arranged. > > > "Nature" is our model of reality. We like to compute from "the bottom > up" > > because it is usually easier to think of simpler things interacting to > make > > more complicated things - but no always. > > Yes, of course. But ISTM that this is often understood as implying > more than merely an explanatory strategy; IOW that "bottom up" - or > really "bottom only" - is how things "really are", internal > contradictions be damned. However, I surmise that you are not in this > simplistic camp. But I would still be interested in an account of > "information processing" that appeals exclusively to third-personal > physical processes without begging the question of the distinctive > first-personal characteristics of any higher-order relational > phenomena thus adduced. > > >> If the foregoing point is fully taken on board, it should be apparent > >> that our fundamental motivation for ascribing any truly independent > >> "reality" to derivative or emergent phenomena is actually their > >> appearance in some first-personal narrative. > > > > But that's just taking 1p narratives as fundamental. > > Not so fast. It's taking them to be "real", not fundamental. My point > is that, according to reductive materialism, there is no motivation to > accept derivative or emergent phenomena as real in any sense, because > they are ever and always simply the underlying fundamentals tout court > (i.e. the people not the nation). Of course, looking at things in this > way has the effect of making such emergent phenomena disappear from > view even more comprehensively than the Cheshire Cat, which also was > my point. > > > The advantage of > > looking at a circle of 'reductions' > > > > NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS. > > > > is that it cautions one against this kind fundamentalism. Shall we take > > perspectives as fundamental (Nietzsche), particles (Stenger), numbers > > (Bruno),... In my view they are all models and one 'reduces' to a level > you > > can understand or manipulate, which will be different in different > > circumstances. > > That's nicely agnostic, of course. Frankly, it about sums up my own > views most of the time. However, I appreciate Bruno's efforts to put > some flesh on the bones of one particular departure from agnosticism. > And I still deprecate those of an airily reductive persuasion who > simply cannot see how they are doggedly assuming almost everything > they wish to explain. > > David > > > > > On 9/25/2013 4:40 AM, David Nyman wrote: > >> > >> On 25 September 2013 05:03, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >>> We will have learned what emotions and feelings > >>> are at the level of sensors and computation and action. And when we > have > >>> done that 'the hard problem' will be seen to have been an idle > question - > >>> like "What is life." proved to be in the 20th century. > >> > >> David Chalmers has a good riposte to this, I think. He points out > >> that, properly framed, the question "What is Life?" was always going to > >> be answerable in terms of lower-level elements and processes of > >> systems we regard as alive. Consequently, once these had been fully > >> elucidated (no matter how difficult this might turn out to be in > >> practice) we simply would have no motivation to look for further kinds > >> of explanation. There never really was any reason to anticipate there > >> being some "hard problem" of Life. OTOH, he argues, even if we > >> possessed a fully adequate account of the brain in terms of its > >> relevant physical elements and processes, the question of why any > >> fully adequate third-person characterisation might imply any further > >> first-person facts would still remain. > >> > >> Of course the standard riposte to this riposte is indeed simply to > >> deny that there are "really" any such further first-person facts at > >> all (a position that Dennett has characterised as third person > >> absolutism). > > > > > > I'd say the standard riposte is that the "first person facts" (qualia?) > are > > just inherent in the 3p model. There is feeling that goes with certain > > kinds of information processing (e.g. creating a personal narrative). > This > > is really implicit in Bruno's theory - that proving certain theorems in > > arithmetic necessarily entails qualia. > > > > > >> I wonder, however, whether this denial really makes any > >> sense in its own terms. After all, if one takes the reductive > >> enterprise as seriously as one ought, anything above the level of > >> fundamental constituents and their relations is understood as being > >> derivative or emergent. IOW, in a sense (and a strong sense for our > >> present purposes) such derivative levels are not independently "real". > >> It is easy to miss this point because of their explanatory > >> indispensability (e.g. Deutsch's example of the alternative histories > >> of the copper atom) but it is central to reductionism that such > >> emergent levels play no independent role in the fundamental machinery. > >> Nature, as we might say, seems to compute exclusively from the bottom > >> up. > > > > > > "Nature" is our model of reality. We like to compute from "the bottom > up" > > because it is usually easier to think of simpler things interacting to > make > > more complicated things - but no always. > > > > > >> > >> If the foregoing point is fully taken on board, it should be apparent > >> that our fundamental motivation for ascribing any truly independent > >> "reality" to derivative or emergent phenomena is actually their > >> appearance in some first-personal narrative. > > > > > > But that's just taking 1p narratives as fundamental. The advantage of > > looking at a circle of 'reductions' > > > > NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS. > > > > is that it cautions one against this kind fundamentalism. Shall we take > > perspectives as fundamental (Nietzsche), particles (Stenger), numbers > > (Bruno),... In my view they are all models and one 'reduces' to a level > you > > can understand or manipulate, which will be different in different > > circumstances. > > > > Brent > > > > > > > >> IOW, it makes no > >> difference to Nature, conceived reductively, whether we choose to > >> explain the current location of a copper atom in terms of nations and > >> wars, or the evolution of the wave-function of the universe, or the > >> structure of the Programmatic Library of Babel for that matter, > >> because the presumed-to-be-fundamental reality is understood to > >> subsist independently whatever the case. According to standard > >> reductionist principles, nations and wars - and indeed atoms and > >> molecules - are simply higher-order derivatives of more fundamental > >> entities and their relations. Indeed, more accurately, they simply > >> *are* those entities and their relations, without addition, in exactly > >> the sense that football teams or societies simply *are* human beings > >> in relation, without addition. > >> > >> My point here is that these derivatives, in the end, are point-of-view > >> dependent. This is not to say, of course, that they are thereby simple > >> or arbitrary; quite the contrary. But there would be no need to appeal > >> to them at all were it not for the putative existence of > >> points-of-view in the first place. Nature, conceived purely as a > >> primary reality of fundamental entities and their relations, has no > >> truck with explaining the history of any particular copper atom in > >> terms of nations and wars or, for that matter, with distinguishing a > >> "copper atom" as worthy of explanation. Hence the primary > >> "first-person fact" that demands something beyond a strictly reductive > >> explanation is the peculiarly "non-derivative" status of a > >> point-of-view and the "emergent" entities in which it apparently > >> deals. That this may appear less than obvious to us is a consequence > >> of our seeming inability even to frame the question without assuming > >> the answer. > >> > >> David > >> > >> > >>> On 9/24/2013 8:44 PM, LizR wrote: > >>> > >>> On 25 September 2013 15:41, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> On 9/24/2013 6:32 PM, LizR wrote: > >>>> > >>>> On 25 September 2013 13:38, Russell Standish <[email protected]> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> This is also true of materialism. Whether you think this is a problem > >>>>> or not depends on whether you think the "hard problem" is a problem > or > >>>>> not. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Indeed. I was about to say something similar (to the effect that it's > >>>> hard > >>>> to imagine how "mere atoms" can have sights, sounds, smells etc > either). > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> As a rule, if you want to explain X you need to start from something > >>>> without X. > >>>> > >>> Absolutely. > >>> > >>> If you know of such an explanation, or even the outlines of one, I'd be > >>> interested to hear it. As Russell said, this is the so-called "hard > >>> problem" > >>> so any light (or sound, touch etc) on it would be welcome. > >>> > >>> > >>> My 'solution' to the hard problem is to prognosticate that when we have > >>> built intelligent robots we will have learned the significance of > having > >>> an > >>> internal narrative memory. We will have learned what emotions and > >>> feelings > >>> are at the level of sensors and computation and action. And when we > have > >>> done that 'the hard problem' will be seen to have been an idle > question - > >>> like "What is life." proved to be in the 20th century. > >>> > >>> Brent > >>> > >>> -- > >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > >>> "Everything List" group. > >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an > >>> email to [email protected]. > >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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