On 25 September 2013 21:31, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > I feel Bruno does not 'depart' from agnosticism: he remarked several time to > be 'even more' agnostic than myself (a confessed all-agnostic). He just > feels awe for his Platonistic base to adore numbers (especially the primes). > I asked him several times to define them, because I cannot find 'single > number relations" in the 'natural nature'. > Only when numbers are already introduced ( - by human logic?).
Well, he departs from it just long enough to be able to formulate a theory! However I do appreciate that he argues from its assumptions rather than insisting that those assumptions must be correct. > IMO "who give philosophers a bad name": are the other philosophers (call > them scientists). Motto (taken from a description of lawyers): > 99% of philosophers give a bad name for the rest of them. Hee hee. Question: what do you have when you have buried a lawyer up to his neck in sand? Answer: insufficient sand! David > Let us start at the end: David's conclusion upon Brent's (>)remark: > ---------------------------- ... >> The advantage of >> looking at a circle of 'reductions' >> >> NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS. >> >> is that it cautions one against this kind fundamentalism. Shall we take >> perspectives as fundamental (Nietzsche), particles (Stenger), numbers >> (Bruno),... In my view they are all models and one 'reduces' to a level >> you >> can understand or manipulate, which will be different in different >> circumstances. > > That's nicely agnostic, of course. Frankly, it about sums up my own > views most of the time. However, I appreciate Bruno's efforts to put > some flesh on the bones of one particular departure from agnosticism. > And I still deprecate those of an airily reductive persuasion who > simply cannot see how they are doggedly assuming almost everything > they wish to explain. > David > ----------------- > I feel Bruno does not 'depart' from agnosticism: he remarked several time to > be 'even more' agnostic than myself (a confessed all-agnostic). He just > feels awe for his Platonistic base to adore numbers (especially the primes). > I asked him several times to define them, because I cannot find 'single > number relations" in the 'natural nature'. > Only when numbers are already introduced ( - by human logic?). > > Those whom you call 'of an airily reductive persuasion' are regular > conventional scientists (if...) who find it natural to 'explain' everything > they THINK they know (or see, postulate in the 'model' of their reductionist > world so far learned). > > IMO "who give philosophers a bad name": are the other philosophers (call > them scientists). Motto (taken from a description of lawyers): > 99% of philosophers give a bad name for the rest of them. > JM > > > > > On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 at 3:42 PM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On 25 September 2013 19:42, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> > I'd say the standard riposte is that the "first person facts" (qualia?) >> > are >> > just inherent in the 3p model. There is feeling that goes with certain >> > kinds of information processing (e.g. creating a personal narrative). >> > This >> > is really implicit in Bruno's theory - that proving certain theorems in >> > arithmetic necessarily entails qualia. >> >> Sure, but in my reply to Bruno I point out that whereas "information >> processing" is an explicit theoretical aspect of comp, it has no >> obvious role to play in reductive materialism. By the way, my critique >> of "reductive materialism" isn't mean to imply a knock-down argument >> against a future account of the first-person in terms of some final >> physical theory. Rather my intention is to stress the often-overlooked >> limitations of existing physical theory in this regard. What role is >> "information processing" supposed to play if what exists is supposed >> to be exhausted by some maximally-reduced material substrate? Is it >> meant as a proxy for some underlying physical process? But then what >> is this proxy supposed to consist of in addition to the process? >> >> As I remarked to Bruno, when one speaks of nations or sports teams (or >> indeed universities, as Ryle famously pointed out, though apparently >> without fully grasping the consequences) one has no difficulty >> realising that all one is speaking of is human beings variously >> arranged. I suppose one might call this reductive peopleism. But >> apparently when one turns to "information processing" it is somehow >> less clear that all one can be speaking of (according to reductive >> materialism) is fundamental material entities variously arranged. >> >> > "Nature" is our model of reality. We like to compute from "the bottom >> > up" >> > because it is usually easier to think of simpler things interacting to >> > make >> > more complicated things - but no always. >> >> Yes, of course. But ISTM that this is often understood as implying >> more than merely an explanatory strategy; IOW that "bottom up" - or >> really "bottom only" - is how things "really are", internal >> contradictions be damned. However, I surmise that you are not in this >> simplistic camp. But I would still be interested in an account of >> "information processing" that appeals exclusively to third-personal >> physical processes without begging the question of the distinctive >> first-personal characteristics of any higher-order relational >> phenomena thus adduced. >> >> >> If the foregoing point is fully taken on board, it should be apparent >> >> that our fundamental motivation for ascribing any truly independent >> >> "reality" to derivative or emergent phenomena is actually their >> >> appearance in some first-personal narrative. >> > >> > But that's just taking 1p narratives as fundamental. >> >> Not so fast. It's taking them to be "real", not fundamental. My point >> is that, according to reductive materialism, there is no motivation to >> accept derivative or emergent phenomena as real in any sense, because >> they are ever and always simply the underlying fundamentals tout court >> (i.e. the people not the nation). Of course, looking at things in this >> way has the effect of making such emergent phenomena disappear from >> view even more comprehensively than the Cheshire Cat, which also was >> my point. >> >> > The advantage of >> > looking at a circle of 'reductions' >> > >> > NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS. >> > >> > is that it cautions one against this kind fundamentalism. Shall we take >> > perspectives as fundamental (Nietzsche), particles (Stenger), numbers >> > (Bruno),... In my view they are all models and one 'reduces' to a level >> > you >> > can understand or manipulate, which will be different in different >> > circumstances. >> >> That's nicely agnostic, of course. Frankly, it about sums up my own >> views most of the time. However, I appreciate Bruno's efforts to put >> some flesh on the bones of one particular departure from agnosticism. >> And I still deprecate those of an airily reductive persuasion who >> simply cannot see how they are doggedly assuming almost everything >> they wish to explain. >> >> David >> >> >> >> > On 9/25/2013 4:40 AM, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> >> On 25 September 2013 05:03, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >>> We will have learned what emotions and feelings >> >>> are at the level of sensors and computation and action. And when we >> >>> have >> >>> done that 'the hard problem' will be seen to have been an idle >> >>> question - >> >>> like "What is life." proved to be in the 20th century. >> >> >> >> David Chalmers has a good riposte to this, I think. He points out >> >> that, properly framed, the question "What is Life?" was always going to >> >> be answerable in terms of lower-level elements and processes of >> >> systems we regard as alive. Consequently, once these had been fully >> >> elucidated (no matter how difficult this might turn out to be in >> >> practice) we simply would have no motivation to look for further kinds >> >> of explanation. There never really was any reason to anticipate there >> >> being some "hard problem" of Life. OTOH, he argues, even if we >> >> possessed a fully adequate account of the brain in terms of its >> >> relevant physical elements and processes, the question of why any >> >> fully adequate third-person characterisation might imply any further >> >> first-person facts would still remain. >> >> >> >> Of course the standard riposte to this riposte is indeed simply to >> >> deny that there are "really" any such further first-person facts at >> >> all (a position that Dennett has characterised as third person >> >> absolutism). >> > >> > >> > I'd say the standard riposte is that the "first person facts" (qualia?) >> > are >> > just inherent in the 3p model. There is feeling that goes with certain >> > kinds of information processing (e.g. creating a personal narrative). >> > This >> > is really implicit in Bruno's theory - that proving certain theorems in >> > arithmetic necessarily entails qualia. >> > >> > >> >> I wonder, however, whether this denial really makes any >> >> sense in its own terms. After all, if one takes the reductive >> >> enterprise as seriously as one ought, anything above the level of >> >> fundamental constituents and their relations is understood as being >> >> derivative or emergent. IOW, in a sense (and a strong sense for our >> >> present purposes) such derivative levels are not independently "real". >> >> It is easy to miss this point because of their explanatory >> >> indispensability (e.g. Deutsch's example of the alternative histories >> >> of the copper atom) but it is central to reductionism that such >> >> emergent levels play no independent role in the fundamental machinery. >> >> Nature, as we might say, seems to compute exclusively from the bottom >> >> up. >> > >> > >> > "Nature" is our model of reality. We like to compute from "the bottom >> > up" >> > because it is usually easier to think of simpler things interacting to >> > make >> > more complicated things - but no always. >> > >> > >> >> >> >> If the foregoing point is fully taken on board, it should be apparent >> >> that our fundamental motivation for ascribing any truly independent >> >> "reality" to derivative or emergent phenomena is actually their >> >> appearance in some first-personal narrative. >> > >> > >> > But that's just taking 1p narratives as fundamental. The advantage of >> > looking at a circle of 'reductions' >> > >> > NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS. >> > >> > is that it cautions one against this kind fundamentalism. Shall we take >> > perspectives as fundamental (Nietzsche), particles (Stenger), numbers >> > (Bruno),... In my view they are all models and one 'reduces' to a level >> > you >> > can understand or manipulate, which will be different in different >> > circumstances. >> > >> > Brent >> > >> > >> > >> >> IOW, it makes no >> >> difference to Nature, conceived reductively, whether we choose to >> >> explain the current location of a copper atom in terms of nations and >> >> wars, or the evolution of the wave-function of the universe, or the >> >> structure of the Programmatic Library of Babel for that matter, >> >> because the presumed-to-be-fundamental reality is understood to >> >> subsist independently whatever the case. According to standard >> >> reductionist principles, nations and wars - and indeed atoms and >> >> molecules - are simply higher-order derivatives of more fundamental >> >> entities and their relations. Indeed, more accurately, they simply >> >> *are* those entities and their relations, without addition, in exactly >> >> the sense that football teams or societies simply *are* human beings >> >> in relation, without addition. >> >> >> >> My point here is that these derivatives, in the end, are point-of-view >> >> dependent. This is not to say, of course, that they are thereby simple >> >> or arbitrary; quite the contrary. But there would be no need to appeal >> >> to them at all were it not for the putative existence of >> >> points-of-view in the first place. Nature, conceived purely as a >> >> primary reality of fundamental entities and their relations, has no >> >> truck with explaining the history of any particular copper atom in >> >> terms of nations and wars or, for that matter, with distinguishing a >> >> "copper atom" as worthy of explanation. Hence the primary >> >> "first-person fact" that demands something beyond a strictly reductive >> >> explanation is the peculiarly "non-derivative" status of a >> >> point-of-view and the "emergent" entities in which it apparently >> >> deals. That this may appear less than obvious to us is a consequence >> >> of our seeming inability even to frame the question without assuming >> >> the answer. >> >> >> >> David >> >> >> >> >> >>> On 9/24/2013 8:44 PM, LizR wrote: >> >>> >> >>> On 25 September 2013 15:41, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> On 9/24/2013 6:32 PM, LizR wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>> On 25 September 2013 13:38, Russell Standish <[email protected]> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>>>> >> >>>>> This is also true of materialism. Whether you think this is a >> >>>>> problem >> >>>>> or not depends on whether you think the "hard problem" is a problem >> >>>>> or >> >>>>> not. >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> Indeed. I was about to say something similar (to the effect that it's >> >>>> hard >> >>>> to imagine how "mere atoms" can have sights, sounds, smells etc >> >>>> either). >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> As a rule, if you want to explain X you need to start from something >> >>>> without X. >> >>>> >> >>> Absolutely. >> >>> >> >>> If you know of such an explanation, or even the outlines of one, I'd >> >>> be >> >>> interested to hear it. As Russell said, this is the so-called "hard >> >>> problem" >> >>> so any light (or sound, touch etc) on it would be welcome. >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> My 'solution' to the hard problem is to prognosticate that when we >> >>> have >> >>> built intelligent robots we will have learned the significance of >> >>> having >> >>> an >> >>> internal narrative memory. We will have learned what emotions and >> >>> feelings >> >>> are at the level of sensors and computation and action. And when we >> >>> have >> >>> done that 'the hard problem' will be seen to have been an idle >> >>> question - >> >>> like "What is life." proved to be in the 20th century. >> >>> >> >>> Brent >> >>> >> >>> -- >> >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >>> Groups >> >>> "Everything List" group. >> >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> >>> an >> >>> email to [email protected]. >> >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> > an >> > email to [email protected]. >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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