Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the 
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to 
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has 
convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness supervenes on the 
computation, not on the physical matter. But functionalism suggests that what 
counts is the output, not the manner in which it as arrived at. That is to say, 
the brain or whatever neural subunit or computer is doing the processing is a 
black box. You input something and then read the output, but the intervening 
steps don't matter. Consider what this might mean in terms of a brain. Let's 
say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks at our puny little 
brains and decides to make one to fool us. This constructed person/brain 
receives normal conversational input and outputs conversation that it knows 
will perfectly mimic a human being. But in fact the computer doing this 
processing is vastly superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC 
emulating a TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a response, 
it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and creativity and 
accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response will completely fool 
any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the cows come home. What this 
thought experiment shows is that, while half-qualia may be absurd, it most 
certainly is possible to reproduce the outputs of a brain without replicating 
its qualia. It might have completely different qualia, just as a very good 
actor's emotions can't be distinguished from the real thing, even though his or 
her internal experience is quite different. And if qualia can be quite 
different even though the functional outputs are the same, this does seem to 
leave functionalism in something of a quandary. All we can say is that there 
must be some kind of qualia occurring, rather a different result from what 
Chalmers is claiming. When we extend this type of scenario to artificial 
neurons or partial brain prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up 
against perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these 
prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct outputs, 
but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more complex system. Does 
the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis experience a kind of expanded 
consciousness because of this, without that difference being detectable? Or do 
the qualia remain somehow confined to the prosthesis (whatever that means)? 
These crazy quandaries suggest to me that basically, we don't know shit.

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