Stathis

Could you provide the proof or a link to it?
Richard


On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com>wrote:

> On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the
> > absurdity of philosophical zombies.
>
> The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least
> conceivable, it is partial zombies.
>
> > Those arguments did have an influence on
> > my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the
> > brain's outputs remains an article of faith.
>
> Although Chalmers doesn't point this out that I am aware, the argument
> for functionalism is established merely with the *concept* of a
> functionally equivalent brain component. That is, it is logically
> impossible to make such a component that replicates behaviour but does
> not replicate consciousness.
>
> >  I remember that almost the
> > first thing I read in Dennett's book was his claim that rich, detailed
> > hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of physical stimuli) are
> > impossible. Dennett is either wrong on this - or a vast body of research
> > into hallucinogens is. Not to mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right
> > and these reports may all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is
> > wrong, the his arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite
> > sense to what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of
> consciousness
> > but as something more like a receptor.  My instinct tells me we don't
> know
> > enough about the brain or consciousness to be certain of any conclusions
> > derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology
> > without the benefit of QM and relativity.
>
> Remarkably, without knowing anything about how the brain actually
> works, it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its
> observable behaviour without also replicating its consciousness. This
> is a very profound result.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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