Stathis Could you provide the proof or a link to it? Richard
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>wrote: > On 30 September 2013 22:00, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote: > > Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's the > > absurdity of philosophical zombies. > > The absurd thing is not philosophical zombies, which are at least > conceivable, it is partial zombies. > > > Those arguments did have an influence on > > my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can* replicate all the > > brain's outputs remains an article of faith. > > Although Chalmers doesn't point this out that I am aware, the argument > for functionalism is established merely with the *concept* of a > functionally equivalent brain component. That is, it is logically > impossible to make such a component that replicates behaviour but does > not replicate consciousness. > > > I remember that almost the > > first thing I read in Dennett's book was his claim that rich, detailed > > hallucinations (perceptions in the absence of physical stimuli) are > > impossible. Dennett is either wrong on this - or a vast body of research > > into hallucinogens is. Not to mention NDEs and OBEs. Dennett may be right > > and these reports may all be mistakes and lies, but I doubt it. If he is > > wrong, the his arguments become a compelling case in quite the opposite > > sense to what he intended: the brain not as a manufacturer of > consciousness > > but as something more like a receptor. My instinct tells me we don't > know > > enough about the brain or consciousness to be certain of any conclusions > > derived from logic alone. We may be like Newtonians arguing cosmology > > without the benefit of QM and relativity. > > Remarkably, without knowing anything about how the brain actually > works, it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its > observable behaviour without also replicating its consciousness. This > is a very profound result. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
