On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
> > Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
> > reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
> > say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It
> > seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that *if* comp holds,
> > then consciousness supervenes on the computation, not on the
> > physical matter. But functionalism suggests that what counts is the
> > output, not the manner in which it as arrived at. That is to say,
> > the brain or whatever neural subunit or computer is doing the
> > processing is a black box. You input something and then read the
> > output, but the intervening steps don't matter. Consider what this
> > might mean in terms of a brain.
> That's not clear to me. The question is "output of what". If it is the
> entie subject, this is more behaviorism than functionalism.
> Putnam's functionalism makes clear that we have to take the output of
> the neurons into account.
> Comp is functionalism, but with the idea that we don't know the level
> of substitution, so it might be that we have to take into account the
> oputput of the gluons in our atoms (so comp makes clear that it only
> ask for the existence of a level of substitution, and then show that
> no machine can know for sure its subst. level, making Putnam's sort of
> functionalism a bit fuzzy).
> I was going on stathis's post. He stated that reproducing the brain's
functions meant reproducing the qualia, but I refuted that (I think).
> > Let's say a vastly advanced alien species comes to earth. It looks
> > at our puny little brains and decides to make one to fool us. This
> > constructed person/brain receives normal conversational input and
> > outputs conversation that it knows will perfectly mimic a human
> > being. But in fact the computer doing this processing is vastly
> > superior to the human brain. It's like a modern PC emulating a
> > TRS-80, except much more so. When it computes/thinks up a response,
> > it draws on a vast amount of knowledge, intelligence and creativity
> > and accesses qualia undreamed of by a human. Yet its response will
> > completely fool any normal human and will pass Turing tests till the
> > cows come home. What this thought experiment shows is that, while
> > half-qualia may be absurd, it most certainly is possible to
> > reproduce the outputs of a brain without replicating its qualia. It
> > might have completely different qualia, just as a very good actor's
> > emotions can't be distinguished from the real thing, even though his
> > or her internal experience is quite different. And if qualia can be
> > quite different even though the functional outputs are the same,
> > this does seem to leave functionalism in something of a quandary.
> > All we can say is that there must be some kind of qualia occurring,
> > rather a different result from what Chalmers is claiming. When we
> > extend this type of scenario to artificial neurons or partial brain
> > prostheses as in Chamer's paper, we quickly run up against
> > perplexing problems. Imagine the advanced alien provides these
> > prostheses. It takes the same inputs and generates the same correct
> > outputs, but it processes those inputs within a much vaster, more
> > complex system. Does the brain utilizing this advanced prosthesis
> > experience a kind of expanded consciousness because of this, without
> > that difference being detectable? Or do the qualia remain somehow
> > confined to the prosthesis (whatever that means)? These crazy
> > quandaries suggest to me that basically, we don't know shit.
> Hmm, I am not convinced. "Chalmers argument" is that to get a
> philosophical zombie, the fading argument shows that you have to go
> through half-qualia, which is absurd. His goal (here) is to show that
> "no qualia" is absurd.
> That the qualia can be different is known in the qualia literature,
> and is a big open problem per se. But Chalmers argues only that "no
> qualia" is absurd, indeed because it would needs some absurd notion of
> intermediate half qualia.
> My be I miss a point. Stathis can clarify this furher.
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia
can be different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it
vary? I'm curious what the literature has to say about that. And if
functionalism means reproducing more than the mere functional output of a
system, if it potentially means replication down to the elementary
particles and possibly their quantum entanglements, then duplication
becomes impossible, not merely technically but in principle. That seems
against the whole point of functionalism - as the idea of "function" is
reduced to something almost meaningless.
> Eventually the qualia is determined by infinitely many number
> relations, and a brain filters them. It does not create them, like no
> machine can create PI, only "re-compute" it, somehow. The anlogy here
> break sown as qualia are purely first person notion, which explains
> why they are distributed on the whole universal dovetailing (sigma_1
> I agree with Brent though on this. Your UDA proceeds on the basis that a
computer in a single reality (not an infinite sum of calculations - that
comes later) can have a 1p. Otherwise the steps of your argument can't
proceed. And 1p entails qualia. Your argument becomes circular.
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