On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote:

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno MarchalSent: Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.comSubject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classicalliquids...On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote:I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is thatdefinitive -granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive? It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside "fundamental" particles! On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote:The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space isbettercompared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35.So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent withFermigamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different inenergyarrived from across the universe at the same time whereasgranularity woulddelay one measurably. Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS. However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is most likely a model construct, rather than actually being somethingphysical "out there". It is something Allen Francom bangs on abouttoo,which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with his Brownian Quantum Universe models.>>Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, butquantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described bysome continuum aI0> + bI1> (a and b complex).The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classicgranularity of space time with the scale this granularity would needto be under being pushed far below the Planck scale.>>The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but thephysical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuousobservable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that*only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to saythose are open problems).>>I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule outgranularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems toplay a role in physics (which should be a first person pluraluniversal machines view).BrunoIf reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is noneed for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressablechunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected asit were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed

`... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so`

`that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some`

`inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but evidences exists,`

`and it might be that physical reality is ever growing.`

`have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine,`

`the physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations`

`(which exist in arithmetic)?`

so that if it were possible to scale infinitely down it would emergeand continue to emerge at whatever minimum scale could be achieved.If reality is information and information can be described withequations that are scale invariant (such as for example vectorgraphics versus pixel based graphics, or fractal geometry) then acomputational model can still describe the entire universalrelationship and identity sets even when there is seemingly no end(that we have found) to how small a point of spacetime can be.

`OK. But computationalism ("I am a machine) entails the existence of`

`at least one observable which relies on real numbers" and is not`

`completely turing emulable. It might be the quantum frequency operator`

`(describe well by Graham and Preskill's course).`

So long as this does not much matter to the computational theoryitself then it is unaffected by this very fine grained measurementof the lack of any fine structure in spacetime.

`Keep in mind the difference between 1) the computationalist hypothesis`

`in "philosophy of mind", and 2) the hypothesis that the universe is`

`the product of some program.`

2) implies 1) but

`1) implies the negation of 2) (this can be explained with the`

`thought experiment like in the UDA).`

`In particular 2) implies the negation of 2), and so is self-`

`contradictory.`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.