On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote:
From: firstname.lastname@example.org [mailto:email@example.com
] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM
Subject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classical
On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote:
I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that
granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive?
It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside
On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote:
The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is
compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35.
So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with
gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in
arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas
delay one measurably.
Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain
classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS.
However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability
of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is
most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something
physical "out there". It is something Allen Francom bangs on about
which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with
his Brownian Quantum Universe models.
>>Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but
quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by
some continuum aI0> + bI1> (a and b complex).
The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic
granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need
to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale.
>>The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the
physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous
observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that
*only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say
those are open problems).
>>I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out
granularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to
play a role in physics (which should be a first person plural
universal machines view).
If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no
need for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable
chunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as
it were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed
... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so
that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some
inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but evidences exists,
and it might be that physical reality is ever growing.
have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine,
the physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations
(which exist in arithmetic)?
so that if it were possible to scale infinitely down it would emerge
and continue to emerge at whatever minimum scale could be achieved.
If reality is information and information can be described with
equations that are scale invariant (such as for example vector
graphics versus pixel based graphics, or fractal geometry) then a
computational model can still describe the entire universal
relationship and identity sets even when there is seemingly no end
(that we have found) to how small a point of spacetime can be.
OK. But computationalism ("I am a machine) entails the existence of
at least one observable which relies on real numbers" and is not
completely turing emulable. It might be the quantum frequency operator
(describe well by Graham and Preskill's course).
So long as this does not much matter to the computational theory
itself then it is unaffected by this very fine grained measurement
of the lack of any fine structure in spacetime.
Keep in mind the difference between 1) the computationalist hypothesis
in "philosophy of mind", and 2) the hypothesis that the universe is
the product of some program.
2) implies 1)
1) implies the negation of 2) (this can be explained with the
thought experiment like in the UDA).
In particular 2) implies the negation of 2), and so is self-
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