On 23 Oct 2013, at 02:15, Chris de Morsella wrote:

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, October 22, 2013 9:50 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: String theory and superconductors and classical liquids...

On 22 Oct 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 02:49:40PM +1300, LizR wrote:

I missed that 10^-48 is rather an impressive result. Is that definitive -
granularity has to be that small - or merely suggestive?

It does suggest the possibility of a lot of internal structure inside
"fundamental" particles!

On 22 October 2013 14:43, Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com> wrote:

The 10^-48 meters for the upper limit on grannular size of space is better
compared to the Planck Scale at 10^-35.
So space is smooth at least to 10^-13 Planck scales consistent with Fermi gamma ray arrival results. Gamma rays a factor of ten different in energy arrived from across the universe at the same time whereas granularity would
delay one measurably.

Indeed this seems an important empiricial result, ruling out certain
classes of models, including, dare I say, Wolfram's NKS.

However, it does not rule out computationalism, nor the countability
of observer moments, as I've point out many time, as space-time is
most likely a model construct, rather than actually being something
physical "out there". It is something Allen Francom bangs on about too,
which I tend to agree with, although admittedly I've gotten lost with
his Brownian Quantum Universe models.

>>Computationalism implies non classical granularity possible, but quantum granularity is not excluded, with a qubit being described by some continuum aI0> + bI1> (a and b complex).

The results seem to exclude any theories that rely on a classic granularity of space time with the scale this granularity would need to be under being pushed far below the Planck scale.

>>The basic ontology can be discrete (indeed arithmetical), but the physical (and the theological) should reasonably have continuous observable (even if those are only the frequency operators, and that *only* the probabilities reflect the continuum. Needless to say those are open problems).

>>I was thinking some recent observations tended to rule out granularity. Hard questions, but with comp, some continuum seems to play a role in physics (which should be a first person plural universal machines view).


If reality arises from scale invariant equations perhaps there is no need for a pixelated foundation to act as the smallest addressable chunks and as the canvas upon which reality is drawn or projected as it were. Perhaps reality really arises at it is observed

... from our points of view. That might even include backtracking, so that the physical reality develops and bactrack when some inconsistency is met. Open problem with comp, but evidences exists, and it might be that physical reality is ever growing. have you understand that if the brain works like a digital machine, the physical realitu emerges from some statistics on all computations (which exist in arithmetic)?

so that if it were possible to scale infinitely down it would emerge and continue to emerge at whatever minimum scale could be achieved. If reality is information and information can be described with equations that are scale invariant (such as for example vector graphics versus pixel based graphics, or fractal geometry) then a computational model can still describe the entire universal relationship and identity sets even when there is seemingly no end (that we have found) to how small a point of spacetime can be.

OK. But computationalism ("I am a machine) entails the existence of at least one observable which relies on real numbers" and is not completely turing emulable. It might be the quantum frequency operator (describe well by Graham and Preskill's course).

So long as this does not much matter to the computational theory itself then it is unaffected by this very fine grained measurement of the lack of any fine structure in spacetime.

Keep in mind the difference between 1) the computationalist hypothesis in "philosophy of mind", and 2) the hypothesis that the universe is the product of some program.

2) implies 1)


1) implies the negation of 2) (this can be explained with the thought experiment like in the UDA).

In particular 2) implies the negation of 2), and so is self- contradictory.



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