So, has step 3 gone from "that's absurd" to "everyone knows that" ?!
On 1 November 2013 17:31, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 7:51 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]>wrote: >> >> > A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and >>> 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball >>> changing color >>> >> >> Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until >> there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a >> red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they >> fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the >> simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls >> that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision >> made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, >> that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure >> out what that decision would be. >> >> > B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number >>> generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether >>> the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times* Then *the >>> AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred >>> first. >>> >>> Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it >> is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are >> not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that >> in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but >> as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of >> itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original >> or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true. >> >> So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A >> was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no >> difference. >> > > Thank you for answering. I think we are in agreement. > > >> >> > I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, >>> and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from >>> all the views, the conclusion is the same. >>> >> >> Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound >> conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's >> grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as >> dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big >> buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually. >> > > Well there is one difference: the entire protocol is explained to the AI, > it knows exactly what will happen in each of the 256 possibilities, but > from inside the simulation, it is no different than had the sequence of > colors been chosen completely randomly. > > Also, you are mistaken if you think this is the grand conclusion of the > UDA, it is only one small (but necessary) step in the reasoning. If you > want to get to the grand conclusion you need only continue on to the next > steps. It seems you have grasped the point of step 3 and are in agreement > that subjective indeterminacy can arise in a fully understood and > deterministic process. > > I'll re-post the link for your convenience. You are less than 2-3 pages > away from finishing reading the UDA: > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm > > Jason > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
