# Re: For John Clark

`On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:`
```
>> I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate
>> the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be
>> given:
>>
>
>>
>   "Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are made,
>> one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body instantly
>> destroyed?"
>>
>
> > This is not what is asked
>

It's the question I asked!  I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or
Washington, I care if I live or die and I suspect you are more interested
in that question too. And if you could reformulate that question (never
mind the answer) so that it was clear to you i might understand what you're
talking about.

> what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you measure
> the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you measure spin
> up
>

As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After
Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third
party so it's easy to determine who "you" is and easy to determine if
predictions about what "you" will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's
thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right
to the title "you" which means that the predictions about what "you" will
see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about
prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or
a sense of self.

> both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5.
>

No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who "you" is,
it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people
clear as a bell and both are called "you" and both saw different things,
and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday "what is the
probability "you" will see X?".

Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a
sense of self.

>> Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact copies
>> of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in Washington,
>> and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed?
>> I would answer the question with a simple "no" without the need for
>> further explanations or caveats,
>>
>
> > That is still not the question asked. The question is about probability.
> The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...]
>

Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually
rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is
clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe
what you're talking about will be clear to me.

> simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and
> looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and
> the correct probability.
>

A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was
written by "you" yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a
equal right to be called "you" because they both remember being the
Helsinki Man yesterday.

John K Clark

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