John, I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from all the views, the conclusion is the same. Perhaps you wouldn't mind commenting on whether or not you agree with my conclusion. I will re-post it here in a single post for your convenience:
*First, consider this experiment:* Imagine there is a conscious AI (or uploaded mind) inside a virtual environment (an open field) Inside that virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the ball is a note which reads: "At noon (when the virtual sun is directly overhead) the protocol will begin. In the protocol, the process containing this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen. This will happen 8 times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end." * * *Now, with the understanding of that experiment, consider the following:* *If* the AI (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball changing color B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times *Then *the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred first. Do you agree that it is impossible *for any entity within the simulation*to determine whether test A was executed first, or whether test B was executed first, with higher than a 50% probability? (Assuming the order in which the tests are administered is determined completely randomly from outside of the simulation)? No where above did I use "you", "personal identity", "predicting who you will be", etc. All I ask is whether or not any entity at any time has access to information that can distinguish between iterated forking or randomized switching. Therefore, there should be no language barriers in this reasoning and you should be able to provide an answer. Thanks, Jason On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 11:18 AM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>wrote: > > >> I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate >>> the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be >>> given: >>> >> >>> >> "Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are >>> made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body >>> instantly destroyed?" >>> >> >> > This is not what is asked >> > > It's the question I asked! I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or > Washington, I care if I live or die and I suspect you are more interested > in that question too. And if you could reformulate that question (never > mind the answer) so that it was clear to you i might understand what you're > talking about. > > > what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you >> measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you >> measure spin up >> > > As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After > Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person is seen by a third > party so it's easy to determine who "you" is and easy to determine if > predictions about what "you" will see were right or wrong, but with Bruno's > thought experiment TWO people can be clearly seen that have a equal right > to the title "you" which means that the predictions about what "you" will > see are useless. And another difference is that Everett was talking about > prediction and probability, and neither has anything to do with identity or > a sense of self. > > > both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. >> > > No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who "you" is, > it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people > clear as a bell and both are called "you" and both saw different things, > and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday "what is the > probability "you" will see X?". > > Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a > sense of self. > > >> Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact >>> copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in >>> Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? >>> I would answer the question with a simple "no" without the need for >>> further explanations or caveats, >>> >> >> > That is still not the question asked. The question is about >> probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...] >> > > Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually > rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is > clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe > what you're talking about will be clear to me. > > > simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and >> looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and >> the correct probability. >> > > A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was > written by "you" yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a > equal right to be called "you" because they both remember being the > Helsinki Man yesterday. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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