2013/10/31 John Clark <[email protected]> > On Wed, Oct 30, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>wrote: > > >> I think this entire matter could be clarified if you could reformulate >>> the following question in such a way that a simple yes or no answer can be >>> given: >>> >> >>> >> "Do you die if two exact copies of Quentin Anciaux in Helsinki are >>> made, one in Moscow and one in Washington and then the Helsinki body >>> instantly destroyed?" >>> >> >> > This is not what is asked >> > > It's the question I asked! >
You do not have to choose the question to attack bruno's one... you either answer his and proceed, or you do not and abandon MWI for the same reason. > I don't give a damn if I see Moscow or Washington, I care if I live or > die > The point is about step 3 and for you to proceed to step 4 or not... I don't give a damn about what you give a damn. > and I suspect you are more interested in that question too. And if you > could reformulate that question (never mind the answer) so that it was > clear to you i might understand what you're talking about. > > > what is asked is the probability to see moscow, likewise when you >> measure the spin of the electron, the question is the probability you >> measure spin up >> > > As I said before there is a profound difference between the two. After > Everett's thought experiment is over only ONE person > No, in everett experiment like in the duplication experiment after the experiment there are two you, if you deny this, you deny *MW*I (as in *multiple world*) > is seen by a third party so it's easy to determine who "you" > The experience as nothing to do about who is you *simply look at the goddamn diary*!!!! > is and easy to determine if predictions about what "you" will see were > right or wrong, but with Bruno's thought experiment TWO people can be > clearly seen that have a equal right to the title "you" which means that > the predictions about what "you" will see are useless. And another > difference is that Everett was talking about prediction and probability, > and neither has anything to do with identity or a sense of self. > > > both question are *valid* and have simple answer which is 0.5. >> > > No, only one question is valid. In Everett's case we know who "you" is, > it's the only fellow we see. In Bruno's case right now we see 2 people > clear as a bell and both are called "you" and both saw different things, > and that makes meaningless the question asked yesterday "what is the > probability "you" will see X?". > > Not that predictions, good bad or meaningless, have anything to do with a > sense of self. > > >> Does the fellow who remembers being in Helsinki die if two exact >>> copies of the fellow in Helsinki are made, one in Moscow and one in >>> Washington, and then the Helsinki body instantly destroyed? >>> I would answer the question with a simple "no" without the need for >>> further explanations or caveats, >>> >> >> > That is still not the question asked. The question is about >> probability. The easiest way to rephrase it, is [...] >> > > Stop telling me how simple it is to rephrase the question and actually > rephrase it. Rephrase that question into a sentence so that the question is > clear to you (we'll worry about the answer another time) and then maybe > what you're talking about will be clear to me. > > > simply to look at the diary, and simply by repeating the experience and >> looking at the result of the diary you can infer the frequency of 0.5 and >> the correct probability. >> > > A diary is of absolutely no value in this matter because the diary was > written by "you" yesterday and today I'm looking at 2 people who have a > equal right to be called "you" because they both remember being the > Helsinki Man yesterday. > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
