On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal
<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:
Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you
have.
Are you referring to "Quantum Mechanics and Experience" (1992)?
I do not have this book but will add it to my list (if it is the
same).
It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite unconvincing
in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.
Bruno,
I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for
recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the math
and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite
infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of
observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the
idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.
Without any argument, I agree.
It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed
make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following a
handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until page
130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely, he
claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the theory,
with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.
While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers
locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or
different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he
considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm
requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum
postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with
special relativity.
It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is
still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-
body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense
of Bohm.
I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh
mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is
correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If
you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ...
I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:
On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory", 1970,
Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76
In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and
macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png
but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me
if he is introducing anything new.
From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to
Everett than to the Albert-Loewer "many mind" theory. Note that the
"many-mind" theory is very specific, and assumes a unique universe.
But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the
superposition is real how can their only be one unique "universe"?
They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it
applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything
physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not
make much sense to me.
Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be
postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for
Everett. It transform "other people" into zombies, also.
Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert and
Loewer's formulation of it?
"may-mind" always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know any
other "many-mind" QM theory. It has nothing to do with the
arithmetical "many-dreams", where the computations are relatively
entirely duplicated "in extenso".
Bruno
Jason
Albert-Loewer "many-minds" theory seems to me less sensical than
Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM-
interpretations in one theory, imo, and this without mentioning
that it needs non-comp.
Bruno
Jason
They all miss, of course, the many "dreams" internal interpretation
of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time before people
awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most scientists are not
even aware of its conjectural status.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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