On 04 Nov 2013, at 18:53, Jason Resch wrote:

It looks like Zeh had more to say in 1999, this theory seems much closer to many dreams: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation #Continuous_infinity_of_minds and http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9908084

Continuous infinity of minds
In Everett's conception the mind of an observer is split by the measuring process as a consequence of the decoherence induced by measurement. In many-minds each physical observer has a postulated associated continuous infinity of minds. The decoherence of the measuring event (observation) causes the infinity of minds associated with each observer to become categorized into distinct yet infinite subsets, each subset associated with each distinct outcome of the observation. No minds are split, in the many-minds view, because it is assumed that they are all already always distinct.

The choice between multiplication and differentiation remains free in the many-worlds too.

The idea of many-minds was suggested early on by Zeh in 1995. He argues that in a decohering no-collapse universe one can avoid the necessity of distinct macrorealms ("parallel worlds" in MWIterminology) by introducing a new psycho-physical parallelism, in which individual minds supervene on each non-interfering component in the physical state. Zeh indeed suggests that, given decoherence, this is the most natural interpretation of quantum mechanics.

I agree with Zeh. I have interpreted the Everett relative states in that way. The problem is that the notion of "world" is very fuzzy in the physical literature (and *very large* in the analytical philosophy).

The main difference between the many-minds and many-worlds interpretations then lies in the definition of the preferred quantity. The many-minds interpretation suggests that to solve the measurement problem, there is no need to secure a definite macrorealm: the only thing that's required is appearance of such.

OK. With comp, we don't have much choice in that matter.

A bit more precisely: the idea is that the preferred quantity is whatever physical quantity, defined on brains (or brains and parts of their environments), has definite-valued states (eigenstates) that underpin such appearances, i.e. underpin the states of belief in, or sensory experience of, the familiar macroscopic realm.

It sounds like under Zeh's many-minds, the difference between it and Everett is a world would be any/all the systems that are psychologically indistinguishable from each other, from the view of some mind.

For some first person plural, which is assured in Everett+Gleason (but ad hoc in Albert-Loewer), and I can't say for Zeh, except that it looks like Everett, but without taking he idea of definite physical world too much seriously. Zeh has an interesting indexical view of time, and his many-minds seems close to the "indexical" view of physicalness we have with computationalism. So Zeh many minds, like Everett many-worlds, and unlike Bohm or Albert-Loewer, might be the measure one part of the arithmetical many dream matrix or UD*. That makes sense. OK.



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