On 04 Nov 2013, at 15:57, Jason Resch wrote:
On Nov 4, 2013, at 2:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 03 Nov 2013, at 18:51, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 2:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 03 Nov 2013, at 09:17, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Nov 3, 2013 at 1:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
On 02 Nov 2013, at 20:11, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2013 at 12:09 AM, Bruno Marchal
<marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 19 Oct 2013, at 19:30, Jason Resch wrote:
Normally this is explained in Albert's book, which I think you
have.
Are you referring to "Quantum Mechanics and
Experience" (1992)? I do not have this book but will add it
to my list (if it is the same).
It is that book indeed. very good, imo, even if quite
unconvincing in his defense of Böhm, and his critics of Everett.
Bruno,
I have just finished reading this book. I thank you for
recommending it as it helped me get some familiarity with the
math and the notation. I found the first 120 or so pages quite
infuriating, for he would seeming get so close to the idea of
observers being in superpositions, (teasing and dangling the
idea), while all the time dismissing it as nonsensical.
Without any argument, I agree.
It was not until page 123 he finally admits that it can indeed
make sense, but almost immediately after page 123, and following
a handwavy dismissal of Everett returns to irrationality, until
page 130 when he introduces the many-minds theory. Strangely,
he claims that he (Albert) and Barry Loewer introduced the
theory, with no mention of Heinz-Dieter Zeh.
While he defends many-minds well, and says how it recovers
locality, he never explains how many-minds is any better (or
different than) many-worlds. Also, I found it strange that he
considered many-minds and Bohm on equal footing, where Bohm
requires additional assumptions beyond the four quantum
postulates, and also Bohm (lacing locality) is incompatible with
special relativity.
It introduces very well QM and the measurement problem, but he is
still, like everybody, believing implicitly in some strong mind-
body thesis, and get irrational, somehow, I agree, in his defense
of Bohm.
I would have also attributed the many-minds to Loewer. I know Zeh
mainly for his indexical analysis of time, which I think is
correct, and certainly close to both Many World and Many Mind. If
you have some references on Zeh and Many Mind ...
I found this paper by Zeh from 1970:
On the interpretation of measurement in quantum theory", 1970,
Foundations of Physics, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 69–76
In particular, he describes the essential idea of many minds and
macroscopic superposition on page 74: http://link.springer.com/static-content/lookinside/406/art%253A10.1007%252FBF00708656/005.png
but he also references Everett, so it isn't entirely clear to me
if he is introducing anything new.
From what I remember, Zeh is, in that paper, much closer to
Everett than to the Albert-Loewer "many mind" theory. Note that
the "many-mind" theory is very specific, and assumes a unique
universe.
But didn't they assume reality of the superposition? If the
superposition is real how can their only be one unique "universe"?
They assume the reality of the superposition, but consider that it
applies only to the subjectivity of the person, not to anything
physical. Yes, it is a dualism, and a very bizarre one. t does not
make much sense to me.
I see. That makes very little sense. What do they suppose happens
when an observer acts on their measurement in one of two ways?
The observer will live an experience among many, with a probability
given by QM.
The other minds still exist, and with comp, should be conscious, but
seem to lost any body to act on. Also, if you and someone else measure
independent spin repetitively, your fellow becomes a zombie, his
bodies still "give" a part of the universal wave needed for the
interference terms, but the probability rule, as used here, guaranties
that minds of the others are no more correlated with your mind. So,
with comp, the QM Many Minds of Albert and Loewer entails both the
seemingly existence of souls lacking bodies and of bodies lacking soul
(zombie).
I remember vaguely that they are more or less aware of the difficulties.
Observers' mind get mutiplied with probabilities which have to be
postulated again, so it lost completely the appeal we can have for
Everett. It transform "other people" into zombies, also.
Is this a necessary consequence of many-minds or only inAlbert
and Loewer's formulation of it?
"may-mind" always refers to Albert Loewer's theory. I don't know
any other "many-mind" QM theory. It has nothing to do with the
arithmetical "many-dreams", where the computations are relatively
entirely duplicated "in extenso".
Oh. I had always thought of many minds as like a many worlds where
instead of splits there are supposed to be infinite minds which
differentiate upon measurement;
That is the natural many dream interpretation of QM which would follow
in case Comp derives QM, with our substitution level defined by the
Heisenberg Uncertainty.
this is how other sites seen to describe it. I see from your
description it is quite unlike the many dreams imof arithmetic.
You mean the Albert Loewer theory? Yes, it is very different.
Albert-Loewer still illustrates well the hardness of the 1p/3p
relation in QM, when wanting to keep some physical reality unique. It
looks to me like getting a Bohmian version of QM, with "one world",
but without using a guiding potential (but using ad hoc probability
rules and strange 1p/3p relations, definitely not mechanical).
Bruno
Jason
Bruno
Jason
Albert-Loewer "many-minds" theory seems to me less sensical than
Bohm or even Copenhagen. It unites all the defects of all QM-
interpretations in one theory, imo, and this without mentioning
that it needs non-comp.
Bruno
Jason
They all miss, of course, the many "dreams" internal
interpretation of ... elementary arithmetic. It will take time
before people awaken from the Aristotelian naturalism. Most
scientists are not even aware of its conjectural status.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-
l...@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
