Thanks for the clarification. But for what refer to the questions i asked, I find that my initial assumptions are broadly correct. I find the platonism of the UDA very different from the Platonism of Plato. despite the merits that the hypothesis of mechanism may have to clarify other questions.
2013/12/10, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>: > > On 10 Dec 2013, at 12:15, Alberto G. Corona wrote: > >> >> >> >> 2013/12/10 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >> >> On 10 Dec 2013, at 10:40, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >> It seems to me that your invocation of platonism is wrong. For Plato >> the reality is a shadow of the perfect world of ideas, universals >> that we can "remember" by anamnesis. >> >> OK. >> >> >> >> >> But for you reality is a partial dream, >> >> Not at all. >> Only physical reality. And it is not "one" dream, it is what result >> from an infinity of dreams, by the FPI on arithmetic. >> (FPI = first person indeterminacy, *on* the complete UD emulation in >> arithmetic). >> >> >> >> >> but coherent or "robust" product of the aleatory Dovetailer Machine, >> >> + The FPI. >> >> >> >> >> and sometimes we have access to that nonsense by our dreams and >> hallucinations. >> >> By comp, and the FPI on all computations going through our comp >> state (which exists theoretically, as we work in the comp theory). >> >> >> >> >> So in fact the reality, as the the platonic realm is just the >> opposite of the one of the UDA: it is full of structure and perfect, >> while the UDA produces every kind of thing possible. >> >> Only computations. Computer science shows this to be a complex >> mathematical structure, structured differently from the different >> points of view of a machines, which themselves obeys the non trivial >> laws of self-reference. It is full of structure. >> >> Where that structure come from? > > They follow from the laws of addition and multiplication and logic, > basically from: > > 0 ≠ s(x) > s(x) = s(y) -> x = y > x+0 = x > x+s(y) = s(x+y) > x*0=0 > x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > The TOE has no other axioms. (Only definitions). > Note that most scientific theories admit those axioms. > > > > > >> I see all computatons possible coming from the UDA, > > You mean the UD (the universal dovetailer). UDA is for the "UD > Argument" (UDA is only the name of a deductive argument based on the > notion of Universal Dovetailing). > > > >> some of them with structure, some of them do not. > > That is ambiguous. They all have some structure. But I am OK, as some > have internal and external (to them, relatively) random data, also. > > > >> It is isomorphic to some subset of the mathematical multiverse > > Too much fuzzy. It depends of your starting assumption. "multiverse" > is usually used in the context of QM. But neither QM, nor "~QM" is > assumed in the UD Argument. > The UD argument is deductive (not entirely in step 8 as it is intended > to apply on 'reality' and use Occam razor). It shows that if you > survive with a digital brain, then you survive in the infinitely many > arithmetical brain, and physics, to remain a stable appearance has no > choice to "exploit" an infinite self-multiplication. > > UDA reduces partially the mind-body problem (my job) to a body problem > in arithmetic. > > It is a problem. Not a solution of a problem (except that in the > arithmetical translation of the UDA (AUDA), we can already interview > the universal machine (Löbian one) on that problem, and they tell us > that Plato seems less foolish than Aristotle. > > > > >> or the boltzmann aleatory structures. > > Same remark. Keep in mind that if we accept the existence of a > physical reality, we "meta-reason" to find the deepest laws of > reality, and be open that physics might not be the fundamental theory. > > > > >> Or can be emulated by UDA. > > Yes. Note that the UD emulation is entirely deterministic (in the 3p), > and hopefully partially deterministic in the 1p (plural) view. > > >> The only additional merit is the use of few initial assumptions. > > I think you miss the point. I am just saying that if comp is correct, > then adding anything to those initial assumption is a redundant form > of conceptual treachery. > > > >> But to emulate everithing possible with few assumptions is not a >> merit IMHO. > > > You do miss the point. With all my respect. > The emulation is only a manner of formulating the problem precisely, > that is, mathematically. > > > > > > >> I´m not trying to be harsh. > > No problem. I could look like a philosopher, defending some theory. > But that's not what I do, and did. > > I am a logician, and computer scientist, explaining that if you say > "yes" to the comp doctor, then (assuming you have enough logical > cognitive ability) to reduce the comp mind body problem into body > problem in arithmetic. > Then I show that we can interview universal machine having such > cognitive ability, translating indeed the problem into a sequence of > problems in arithmetic. > At first sight Plotinus and the mystics are closer to the Löbian > numbers than Aristotle. I mean in term of coherent whole. > > > >> I just want to put my impressions in words. The platoninc world of >> ideas is then ONE of the many possible infinite whoknows that the >> UDA can produce. > > Well, it is just the sigma_1 complete part of a vastly bigger > arithmetical reality (pi_1, sigma_24, pi_1000, etc.)) > > It is important to keep in mind the difference between the computable > part of the arithmetical reality, with the non computable part, and > the non provable part, by any machines, even ZF+kappa, etc. > > > > > >> The self reference, the diofantic equations etc are tentative ways >> to stablish a limit to that exuberance, but either you postulate UDA >> in its completeness and everithing produced from UDA exist and >> therefore I´m right and the order is only apparent and local, like >> in the multiverse hypothesis(that i find equaly unsatisfactory) or >> you add additional axioms. > > Comp makes it possible to work entirely in arithmetic. This is a > theorem in computer science. Even without Church thesis. > > You must understand that I am not trying to sell you a new theory. I > just show that in an older "banal", seemingly innocent, but commonly > believed or intuited theory, Milinda-Descartes "Mechanism", Church > thesis makes it possible, and necessary (that's the point), to reduce > the mind-body problem into a purely arithmetical universal self- > justification problem, which includes way to distinguishing the many > points of view, including the physical. > > You can understand the conclusion, before understanding that comp > leads to that conclusion. For this, you have to be open minded for non > materialist, or non physicalist fundamental reality, like the > arithmetical reality, which contains the many meta-arithmetical > realities. > > I transform a problem into another, mathematical problem. Then I solve > the propositional part of the many points of view, including the > physical, so we can compare with 'nature'. The presence of three > arithmetical quantizations give hope to show that the arithmetical > winner is a quantum computer, but that's remain an open problem. > > The subject is difficult, and I might have been mistaken, but in > principle, it concerns something which you should understand, not > taken as a new theory. > > It is a big problem for the computationalist, but then you ask the > machines, and they expected that! > > UD is a not a solution. It is a precise problem, which confronts all > universal numbers, and many "inside" things in arithmetic. > > Have you read the sane04 paper, or the new one? > > UDA can be understood by any good willing human reasoner. I think. > AUDA necessitates familiarity with mathematical logic and computer > science. > > AUDA shows that UDA can be understood by any good willing universal > number. > > But it is a problem, not a solution, although AUDA provides the > solutions at the propositional level, in the ideal case of sound > arithmetical machines, admitting (us) the standard theory of knowledge > (S4). > > With comp we have to extend the embedding of the physicist in the > physical reality by an embedding of the mathematician in the > mathematical reality. But that was what Gödel made, by showing how to > arithmetized meta-arithmetic. With comp, that embedding of the > machines in the arithmetical reality is enough to formulate the > problem precisely. > > The hard work has been done by Gödel, Löb, Grzegorczyk, Solovay, and > Visser (and many others). > > Bruno > > > >> >> >> >> So at the end while Plato pressuposes order the UDA pressuposes that >> there are tree elements that produce everithing that exist, and >> those that does not exist. >> >> I assume comp, and then reason. Like Plato we presuppose order >> (indeed, brought by arithmetic: we know that the order in arithmetic >> is *very* rich, and not completely accessible by *any* effective >> theory). >> Comp let us just assume no more order than there is in arithmetic, >> at he basic ontological (assumed) level.. >> >> >> >> >> >> Al the end there are two theories of everithing: In the beginning >> there was order and mind >> >> That is exactly what you get by assuming comp. In the 'beginning' >> you have order (the additive/multiplicative structure of the >> numbers) and the emerging mind from it (the universal consciousness >> that you associate to all universal numbers in arithmetic, by comp, >> and which is differentiating through the indexical (self- >> referential) FPI). >> >> >> >> >> >> or at the beginning there was some kind of primitive matter and >> chaos. Plato theory is in the first case. >> >> Yes. No primitive matter, and the full rich order of the numbers (or >> of any Turing universal system). >> >> >> >> Yours appears to be in the second. >> >> Not at all. There is no assumed matter, and we assume the order >> needed to make sense of computations and Church thesis. You are >> right that there is some chaos, but that is part of the (new) world >> of ideas. >> >> >> >> >> >> What is your route from chaos to Plato? >> >> The One of the Parmenides (used by Plotinus) = arithmetical truth >> (that is full order far beyond what any machine can grasped). Chaos >> can be there, like in the prime numbers, but there is also a lot of >> music. That chaos is there is what is new in Platonia, but Plato >> could not be aware of Gödel. >> The Noùs (Plato's universe of ideas) is given by the arithmetical >> truth, made partially intelligible by the universal numbers. >> The Soul (Plato's soul, Plotinus' universal soul) is given by the >> conjunction/intersection of the One, and the Noùs. >> Intelligible Matter is given by the conjunction of the Noùs and the >> existence of a reality (self-consistency, Dt). >> Sensible Matter is given by the conjunction of intelligible matter >> and the One. >> >> More on this in the Plotinus' paper. Comp rehabilitates not just >> Plato, but Pythagorus (thanks to Church thesis). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> -- >> Alberto. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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