http://nocorrecto.blogspot.com.es/2011/11/why-women-like-bags-and-shoes-but-only.html
2013/12/11, Alberto G. Corona <[email protected]>: > Not a bad achievement. > > Instead, the hypothesis that the living beings compute in order to > solve evolutionary pressures is closer to the Plato world of ideas, Or > specifically, the Plato-Aristotle syntesis of Thomas Aquinas. and also > closer to dig knowledge for living, that it , at last, the purpose of > the philosophers of the antiquity. > > It can explain how the world of ideas is the result of the > hardcoding, by natural selection. of key concepts and their relations > in order to survive in society and nature. That go as deep as to > define reality, the perception of space and time, that is, the entire > soul, psyche or mind whatever you may call it. > > Lorentz explained how the Kantian a prioris, that embrace the platonic > ideas or Aristotle categories, but also the mechanisms of the > perceptions are shaped by natural selection. So matter becomes a > phenomenon in the mind. and the kantian thing-in-itself becomes > something whose only attribute is that produces coherent perceptions > among many observers. It can be purely mathematical and nothing more, > then. > > The cause-effect may be reversed, to say that the mind determines the > coherence (That is, the mathematicity) of the external reality and > also its evolutionary history in order to be coherent with its own > coherence in time, since what is observed is correlation, not > causality in one or other direction. > > It explains also how the aestetic appreciation of flowers and patterns > of colors, and the horror to the serpents, the need to carry empty > bags and boots (even in summertime) in women is linked to the > ancestral need to locate patterns of edible vegetables in the wild, > avoid serpents and carry the gathered vegetables home. > > 2013/12/11, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >> >> On 10 Dec 2013, at 23:38, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >>> Thanks for the clarification. >> >> You are welcome. >> >> >> >>> But for what refer to the questions i >>> asked, I find that my initial assumptions are broadly correct. I find >>> the platonism of the UDA very different from the Platonism of Plato. >> >> It is more pythagorean, and it contains Plotinus correction of >> Aristotle theory of matter (as mainly an indeterminate). >> >> Yes, Platonism evolved a lot from Plato to Damascius, and made a big >> jump, through Church-Turing and Gödel. >> >> >> >> >>> despite the merits that the hypothesis of mechanism may have to >>> clarify other questions. >> >> The goal is to show that with computationalism, the mind-body problem >> is a problem in mathematical logic. Then we can see that the solution >> will satisfy more Plato than Naturalism. Physics become a branch of >> machine's theology or psychology ... >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> 2013/12/10, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >>>> >>>> On 10 Dec 2013, at 12:15, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2013/12/10 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>> >>>>> On 10 Dec 2013, at 10:40, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >>>>> >>>>> It seems to me that your invocation of platonism is wrong. For Plato >>>>> the reality is a shadow of the perfect world of ideas, universals >>>>> that we can "remember" by anamnesis. >>>>> >>>>> OK. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> But for you reality is a partial dream, >>>>> >>>>> Not at all. >>>>> Only physical reality. And it is not "one" dream, it is what result >>>>> from an infinity of dreams, by the FPI on arithmetic. >>>>> (FPI = first person indeterminacy, *on* the complete UD emulation in >>>>> arithmetic). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> but coherent or "robust" product of the aleatory Dovetailer >>>>> Machine, >>>>> >>>>> + The FPI. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> and sometimes we have access to that nonsense by our dreams and >>>>> hallucinations. >>>>> >>>>> By comp, and the FPI on all computations going through our comp >>>>> state (which exists theoretically, as we work in the comp theory). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So in fact the reality, as the the platonic realm is just the >>>>> opposite of the one of the UDA: it is full of structure and perfect, >>>>> while the UDA produces every kind of thing possible. >>>>> >>>>> Only computations. Computer science shows this to be a complex >>>>> mathematical structure, structured differently from the different >>>>> points of view of a machines, which themselves obeys the non trivial >>>>> laws of self-reference. It is full of structure. >>>>> >>>>> Where that structure come from? >>>> >>>> They follow from the laws of addition and multiplication and logic, >>>> basically from: >>>> >>>> 0 ≠ s(x) >>>> s(x) = s(y) -> x = y >>>> x+0 = x >>>> x+s(y) = s(x+y) >>>> x*0=0 >>>> x*s(y)=(x*y)+x >>>> >>>> The TOE has no other axioms. (Only definitions). >>>> Note that most scientific theories admit those axioms. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I see all computatons possible coming from the UDA, >>>> >>>> You mean the UD (the universal dovetailer). UDA is for the "UD >>>> Argument" (UDA is only the name of a deductive argument based on the >>>> notion of Universal Dovetailing). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> some of them with structure, some of them do not. >>>> >>>> That is ambiguous. They all have some structure. But I am OK, as some >>>> have internal and external (to them, relatively) random data, also. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> It is isomorphic to some subset of the mathematical multiverse >>>> >>>> Too much fuzzy. It depends of your starting assumption. "multiverse" >>>> is usually used in the context of QM. But neither QM, nor "~QM" is >>>> assumed in the UD Argument. >>>> The UD argument is deductive (not entirely in step 8 as it is >>>> intended >>>> to apply on 'reality' and use Occam razor). It shows that if you >>>> survive with a digital brain, then you survive in the infinitely many >>>> arithmetical brain, and physics, to remain a stable appearance has no >>>> choice to "exploit" an infinite self-multiplication. >>>> >>>> UDA reduces partially the mind-body problem (my job) to a body >>>> problem >>>> in arithmetic. >>>> >>>> It is a problem. Not a solution of a problem (except that in the >>>> arithmetical translation of the UDA (AUDA), we can already interview >>>> the universal machine (Löbian one) on that problem, and they tell us >>>> that Plato seems less foolish than Aristotle. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> or the boltzmann aleatory structures. >>>> >>>> Same remark. Keep in mind that if we accept the existence of a >>>> physical reality, we "meta-reason" to find the deepest laws of >>>> reality, and be open that physics might not be the fundamental >>>> theory. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Or can be emulated by UDA. >>>> >>>> Yes. Note that the UD emulation is entirely deterministic (in the >>>> 3p), >>>> and hopefully partially deterministic in the 1p (plural) view. >>>> >>>> >>>>> The only additional merit is the use of few initial assumptions. >>>> >>>> I think you miss the point. I am just saying that if comp is correct, >>>> then adding anything to those initial assumption is a redundant form >>>> of conceptual treachery. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> But to emulate everithing possible with few assumptions is not a >>>>> merit IMHO. >>>> >>>> >>>> You do miss the point. With all my respect. >>>> The emulation is only a manner of formulating the problem precisely, >>>> that is, mathematically. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I´m not trying to be harsh. >>>> >>>> No problem. I could look like a philosopher, defending some theory. >>>> But that's not what I do, and did. >>>> >>>> I am a logician, and computer scientist, explaining that if you say >>>> "yes" to the comp doctor, then (assuming you have enough logical >>>> cognitive ability) to reduce the comp mind body problem into body >>>> problem in arithmetic. >>>> Then I show that we can interview universal machine having such >>>> cognitive ability, translating indeed the problem into a sequence of >>>> problems in arithmetic. >>>> At first sight Plotinus and the mystics are closer to the Löbian >>>> numbers than Aristotle. I mean in term of coherent whole. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> I just want to put my impressions in words. The platoninc world of >>>>> ideas is then ONE of the many possible infinite whoknows that the >>>>> UDA can produce. >>>> >>>> Well, it is just the sigma_1 complete part of a vastly bigger >>>> arithmetical reality (pi_1, sigma_24, pi_1000, etc.)) >>>> >>>> It is important to keep in mind the difference between the computable >>>> part of the arithmetical reality, with the non computable part, and >>>> the non provable part, by any machines, even ZF+kappa, etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> The self reference, the diofantic equations etc are tentative ways >>>>> to stablish a limit to that exuberance, but either you postulate UDA >>>>> in its completeness and everithing produced from UDA exist and >>>>> therefore I´m right and the order is only apparent and local, like >>>>> in the multiverse hypothesis(that i find equaly unsatisfactory) or >>>>> you add additional axioms. >>>> >>>> Comp makes it possible to work entirely in arithmetic. This is a >>>> theorem in computer science. Even without Church thesis. >>>> >>>> You must understand that I am not trying to sell you a new theory. I >>>> just show that in an older "banal", seemingly innocent, but commonly >>>> believed or intuited theory, Milinda-Descartes "Mechanism", Church >>>> thesis makes it possible, and necessary (that's the point), to >>>> reduce >>>> the mind-body problem into a purely arithmetical universal self- >>>> justification problem, which includes way to distinguishing the many >>>> points of view, including the physical. >>>> >>>> You can understand the conclusion, before understanding that comp >>>> leads to that conclusion. For this, you have to be open minded for >>>> non >>>> materialist, or non physicalist fundamental reality, like the >>>> arithmetical reality, which contains the many meta-arithmetical >>>> realities. >>>> >>>> I transform a problem into another, mathematical problem. Then I >>>> solve >>>> the propositional part of the many points of view, including the >>>> physical, so we can compare with 'nature'. The presence of three >>>> arithmetical quantizations give hope to show that the arithmetical >>>> winner is a quantum computer, but that's remain an open problem. >>>> >>>> The subject is difficult, and I might have been mistaken, but in >>>> principle, it concerns something which you should understand, not >>>> taken as a new theory. >>>> >>>> It is a big problem for the computationalist, but then you ask the >>>> machines, and they expected that! >>>> >>>> UD is a not a solution. It is a precise problem, which confronts all >>>> universal numbers, and many "inside" things in arithmetic. >>>> >>>> Have you read the sane04 paper, or the new one? >>>> >>>> UDA can be understood by any good willing human reasoner. I think. >>>> AUDA necessitates familiarity with mathematical logic and computer >>>> science. >>>> >>>> AUDA shows that UDA can be understood by any good willing universal >>>> number. >>>> >>>> But it is a problem, not a solution, although AUDA provides the >>>> solutions at the propositional level, in the ideal case of sound >>>> arithmetical machines, admitting (us) the standard theory of >>>> knowledge >>>> (S4). >>>> >>>> With comp we have to extend the embedding of the physicist in the >>>> physical reality by an embedding of the mathematician in the >>>> mathematical reality. But that was what Gödel made, by showing how >>>> to >>>> arithmetized meta-arithmetic. With comp, that embedding of the >>>> machines in the arithmetical reality is enough to formulate the >>>> problem precisely. >>>> >>>> The hard work has been done by Gödel, Löb, Grzegorczyk, Solovay, >>>> and >>>> Visser (and many others). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So at the end while Plato pressuposes order the UDA pressuposes that >>>>> there are tree elements that produce everithing that exist, and >>>>> those that does not exist. >>>>> >>>>> I assume comp, and then reason. Like Plato we presuppose order >>>>> (indeed, brought by arithmetic: we know that the order in arithmetic >>>>> is *very* rich, and not completely accessible by *any* effective >>>>> theory). >>>>> Comp let us just assume no more order than there is in arithmetic, >>>>> at he basic ontological (assumed) level.. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Al the end there are two theories of everithing: In the beginning >>>>> there was order and mind >>>>> >>>>> That is exactly what you get by assuming comp. In the 'beginning' >>>>> you have order (the additive/multiplicative structure of the >>>>> numbers) and the emerging mind from it (the universal consciousness >>>>> that you associate to all universal numbers in arithmetic, by comp, >>>>> and which is differentiating through the indexical (self- >>>>> referential) FPI). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> or at the beginning there was some kind of primitive matter and >>>>> chaos. Plato theory is in the first case. >>>>> >>>>> Yes. No primitive matter, and the full rich order of the numbers (or >>>>> of any Turing universal system). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yours appears to be in the second. >>>>> >>>>> Not at all. There is no assumed matter, and we assume the order >>>>> needed to make sense of computations and Church thesis. You are >>>>> right that there is some chaos, but that is part of the (new) world >>>>> of ideas. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What is your route from chaos to Plato? >>>>> >>>>> The One of the Parmenides (used by Plotinus) = arithmetical truth >>>>> (that is full order far beyond what any machine can grasped). Chaos >>>>> can be there, like in the prime numbers, but there is also a lot of >>>>> music. That chaos is there is what is new in Platonia, but Plato >>>>> could not be aware of Gödel. >>>>> The Noùs (Plato's universe of ideas) is given by the arithmetical >>>>> truth, made partially intelligible by the universal numbers. >>>>> The Soul (Plato's soul, Plotinus' universal soul) is given by the >>>>> conjunction/intersection of the One, and the Noùs. >>>>> Intelligible Matter is given by the conjunction of the Noùs and the >>>>> existence of a reality (self-consistency, Dt). >>>>> Sensible Matter is given by the conjunction of intelligible matter >>>>> and the One. >>>>> >>>>> More on this in the Plotinus' paper. Comp rehabilitates not just >>>>> Plato, but Pythagorus (thanks to Church thesis). >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>> . >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Alberto. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>> . >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>> send an >>>> email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything- >>>> [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Alberto. >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>> send an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > Alberto. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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