On 12/16/2013 6:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 6:07 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 12/16/2013 2:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

    On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
    <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

        On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
        On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
        <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

            JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
            although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.  Everett only
            considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the 
            and the observed system.  In some ways this is more fundamental 
because in
principle the "different worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another. That they usually don't is a statistical result.

        ("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, like 
        Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very Faintly 
        Region of Infinite Gravity :)

            I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen.  Deterministic 
            just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an 
            event or an infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual 
virtue in
            rejecting uncaused events.  Quantum mechanics is an interesting
            intermediate case.  It has randomness, but randomness that is 
            limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical 
world at
            a statistical level.

        The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If 
        is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge 
naturally from
        (for example) the equations that are believed to describe the universe. 
        can say the same about an infinite past.

            Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the 
            of a universal dovetailer.  The whole idea of "everythingism" was 
            by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. If you
            measure a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not 
            possible value.  If you measure it again you get the same 
eigenvalue again
            - not any value.

        I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, 
and that
        they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary 
consequence of
        its existence. Did I get that wrong?

        I wouldn't say "wrong".  It depends on whether you think "There exists a
        successor of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a 
confusion to
        say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as saying X 
exists in
        the ontological sense.

            On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
            indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.

            Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a 

        Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) 
arises from
        the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to the same
        extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I 
        that too?

        (Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make 
all the
        time anyway?)

            Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
            explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.

            No more magic than a UD.

        Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)

        It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it?  
It's in
        Platonia.  It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical than 
        atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."

    In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the 
    reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in atoms, and 
stars, and
    photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that same demon to give us 
    experience of factoring 7 in to two integers besides 1 and 7.

    But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring.  
Their our
    language and that's why we have control of them.

That's what Hilbert thought, but Godel showed he was wrong.

    So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could not doubt the 
    of arithmetically impossible experiences".

    I don't think Descartes could doubt physical reality.

He did. It could have all be an illusion or a dream, as in the Matrix. There is no proof that your perceptions correspond to reality any more than the reality necessary to create your perceptions.

Proof is for mathematicians - and they are only relative to axioms. My point is not that Descarte couldn't say he doubted reality, but that he couldn't act on that doubt; he couldn't really doubt it because that makes the concept of "reality" meaningless.

    Even Bruno rejects solipism and that's just doubting the reality of other 
people.  I
    find it pretty easy to doubt that you can always add one more to an 
integer.  I
    think 10^10^10 + 1 may well equal 10^10^10 in most contexts.

I don't see the relevance of this to the fact that even a highly doubtful person (such as Descartes or yourself :-) ), can reason that his possible experiences are constrained by mathematical possibility (even if all his (or your) perceptions are created by an evil demon, a dream, or the matrix).

Descartes gave up too quickly.

Indeed, all he should have concluded is "This is a thought.". "I" and "am thinking" are inferences.

Instead of concluding only that the only thing he could prove is that "he exists", he might have reasoned further that mathematical laws exist,

Only by adopting the mathematicians idea of "exists" = "satisfies some 

and from there he could have proven the existence of the rest of the universe 
around him.

    In that sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences, and 
is harder
    to doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains experiences. 
    computationalism suggests this is true.  An appropriately programmed 
computer can
    generate any experience that can be possibly experienced in any universe: 
our own
    "laws of physics" do not constrain our possible experience whatsoever,

    ?? They seem to constrain my experience of breathing under water and flying 
to Mars.

Those represent constraints on physical possibilities, not experiences.

More than that, since I have not had the experiences there is no way to know when a simulation would have succeeded in creating them.

With the right computer simulation you could experience breathing under water, or flying to mars, even flying there faster than light. Nothing in the laws of the physics of our universe prevents someone from having such an experience here in this universe. Of course, that experience would have no correspondence to reality, but the experience is still possible and can be implemented here. Just look at all the impossible scenarios that take place in our dreams.

    so long as a Turing machine can be built within the laws of some physical 

    I know.  That's your story and you're sticking to it.

Now you doubt that computers can be made in this universe?

I doubt everything, except "This is a doubt".


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to