On 16 Dec 2013, at 22:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only
considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the
observer and the observed system. In some ways this is more
fundamental because in principle the "different worlds" of MWI can
interfere with one another. That they usually don't is a
statistical result.
("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description,
like Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than
Very Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)
I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic
theories just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is
either an uncaused event or an infinite past. So there is not
great intellectual virtue in rejecting uncaused events. Quantum
mechanics is an interesting intermediate case. It has randomness,
but randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such a way
that it produces the classical world at a statistical level.
The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental.
If there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't
emerge naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed
to describe the universe. One can say the same about an infinite
past.
Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
computations of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of
"everythingism" was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail
that everything happens. If you measure a variable you only get
eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If you
measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any value.
I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't
events, and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically
necessary consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?
I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There
exists a successor of 2." implies that 3 exists.
3 *is* the successor of 2.
Personally I think it is a confusion to say that a logical formula
is satisfied by X is the same as saying X exists in the ontological
sense.
Existence is always theoretical, and is treated by satisfaction of a
formula beginning by Ex.
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a
further assumption.
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication)
arises from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a
consequence, to the same extent that one has it within ones own
personal past? Or have I misunderstood that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to
make all the time anyway?)
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is
it? It's in Platonia.
Platonia = Arithmetic. You need just to believe that 2+2=4 is true.
You need this Platonia to just define what is a computation.
It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical
Once you believe in "flesh", but in comp, there is only appearance of
flesh, and we explain where that appearance comes from (completely).
Bruno
than "that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the
equations say."
Brent
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