On 12/16/2013 9:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 11:11 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/16/2013 6:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 6:07 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/16/2013 2:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum
although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett
considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the
observer and the observed system. In some ways this is more
fundamental because in principle the "different worlds" of MWI
interfere with one another. That they usually don't is a
("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description,
Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very
Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)
I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic
theories just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is
either an uncaused event or an infinite past. So there is not
intellectual virtue in rejecting uncaused events. Quantum
is an interesting intermediate case. It has randomness, but
randomness that is strictly limited and limited in such a way
produces the classical world at a statistical level.
The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental.
there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to
the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.
Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
computations of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of
"everythingism" was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't
everything happens. If you measure a variable you only get
eigenvalues of that variable - not every possible value. If you
measure it again you get the same eigenvalue again - not any
I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't
that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?
I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There
successor of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a
confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the
saying X exists in the ontological sense.
On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of
indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a
Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication)
from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence,
same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
misunderstood that too?
(Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to
all the time anyway?)
Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable
No more magic than a UD.
Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is
in Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical
"that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations
In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the
physical reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in
and stars, and photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that same
to give us the experience of factoring 7 in to two integers besides 1
But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring.
our language and that's why we have control of them.
That's what Hilbert thought, but Godel showed he was wrong.
So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could not doubt the
"unreality of arithmetically impossible experiences".
I don't think Descartes could doubt physical reality.
He did. It could have all be an illusion or a dream, as in the Matrix.
There is no
proof that your perceptions correspond to reality any more than the reality
necessary to create your perceptions.
Proof is for mathematicians - and they are only relative to axioms. My
point is not
that Descarte couldn't say he doubted reality, but that he couldn't act on
doubt; he couldn't really doubt it because that makes the concept of
Maybe some people come to that conclusion, and become insane, nihilistic, or depressed
as a result.
Even Bruno rejects solipism and that's just doubting the reality of
people. I find it pretty easy to doubt that you can always add one
more to an
integer. I think 10^10^10 + 1 may well equal 10^10^10 in most contexts.
I don't see the relevance of this to the fact that even a highly doubtful
(such as Descartes or yourself :-) ), can reason that his possible
constrained by mathematical possibility (even if all his (or your)
created by an evil demon, a dream, or the matrix).
Descartes gave up too quickly.
Indeed, all he should have concluded is "This is a thought.". "I" and "am
You went from "Descartes went to far" to "Descarte didn't go far enough".
I went from what Descartes could really do to what he could have concluded from
Instead of concluding only that the only thing he could prove is that "he
he might have reasoned further that mathematical laws exist,
Only by adopting the mathematicians idea of "exists" = "satisfies some
I mean it in a deeper sense than that. They exist in the same way any physical laws
exist; they limit and restrict what is possible to experience, they have a genuine
Indeed, physical laws tell us what to expect - but they don't restrict anything, rather
they are restricted to agree with observation. You seem to have picture of a divine
lawgiver who gave us the laws on golden tablets.
and from there he could have proven the existence of the rest of the
In that sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences,
harder to doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains
Indeed, computationalism suggests this is true. An appropriately
computer can generate any experience that can be possibly experienced
universe: our own "laws of physics" do not constrain our possible
?? They seem to constrain my experience of breathing under water and
Those represent constraints on physical possibilities, not experiences.
More than that, since I have not had the experiences there is no way to
know when a
simulation would have succeeded in creating them.
You are just not being imaginative enough. Look at the worlds created in various video
games for some inspiration.
Yes, those are other possible worlds - but I only experience playing the game, I don't
know how it would actually *feel* to fly. I assume that's what Bruno means by 1p
experience is incommunicable.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.