On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 11:11 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 12/16/2013 6:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 6:07 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 12/16/2013 2:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds, >>>> although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds. Everett only >>>> considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the observer >>>> and the observed system. In some ways this is more fundamental because in >>>> principle the "different worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another. >>>> That they usually don't is a statistical result. >>>> >>>> ("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description, >>> like Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very >>> Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :) >>> >>> I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen. Deterministic >>>> theories just push the problem back in time. Ultimately there is either an >>>> uncaused event or an infinite past. So there is not great intellectual >>>> virtue in rejecting uncaused events. Quantum mechanics is an interesting >>>> intermediate case. It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly >>>> limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a >>>> statistical level. >>>> >>> >>> The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If >>> there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge >>> naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe >>> the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past. >>> >>> Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the >>>> computations of a universal dovetailer. The whole idea of "everythingism" >>>> was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens. >>>> If you measure a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not >>>> every possible value. If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue >>>> again - not any value. >>>> >>> >>> I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events, >>> and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary >>> consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong? >>> >>> >>> I wouldn't say "wrong". It depends on whether you think "There exists >>> a successor of 2." implies that 3 exists. Personally I think it is a >>> confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as >>> saying X exists in the ontological sense. >>> >>> >>> On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such >>>> indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions. >>>> >>> Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a >>> further assumption. >>> >>> Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication) >>> arises from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to >>> the same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I >>> misunderstood that too? >>> >>> (Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make >>> all the time anyway?) >>> >>> Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple >>>> explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic. >>>> >>> No more magic than a UD. >>> >>> Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?) >>> >>> >>> It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it? >>> It's in Platonia. It's "the word made flesh." Sounds a lot more magical >>> than "that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say." >>> >>> >> >> In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the >> physical reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in >> atoms, and stars, and photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that >> same demon to give us the experience of factoring 7 in to two integers >> besides 1 and 7. >> >> >> But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring. >> Their our language and that's why we have control of them. >> >> > That's what Hilbert thought, but Godel showed he was wrong. > > >> >> So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could not doubt >> the "unreality of arithmetically impossible experiences". >> >> >> I don't think Descartes could doubt physical reality. >> > > > He did. It could have all be an illusion or a dream, as in the Matrix. > There is no proof that your perceptions correspond to reality any more than > the reality necessary to create your perceptions. > > > Proof is for mathematicians - and they are only relative to axioms. My > point is not that Descarte couldn't say he doubted reality, but that he > couldn't act on that doubt; he couldn't really doubt it because that makes > the concept of "reality" meaningless. > Maybe some people come to that conclusion, and become insane, nihilistic, or depressed as a result. > > > > > >> Even Bruno rejects solipism and that's just doubting the reality of >> other people. I find it pretty easy to doubt that you can always add one >> more to an integer. I think 10^10^10 + 1 may well equal 10^10^10 in most >> contexts. >> > > I don't see the relevance of this to the fact that even a highly > doubtful person (such as Descartes or yourself :-) ), can reason that his > possible experiences are constrained by mathematical possibility (even if > all his (or your) perceptions are created by an evil demon, a dream, or the > matrix). > > Descartes gave up too quickly. > > > Indeed, all he should have concluded is "This is a thought.". "I" and "am > thinking" are inferences. > You went from "Descartes went to far" to "Descarte didn't go far enough". > > > Instead of concluding only that the only thing he could prove is that > "he exists", he might have reasoned further that mathematical laws exist, > > > Only by adopting the mathematicians idea of "exists" = "satisfies some > predicate". > I mean it in a deeper sense than that. They exist in the same way any physical laws exist; they limit and restrict what is possible to experience, they have a genuine perceptible effect. > > > and from there he could have proven the existence of the rest of the > universe around him. > > >> >> >> In that sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences, >> and is harder to doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains >> experiences. Indeed, computationalism suggests this is true. An >> appropriately programmed computer can generate any experience that can be >> possibly experienced in any universe: our own "laws of physics" do not >> constrain our possible experience whatsoever, >> >> >> ?? They seem to constrain my experience of breathing under water and >> flying to Mars. >> > > Those represent constraints on physical possibilities, not experiences. > > > More than that, since I have not had the experiences there is no way to > know when a simulation would have succeeded in creating them. > You are just not being imaginative enough. Look at the worlds created in various video games for some inspiration. Jason > > > > With the right computer simulation you could experience breathing under > water, or flying to mars, even flying there faster than light. Nothing in > the laws of the physics of our universe prevents someone from having such > an experience here in this universe. Of course, that experience would have > no correspondence to reality, but the experience is still possible and can > be implemented here. Just look at all the impossible scenarios that take > place in our dreams. > > >> >> >> so long as a Turing machine can be built within the laws of some >> physical universe. >> >> >> I know. That's your story and you're sticking to it. >> > > > Now you doubt that computers can be made in this universe? > > > I doubt everything, except "This is a doubt". > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
