On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 11:11 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 12/16/2013 6:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 6:07 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>  On 12/16/2013 2:27 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 16, 2013 at 3:14 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>  On 12/16/2013 12:40 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 17 December 2013 08:06, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> JKC makes a big point of the complete separation of quantum worlds,
>>>> although Everett didn't write about multiple worlds.  Everett only
>>>> considered one world and wrote about the "relative state" of the observer
>>>> and the observed system.  In some ways this is more fundamental because in
>>>> principle the "different worlds" of MWI can interfere with one another.
>>>> That they usually don't is a statistical result.
>>>>
>>>>   ("Many worlds" is just a nice (and roughly accurate) description,
>>> like Big Bang (better than Small Hiss) or Black Hole (better than Very
>>> Faintly Glowing Region of Infinite Gravity :)
>>>
>>> I think that's an unfair criticism of Copenhagen.  Deterministic
>>>> theories just push the problem back in time.  Ultimately there is either an
>>>> uncaused event or an infinite past.  So there is not great intellectual
>>>> virtue in rejecting uncaused events.  Quantum mechanics is an interesting
>>>> intermediate case.  It has randomness, but randomness that is strictly
>>>> limited and limited in such a way that it produces the classical world at a
>>>> statistical level.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  The problem is pushed back onto whatever is considered fundamental. If
>>> there is an original event, it is only uncaused if it doesn't emerge
>>> naturally from (for example) the equations that are believed to describe
>>> the universe. One can say the same about an infinite past.
>>>
>>>  Your own theory also introduces uncaused events, namely the
>>>> computations of a universal dovetailer.  The whole idea of "everythingism"
>>>> was inspired by QM, but QM itself doesn't entail that everything happens.
>>>> If you measure a variable you only get eigenvalues of that variable - not
>>>> every possible value.  If you measure it again you get the same eigenvalue
>>>> again - not any value.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  I was given to believe that the computations of the UD aren't events,
>>> and that they simply exist within arithmetic as a logically necessary
>>> consequence of its existence. Did I get that wrong?
>>>
>>>
>>>  I wouldn't say "wrong".  It depends on whether you think "There exists
>>> a successor of 2." implies that 3 exists.  Personally I think it is a
>>> confusion to say that a logical formula is satisfied by X is the same as
>>> saying X exists in the ontological sense.
>>>
>>>
>>>      On the contrary, self-duplication explains the appearance of such
>>>> indeterminacy, without adding any further assumptions.
>>>>
>>>     Well, the existence of self-duplication, even via Everett, is a
>>> further assumption.
>>>
>>> Surely the existence of duplication (rather than self-duplication)
>>> arises from the equations? So one has self-duplication as a consequence, to
>>> the same extent that one has it within ones own personal past? Or have I
>>> misunderstood that too?
>>>
>>>  (Or are you just talking about the sort of assumptions we have to make
>>> all the time anyway?)
>>>
>>>   Occam favors it. Your belief in "3)" substitutes a very simple
>>>> explanation by a call to a form of built-in-non-explainable magic.
>>>>
>>>     No more magic than a UD.
>>>
>>> Why is the UD magic? (Is arithmetic magic?)
>>>
>>>
>>>  It's hypothetically generating all possible worlds, but where is it?
>>> It's in Platonia.  It's "the word made flesh."  Sounds a lot more magical
>>> than "that atom decayed by potential tunneling just like the equations say."
>>>
>>>
>>
>>  In a sense, one can be more certain about arithmetical reality than the
>> physical reality. An evil demon could be responsible for our belief in
>> atoms, and stars, and photons, etc., but it is may be impossible for that
>> same demon to give us the experience of factoring 7 in to two integers
>> besides 1 and 7.
>>
>>
>>  But that's because we made up 1 and 7 and the defintion of factoring.
>> Their our language and that's why we have control of them.
>>
>>
>  That's what Hilbert thought, but Godel showed he was wrong.
>
>
>>
>>   So while Descartes could doubt physical reality, he could not doubt
>> the "unreality of arithmetically impossible experiences".
>>
>>
>>  I don't think Descartes could doubt physical reality.
>>
>
>
>  He did.  It could have all be an illusion or a dream, as in the Matrix.
> There is no proof that your perceptions correspond to reality any more than
> the reality necessary to create your perceptions.
>
>
> Proof is for mathematicians - and they are only relative to axioms. My
> point is not that Descarte couldn't say he doubted reality, but that he
> couldn't act on that doubt; he couldn't really doubt it because that makes
> the concept of "reality" meaningless.
>


Maybe some people come to that conclusion, and become insane, nihilistic,
or depressed as a result.



>
>
>
>
>
>>  Even Bruno rejects solipism and that's just doubting the reality of
>> other people.  I find it pretty easy to doubt that you can always add one
>> more to an integer.  I think 10^10^10 + 1 may well equal 10^10^10 in most
>> contexts.
>>
>
>  I don't see the relevance of this to the fact that even a highly
> doubtful person (such as Descartes or yourself :-) ), can reason that his
> possible experiences are constrained by mathematical possibility (even if
> all his (or your) perceptions are created by an evil demon, a dream, or the
> matrix).
>
>  Descartes gave up too quickly.
>
>
> Indeed, all he should have concluded is "This is a thought.".  "I" and "am
> thinking" are inferences.
>

You went from "Descartes went to far" to "Descarte didn't go far enough".


>
>
>   Instead of concluding only that the only thing he could prove is that
> "he exists", he might have reasoned further that mathematical laws exist,
>
>
> Only by adopting the mathematicians idea of "exists" = "satisfies some
> predicate".
>

I mean it in a deeper sense than that.  They exist in the same way any
physical laws exist; they limit and restrict what is possible to
experience, they have a genuine perceptible effect.



>
>
>   and from there he could have proven the existence of the rest of the
> universe around him.
>
>
>>
>>
>>   In that sense, arithmetic would in-part control possible experiences,
>> and is harder to doubt than the possibility that physics is constrains
>> experiences. Indeed, computationalism suggests this is true.  An
>> appropriately programmed computer can generate any experience that can be
>> possibly experienced in any universe: our own "laws of physics" do not
>> constrain our possible experience whatsoever,
>>
>>
>>  ?? They seem to constrain my experience of breathing under water and
>> flying to Mars.
>>
>
>  Those represent constraints on physical possibilities, not experiences.
>
>
> More than that, since I have not had the experiences there is no way to
> know when a simulation would have succeeded in creating them.
>

You are just not being imaginative enough.  Look at the worlds created in
various video games for some inspiration.

Jason



>
>
>
> With the right computer simulation you could experience breathing under
> water, or flying to mars, even flying there faster than light.  Nothing in
> the laws of the physics of our universe prevents someone from having such
> an experience here in this universe. Of course, that experience would have
> no correspondence to reality, but the experience is still possible and can
> be implemented here.  Just look at all the impossible scenarios that take
> place in our dreams.
>
>
>>
>>
>>   so long as a Turing machine can be built within the laws of some
>> physical universe.
>>
>>
>>  I know.  That's your story and you're sticking to it.
>>
>
>
>  Now you doubt that computers can be made in this universe?
>
>
> I doubt everything, except "This is a doubt".
>
> Brent
>
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