On 24 Dec 2013, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> He did answer and did it correctly,
> I somehow missed that post. What number did Bruno give?
I quote myself:
>>> That's a great answer but unfortunately it's NOT a answer to
the question John Clark asked, the question never asked anything
about "the 3p view", it was never mentioned. So John Clark will
repeat the question for a fifth time: how many first person
experiences viewed from their first person points of view does
Bruno Marchal believe exists on planet Earth right now?
>1 (I already answered this, note)
No you did not.
> from the 1-view, the 1-view is always unique.
That's real nice, but it wasn't the question.
How many unique integers are there in the first 7 billion integers?
John Clark's answer: 7 billion.
How many unique 1-views from 1-view are there on planet Earth right
Bruno Marchal's answer: Bruno Marchal refuses to answer.
I answered this two times already. The answer is 1. Not just right
now. Always. The infinitely many 1-views are all unique from their 1-
> Can you explain why you ask?
Because Bruno Marchal claims to understand the difference between 1P
and 3P and says that John Clark does not. And because Bruno Marchal
said "the first person experiences viewed from their first person
points of view" and it would greatly help John Clark understand what
Bruno Marchal meant by this (assuming anything at all) if John Clark
knew approximately how many first person experiences views from
their first person points of view existed on planet Earth right now.
It is a simple question, what is the number?
In the 3-views on the 1-views, there are right now about 7.10^6 such
In the 1-view there is only one, from her 1-view.
This explains the existence of the 1-indeterminacy. If I am duplicated
iteratively ten times: the number of 3-1-views will grow
exponentially, and after the 10th duplication, there 2^10 1-views.
But assuming comp and the default hypotheses, each of the
copies get one bit of information, at each duplication step (they
write W or they wrote M, never both). All of them feel constantly
unique, and the vast majority get a non computable history when
iterating infinitely (or incompressible when iterating finitely a long
You seem to have understood the point, and in a recent post to Jason
you seem to assess steps 3, 4, 5, 6.
So what about step 7?
How do you predict "conceptually" the result of any physical
experiences and experiments, when assuming a physical universe, and
assuming it executes integrally (without ever stopping) a Universal
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