On 24 Dec 2013, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:

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On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:>> He did answer and did it correctly, > I somehow missed that post. What number did Bruno give?I quote myself:>>> That's a great answer but unfortunately it's NOT a answer tothe question John Clark asked, the question never asked anythingabout "the 3p view", it was never mentioned. So John Clark willrepeat the question for a fifth time: how many first personexperiences viewed from their first person points of view doesBruno Marchal believe exists on planet Earth right now?>1 (I already answered this, note)No you did not.> from the 1-view, the 1-view is always unique.That's real nice, but it wasn't the question. How many unique integers are there in the first 7 billion integers? John Clark's answer: 7 billion.How many unique 1-views from 1-view are there on planet Earth rightnow?Bruno Marchal's answer: Bruno Marchal refuses to answer.

`I answered this two times already. The answer is 1. Not just right`

`now. Always. The infinitely many 1-views are all unique from their 1-`

`view.`

> Can you explain why you ask?Because Bruno Marchal claims to understand the difference between 1Pand 3P and says that John Clark does not. And because Bruno Marchalsaid "the first person experiences viewed from their first personpoints of view" and it would greatly help John Clark understand whatBruno Marchal meant by this (assuming anything at all) if John Clarkknew approximately how many first person experiences views fromtheir first person points of view existed on planet Earth right now.It is a simple question, what is the number?

`In the 3-views on the 1-views, there are right now about 7.10^6 such`

`human 1-view.`

In the 1-view there is only one, from her 1-view. OK?

`This explains the existence of the 1-indeterminacy. If I am duplicated`

`iteratively ten times: the number of 3-1-views will grow`

`exponentially, and after the 10th duplication, there 2^10 1-views.`

`But assuming comp and the default hypotheses, each of the`

`copies get one bit of information, at each duplication step (they`

`write W or they wrote M, never both). All of them feel constantly`

`unique, and the vast majority get a non computable history when`

`iterating infinitely (or incompressible when iterating finitely a long`

`enough time).`

`You seem to have understood the point, and in a recent post to Jason`

`you seem to assess steps 3, 4, 5, 6.`

So what about step 7?

`How do you predict "conceptually" the result of any physical`

`experiences and experiments, when assuming a physical universe, and`

`assuming it executes integrally (without ever stopping) a Universal`

`Dovetailer?`

Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.