On 24 Dec 2013, at 19:39, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Dec 24, 2013 at 4:04 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> He did answer and did it correctly,

> I somehow missed that post. What number did Bruno give?

I quote myself:
>>> That's a great answer but unfortunately it's NOT a answer to the question John Clark asked, the question never asked anything about "the 3p view", it was never mentioned. So John Clark will repeat the question for a fifth time: how many first person experiences viewed from their first person points of view does Bruno Marchal believe exists on planet Earth right now?

>1  (I already answered this, note)

No you did not.
> from the 1-view, the 1-view is always unique.

That's real nice, but it wasn't the question.

How many unique integers are there in the first 7 billion integers?
John Clark's answer: 7 billion.

How many unique 1-views from 1-view are there on planet Earth right now?
Bruno Marchal's answer: Bruno Marchal refuses to answer.

I answered this two times already. The answer is 1. Not just right now. Always. The infinitely many 1-views are all unique from their 1- view.

> Can you explain why you ask?

Because Bruno Marchal claims to understand the difference between 1P and 3P and says that John Clark does not. And because Bruno Marchal said "the first person experiences viewed from their first person points of view" and it would greatly help John Clark understand what Bruno Marchal meant by this (assuming anything at all) if John Clark knew approximately how many first person experiences views from their first person points of view existed on planet Earth right now.
It is a simple question, what is the number?

In the 3-views on the 1-views, there are right now about 7.10^6 such human 1-view.
In the 1-view there is only one, from her 1-view.


This explains the existence of the 1-indeterminacy. If I am duplicated iteratively ten times: the number of 3-1-views will grow exponentially, and after the 10th duplication, there 2^10 1-views. But assuming comp and the default hypotheses, each of the copies get one bit of information, at each duplication step (they write W or they wrote M, never both). All of them feel constantly unique, and the vast majority get a non computable history when iterating infinitely (or incompressible when iterating finitely a long enough time).

You seem to have understood the point, and in a recent post to Jason you seem to assess steps 3, 4, 5, 6.

So what about step 7?
How do you predict "conceptually" the result of any physical experiences and experiments, when assuming a physical universe, and assuming it executes integrally (without ever stopping) a Universal Dovetailer?



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