On Sunday, December 29, 2013 6:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Dec 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> "humans are machines unable to recognize the fact that they are machines,"
>>
>
> Who wrote this?
>
> *any* ideally correct machines is unable to recognize the fact that they 
> are machines.
>

Just someone on a Facebook thread, I forget who. 

Anyone who says yes to the doctor then cannot be an ideally correct machine.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> I would re-word it as 'Humans are not machines but when they introspect on 
> their most mechanical aspects mechanistically, they are able to imagine 
> that they could be machines who are unable recognize the fact."
>
> I agree that there is an intrinsic limit to Strong AI, but I think that 
> the limit is at the starting gate. Since consciousness is the embodiment of 
> uniqueness and unrepeatability, there is no "almost" conscious. It doesn't 
> matter how much the artist in the painting looks like he is really painting 
> himself in the mirror, or how realistic Escher makes the staircase look, 
> those realities are forever sculpted in theory, not in the multisense 
> realism.
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>.
> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>
> .
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

Reply via email to