On Sunday, December 29, 2013 6:42:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Dec 2013, at 15:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> "humans are machines unable to recognize the fact that they are machines,"
>>
>
> Who wrote this?
>
> *any* ideally correct machines is unable to recognize the fact that they 
> are machines.
>

Just someone on a Facebook thread, I forget who. 

Anyone who says yes to the doctor then cannot be an ideally correct machine.

Craig
 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> I would re-word it as 'Humans are not machines but when they introspect on 
> their most mechanical aspects mechanistically, they are able to imagine 
> that they could be machines who are unable recognize the fact."
>
> I agree that there is an intrinsic limit to Strong AI, but I think that 
> the limit is at the starting gate. Since consciousness is the embodiment of 
> uniqueness and unrepeatability, there is no "almost" conscious. It doesn't 
> matter how much the artist in the painting looks like he is really painting 
> himself in the mirror, or how realistic Escher makes the staircase look, 
> those realities are forever sculpted in theory, not in the multisense 
> realism.
>
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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