I agree with Bruno on these point more than what with you.
On Fri, Jan 17, 2014 at 11:16 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 1/17/2014 5:40 PM, LizR wrote:
> But apparently the brain has a lot to do with those computations in
>> Platonia, c.f. anesthetic. Notice that I'm not a disciple of Platonia.
> Me neither, I am agnostic - but within comp it is assumed, so while
> discussing comp we have to assume it (unless we're rejecting comp on that
> basis). But I can see that Platonia makes sense in that 17 does seem to be
> prime idependently of you and me and everyone else, which is (I'm told)
> enough for the whole shebang to come into some sort of existence.
> I don't think you have to buy the equivalence between (17 is prime) is
> true and (17 is prime) exists.
AFAIK, there is a universal relationship between ("17 is prime" is a true
statement) and (17 is prime is a true statement) iff we are considering
wolds that require (via inference) that 17 is prime. If an infinite number
of observer agree that they have never observed that "17 is prime" is not
true, then what?
> In fact Bruno always says you only have to believe the first for his
> argument to succeed.
I don;t see a problem with that; we start with the facts in front of us. I
exist. I am aware that it is possible that others like me exist.
> But then he slips in the UD and it seems that every truth of arithmetic
> implies and existence.
No, the way that AR is defined and in the UDA, it is required that
arithmetic encodes somehow every truth about both.
> I think this is the same problem as step 8.
> If everything has to be simulated, then there's no difference between
> simulated and real. If I'm "really" existing in an infinity of
> world/simulations that are *just like this one up to now* - then they ARE
> this one (c.f. Leibniz).
I disagree, the simulation of a Thing and the thing cannot be
distinguished. This requires that a class of "similar" things that could
stand in for "I" and that the random observers of the vendor are trackable.
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