On 18 Jan 2014, at 01:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/17/2014 2:04 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 January 2014 18:03, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the
brain
with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would not
be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain,
Just to clarify, as I understand Bruno's theory, there is non-
computable physics in the brain. In fact physics is non-computable
in general, BUT the mind is computable, i.e. the level of
substitution that preserves the person is above the fundamental
physics level. I actually think this last is dubious.
I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum
level. Or at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then
we can guarantee that the duplication arguments would work
(assuming we could duplicate objects at that level, which we can't
due to a fundamental principle...!)
Actually Brent, your comment above reads like a refutation of comp,
which I suspect isn't the intention.
Or is it? I read it as
1 Comp says fundamental physics is non-computable.
2 Comp says the mind is the result of a computation.
3 Hence if the subst level is at the level of fundamental physics,
2 can't be correct
4 I think it IS at the quantum level, so 2 is wrong, so comp is
wrong - QED :)
I don't think 2 is right. I think comp says that a mind is the
result of an infinite set of computations, which are not
computable. But Bruno can correct me if I'm wrong.
It is subtle.
By comp, "one" computation can brought your mind, in principle. But
you need an infinity of computation to have a stable mind relatively
to "one" or "an infinity" of computations to not only have a mind, but
a stable physics.
So "one" computation is enough, if it is done relatively to an
environment which multiplies it with the right (physical) measure.
Like the quantum seem to do. This assure also some notion of first
person plural consistency. We can share the (infinity) of relative
computations.
And similarly a physical object, like a neuron or an artificial
neuron, is also not computable. But then it may become a question
of what does it mean to 'preserve a person' when a person is just an
abstraction, a self-modeling piece of the world. How accurately
does the substitution have to be to 'preserve'? If I had a silicon
based neuron replacing one of my biologically based ones, it might
serve fine in transmitting neural pulses. But it might not respond
to some hormones. It wouldn't grow. I might respond very
differently to a stray cosmic ray particle. But I might still seem
to be "me".
That will plausibly be the case with the first artificial brain. You
will survive, but loss some things. But it just means that the level
of subst was not adequate enough.
However, surely comp says the mind is the result of computations in
Platonia, rather than in the brain? In fact it says that the brain
doesn't exist (along with everything else, apart from Platonia).
But apparently the brain has a lot to do with those computations in
Platonia, c.f. anesthetic. Notice that I'm not a disciple of
Platonia.
You believe that "17 is prime" depends on the physical existence of
Brent? OK, but can you explain the dependency? And to answer this
properly, you have to define "physical existence of Brent" without
using arithmetic.
Bruno
Brent
I feel as though my own brain is about to boggle, or would if it
existed. Maybe I should write everything "under erasure" to be on
the safe side!
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