On 19 Jan 2014, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/19/2014 3:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Jan 2014, at 01:48, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/17/2014 2:04 PM, LizR wrote:
On 17 January 2014 18:03, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Briefly, computationalism is the idea that you could replace the
brain
with a Turing machine and you would preserve the mind. This would
not
be possible if there is non-computable physics in the brain,
Just to clarify, as I understand Bruno's theory, there is non-
computable physics in the brain. In fact physics is non-
computable in general, BUT the mind is computable, i.e. the level
of substitution that preserves the person is above the
fundamental physics level. I actually think this last is dubious.
I also find it unlikely that the subst level is above the quantum
level. Or at least I think that if it's at the quantum level then
we can guarantee that the duplication arguments would work
(assuming we could duplicate objects at that level, which we
can't due to a fundamental principle...!)
Actually Brent, your comment above reads like a refutation of
comp, which I suspect isn't the intention.
Or is it? I read it as
1 Comp says fundamental physics is non-computable.
2 Comp says the mind is the result of a computation.
3 Hence if the subst level is at the level of fundamental
physics, 2 can't be correct
4 I think it IS at the quantum level, so 2 is wrong, so comp is
wrong - QED :)
I don't think 2 is right. I think comp says that a mind is the
result of an infinite set of computations, which are not
computable. But Bruno can correct me if I'm wrong.
It is subtle.
By comp, "one" computation can brought your mind, in principle. But
you need an infinity of computation to have a stable mind
relatively to "one" or "an infinity" of computations to not only
have a mind, but a stable physics.
So "one" computation is enough, if it is done relatively to an
environment which multiplies it with the right (physical) measure.
Like the quantum seem to do. This assure also some notion of first
person plural consistency. We can share the (infinity) of relative
computations.
And similarly a physical object, like a neuron or an artificial
neuron, is also not computable. But then it may become a question
of what does it mean to 'preserve a person' when a person is just
an abstraction, a self-modeling piece of the world. How
accurately does the substitution have to be to 'preserve'? If I
had a silicon based neuron replacing one of my biologically based
ones, it might serve fine in transmitting neural pulses. But it
might not respond to some hormones. It wouldn't grow. I might
respond very differently to a stray cosmic ray particle. But I
might still seem to be "me".
That will plausibly be the case with the first artificial brain.
You will survive, but loss some things. But it just means that the
level of subst was not adequate enough.
However, surely comp says the mind is the result of computations
in Platonia, rather than in the brain? In fact it says that the
brain doesn't exist (along with everything else, apart from
Platonia).
But apparently the brain has a lot to do with those computations
in Platonia, c.f. anesthetic. Notice that I'm not a disciple of
Platonia.
You believe that "17 is prime" depends on the physical existence of
Brent? OK, but can you explain the dependency?
Sure. See William S. Cooper's book "The Evolution of Reason".
This assume "17 is prime", and explain only how "17 is prime" comes to
humans. If not it is begging the question.
If not, then Coopers is just given an argument that comp is false.
And to answer this properly, you have to define "physical existence
of Brent" without using arithmetic.
Brent:=the being who typed this sentence. (Or next time you're in
California, come by and I'll give an ostensive definition - and a
cup of coffee.)
Thanks very much for the coffee cup, I appreciate. But frankly this
will not work. If I need to define number by invoking a being typing a
sentence in a post dated the 19 janvier 2014, oops: I am using some
numbers here. Don't ask someone who want to compute 2+2=4 to come in
California and drink four cups of coffee, if all computers have to do
that I am afraid the net will become extremely slow ...
I find much more plausible that I can explain numbers behavior, and
Brent's brain and ideas, from elementary arithmetical axioms, than
explain arithmetic from Brent and other humans ideas. Come on ...
Bruno
Brent
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