On 23 Jan 2014, at 17:05, David Nyman wrote:
On 23 January 2014 08:39, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Let us take the WM-duplication. Suppose that the guy in Helsinki is
told that the "randomly chosen unique flaslight sequence will
illuminate W "just" after the duplication (if this makes sense).
Should he decide that P(W) = 1 and P(M) = 0? Is the guy in M, which
exists (even with just Behavior Mechanism), a zombie?
Oh dear no, that makes no sense whatsoever. I would humbly suggest
that this is not at all how Hoyle intended his metaphor to be applied.
You reassure me. Not that I did really believe it, but I was trying to
illustrate why I think that such a metaphor can be misleading. Of
course all metaphor are misleading when taken literally.
In my understanding, his idea bears rather on the specific question
of "personal universality".
Where we do cross indeed, recurrently.
IOW, in what sense, if any, can we intelligibly conceive of
consciousness as the "property" of some unique, universal person
(as, for example, in Hindu or Buddhist theology)?
The more I think of this in the comp realm, the more I think this
means the consciousness of the universal numbers. All universal
number. The Löbian numbers are just more chatty, which is handy for
the interviews.
Let us assume that we are to understand "person" in the sense of the
"owner" of some particular logical ordering of conscious moments.
All right, but the *particular* here, when defined, will look like an
abstract primitive belief, like a type or ordering thought.
The universal number fortran might need to have the same consciousness
than any other universal numbers.
They are the seed of the same histories or consciousness
differentiation and dedifferentiation. That universal consciousness
has a *particular* which might be like an altered state of
consciousness, a moment of insanity, like a confusion between G and
G*, perhaps.
Then, if the idea of a "universal person" is to be made intelligible
in some way, it should be as the owner of all possible logical
orderings of conscious moments.
I think that make sense, with the universal machines being the owner
of themselves and their capacities, but of course their 1-p diffuse in
an large forest of different particulars, although it is not exclude
some transfinite complex relation with Truth, which participates in
the consciousness of the universal person.
The universal first person is the intersection between truth and very
basic principles, like addition and multiplication.
If that be so, the question then arises: How to make sense of the
experience of such a universal person? What could it possibly be
"like"?
The 1-p of the universal machine has free will, but no means, nor
needs. Yet a lot of choices. "A lot is an euphemism". I think it is
Vimalakirty's state of the unconceivable freedom.
If Hoyle's metaphor, or heuristic, is considered in this way, it
should I hope be apparent that it is not any sort of proposal for a
"second time dimension" or indeed any kind of additional "machinery".
OK.
That it is not the former should be manifest in that the
"flashlight" is merely one possible metaphor for the unique
consideration of a logical sequence of particularised moments, each
to the exclusion of any other. It is redundant - nor does it make
any sense - to think of a mere heuristic of this sort as necessarily
introducing any supplementary or independent properties of duration,
rate or order. Its role is rather to assist us in making some sort
of intuitive sense of something that is no doubt much deeper and
more complex, without (hopefully) doing it irreparable violence.
I think the 8 hypostases explains well how, by incompleteness, all
machines selves split in 2, 4, 8, 16, hypostases, and lives them all
at once, although the arithmetical interpretation of the boxes and
diamond changes "at the speed of light".
I think you are not so incline to study the math, but I am just
explaining the basics to Liz, and it might be an opportunity to take
the wagon.
In a sense, the 8 hypostases are already given by an interview, well
not really of a universal person, but of a universal scientist, which
the universal numbers also can own, and that scientist acknowledges
the presence of the universal person, and it can tell why she obeys
different laws that the scientist laws.
The mental picture of the logical sequence of the flashlight's
random walk should suggest or entail no characteristic other than
the "momentary" filtering out of a single perspective.
You lost me again. I see more the universal person consciousness state
as a blisfull peaceful state like the one of the baby in the womb of
her/his mother.
Then it differentiates.
Filtered, that is, from the otherwise "panoptic" view that we should
presumably attribute to a universal personhood.
I agree. Consciousness is related to knowledge (notably the knowledge
that we have beliefs). Consciousness is also related to the
possibilities. That panoptic view is what we get, for all particular
machine, when we add the <>p and "& p" nuances, for the Bp machine
(the []).
The panoptic view is important, but not all. But I don't think that
consciousness related easily to all other consciousness state. The
differentiation can go through long and deep histories. "we", on the
contrary might have an idea of what that universal 1p experience is,
by making psychotropic experiences. That is to be handled with care.
The question then arises: Could the intuition of such a "multiplex"
of random momentary filterings possibly give an adequate account of
the myriad, ordered experiential trajectories of each and every one
of "us"?
I can't see how *that* randomness makes sense.
It seems to me more like a conversion/emanation like in Plotinus. A
back and forth done by the inner God between matter and god.
Hoyle's answer, simpliciter, is yes it could. If that be so, it
perhaps becomes at least intelligible to reconsider some of our
favourite thought experiments as, so to speak, the interleaved
"dreams" of a single solipsistic multiple-personality. Such an
attempt, I suggest, while often bringing forth exceedingly puzzling
questions in itself, can sometimes resolve apparent paradoxes
(especially those related to identity) or at least offer some
interesting nuances.
OK. Keep in mind that I have taken a long time to translate UDA in
arithmetic. The possibility of this is given by the fact that a
computer is a mathematical, even arithmetical, object (with CT).
AUDA, that is the arithmetical UDA, is already, it seems to me (and I
can explain why) the result of an interview of a universal person,
notably on its many possible first person view.
I know we have discussed these ideas before and each time I have
proposed them to you in more or less the same terms as I have just
recapitulated. However your question, quoted above, gives me pause
that I have as yet failed to communicate the real gist and point
while at the same time succeeding in attaching additional,
unintended baggage.
Yes, I really feel to miss something.
Nonetheless I don't think we're necessarily too far apart. ISTM that
Hoyle's idea must rely on the opacity of 1p "personal history" to
delay, suspension, etc. in the 3p view, that you argue for in UDA
1-6. Where he goes a step further is to generalise this to a
"universalist" perspective (which hasn't been, I assume, any part
your own professional goal in this regard),
But I am not sure I can avoid it, as the discovery of the universal
machine, gives (by incompleteness) rich universal biology, universal
psychology, universal theology. The FPI applies to all universal
numbers, like lisp, your laptop, and you and me. The laws of physics
get also universal and invariant for all universal number or machine
perspective.
relying on the intuition that no moment is ever simultaneous with
any other moment: not "yours", not "mine".
Yes. It is a generalization from being in W and being in M after a
duplication. But in front the UD, all universal numbers are equal, and
the universal consciousness is plausibly the same for all universal
numbers.
But introduce a new randomness there, seems to me like reintroducing a
form of absolute random sampling. And I sincerely don't see why we
should do that.
"You" and "me" can then be understood as mere proxies for a deeper
unification. This might lead us to the remarkable intuition that the
universal first-person can indeed be understood in terms of a unique
first-personal serialisation. That in turn might lead us to wonder
what other "proxies", with whom we may bear some relation, may be
experiencing whilst we are "suspended". And so forth and so on.
OK.
Though I am tempted to provide a more specific rejoinder to your
question above, I hope that it may now succeed in answering itself
in the light of the foregoing points. If so, we might find ourselves
better able to consider some of the more "intriguing" consequences I
had in mind.
It would be nice if you really try to have an idea of what is done in
AUDA, so that you might find some way to explain and develop your
intuition. The key method is that the self is defined indexically
(where computer science excels), and everything proceeds from there.
I try hard to make sense of Hoyles, but I fail, may be it is because I
am blinded by the interview of the machine, or just by the discovery
of the universal machine, who knows.
I said blinded, but I could say astonished, bewildered, confounded,
blowed away, bowled over, confused, dazed, dumbfounded, retarded,
knocked over, overwhelmed, shocked, staggered, startled, stunned,
flabbergasted, taken aback, etc.
Both the UDA and the AUDA relies importantly of the discovery of the
universal machine in arithmetic.
Comp makes a non metaphoric use of that universal machine, which suits
well to the scientifically minded person, who can still appreciate
good metaphor, also, of course, but I continue to find that flashlight
and that randomness bizarre, to be franc. I might miss something.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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