On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 11:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 27 Jan 2014, at 16:33, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 27 Jan 2014, at 13:01, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Jan 27, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 27 Jan 2014, at 03:44, LizR wrote: >>> >>> On 27 January 2014 14:08, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 1/26/2014 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> I have provided the definition. Should I repeat? >>>> God is the transcendental reality we bet on, and which is supposed to >>>> be responsible for my or our existence. >>>> >>>> Sounds like "physics" to me. >>>> >>> >>> If physics is transcendental, a lot of people may be wasting their time >>> trying to find a TOE. >>> >>> >>> The physical TOE would be a very natural candidate for the general TOE, >>> if it was not dissolving consciousness and person when tackling the mind >>> body problem. >>> >>> The fact that the most coherent and rational materialist tend to >>> eliminate consciousness is coherent with the UDA conclusion. We cannot >>> have both a primitive materials universe, and a mechanist expanation of the >>> mind. >>> >> >> >> I have suggested based on string theory that we can have a primitive >> materialistic universe derived from >> >> >> If it is "primitive", it cannot be "derived from". >> i use "primitive" in the sense of "having to be assumed in the theory", >> or "not derivable" (yet, accepted). >> > Well, I got your attention. I'm happy to use "primitive" in a way that you understand. > >> >> >> >> the effectively complete computations of a metaverse machine and at the >> same time a mind and consciousness derived from an incomplete universe >> machine. That is, mind/body comes from two different comp machines, one >> infinite and the other finite. Richard >> >> >> It is a bit fuzzy, but that sounds reasonable. Yet, string theory comes >> from experimentation (if only because it is build on QM) which is, in comp, >> a bit of a sort of treachery. >> > > God is indeed treacherous, consisting of the programmer, the metaverse > comp(uter) machine and each universe comp machine > > > You are quick. > Thank you. But I am just finally brave enough to lay it all out. > > > in my string cosmology. The metaverse spacetime overlaps each universe > spacetime; and each are at least mental multiverses if not physical > multiverses. However, physical particles are computed early on by the > effectively complete metaverse machine. Consciousness stems from physical > complexity exceeding the Lloyd bit limit (10^120) of our universe, > > > "our universe"? That is what I want to explain and worse, what a mechanist > is obliged to explain. > It is not quite compatible with comp to associate consciousness to "our > universe". > Right on. Consciousness is actually computed in the metaverse once and for all time, like energy and matter, in a block metaverse containing universes, including all its physical machinations,* by your comp theory*assuming "effective completeness". I imagine, conjecture if you will, that the degree of completeness of a metaverse comp machine relates to effective particle-creation resolution (like a sub-Planck volume) as a function of its information bit-limit, which in turn depends on the size of the metaverse. We can imagine a growing metaverse which at first is only complete enough to compute/create real pockets of energy (black holes) but at a later stage of growth is complete enough to compute/create particles of energy and particles of matter using complex-arithmetic quantum computations. Richard > That is comp compatible, but only if *that* is derived from arithmetic. > (And it would be weird and forbid to say "yes" to any comp doctor, as in > this case comp, though true, is definitely not practical: we can't emulate > in one skull the "physical complexity exceeding the Lloyd bit limit > (10^120) of our universe". > > > which allows an unfettered connection to the metaverse, a sort of > Platonia. [Perhaps] > > > > I don't want to throw cold water on this, but if it is correct, and if > mechanism is correct, the "logical" modest point is that (to be TOE > complete and not put the person under the rug), you need to derive this > from any first order specification of any universal system (machine, > language, combinator, number, game, finite set theory, etc.) > > You might have the correct theology, but with mechanism, you have to > derive it from any universal u, computing a universal function phi_u, in > the list of the phi_i. > Equivalently you have to prove, in your theory if you want, that your > theory solves the comp measure problem. > That's why I hook my string cosmology to your comp star. But I am still unsure about the measure problem which seems to result from 1p controlled experiments, but such measures may not apply in general. > > You might try to explain what is the effectively complete (I know only > sigma_1 set or sentence to be like that in some sense) metaverse machine > (it looks like the UD). And why particles are computed before the dreams? > The whole block metaverse including particles and dreams are computed initially and then possibly refined if time exists. I don't believe, nor made sense of "Consciousness stems from physical > complexity exceeding the Lloyd bit limit (10^120) of our universe", but > that does not mean that there is no interesting idea there. > TBA > The comp subst level might be low then, below Planck length. Perhaps. > > Bruno > > > Richard > > > >> This prevents the use of the G/G* separation to be exploited for >> consciousness and qualia. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >>> Consciousness is the grain of dust in the picture of reality, which >>> will force us to come back to seriousness in the fundamental questioning >>> about the mind. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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