On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is that >> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, crucially, >> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious phenomena >> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But if >> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such extrinsic >> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, even >> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated remainder >> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it is >> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in >> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of >> reference in the first place. >> > > Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of causal > closure. > But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT in fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to John Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account (and which of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might otherwise wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a paradox. The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the view that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to refer to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious! I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, although it isn't IMO acknowledged as often as it should be, perhaps because of its very intractability. It's sometimes referred to as the Paradox of Phenomenal Judgement. David Chalmers, for example, acknowledges it in passing in The Conscious Mind, fails to offer any solution and then proceeds to ignore it. Gregg Rosenberg - who if you haven't read perhaps you should - deals with it a little more explicitly in A Place for Consciousness, but IMO ultimately also fails to square this particular circle. In fact I know of no mind-body theory, other than comp, that confronts it head-on and suggests at least the shape of a possible solution. That said, do you see what the paradox is and if you do, how specifically does your theory deal with it? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
