On 30 January 2014 02:19, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events possibly be >> linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of explanation? To >> put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute certainty "the fact >> that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to accept that this very >> assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, cannot have anything >> to do) with the fact that I am conscious! >> > > Sure, but the fact that you would expect that your assertion could or > should have anything to do with your being conscious would not make sense > in a universe in which consciousness did not exist in a fundamentally real > way. > I'm sorry, Craig, but nothing that you have said encourages me to believe that you have understood the paradox as posed or the particular problem it raises. What we must account for is that there is a causally closed extrinsic account, on which we rely utterly for every other purpose, that appears to refer to something with which it has no systematic connection. This would seem to imply that what truly exists is merely a "mechanism" that merely gives the appearance of making such references, but that this is in fact some sort of conceptual mistake (i.e. in truth there are no such references). Of course, were we to accept such a conclusion, we would be forced to eliminate consciousness, which is untenable to all but "objectivist" hard-liners who resolutely avert their eyes from the paradoxes that ensue. But postulating sense as fundamental doesn't save you from the paradox, unless you are willing to believe that the extrinsic account somehow just mimics the sensory one by some sort of "pre-established harmony" and that there is in fact no on-going systematic link between them. That's why, as I've argued in a post to Brent, we need a theory that is, at least, conceptually equipped to elucidate the systematic logical-causal links between *all* the domains that appear to be in play. Nothing that you have said persuades me that merely giving consciousness "fundamental" priority over everything else even addresses this issue. It merely reverses the paradox at the price of making the extrinsic account an isolated epiphenomenon and provides no explanation for how that epiphenomenon might be linked systematically to the "sense" it purports (per impossibile) to refer to. >From my reading of you, I think you have fallen into confusing the notions of fundamental and irreducible. But in the appropriate schema, it is possible for entities (conscious phenomena, for example) to be irreducible to simpler explanatory elements, whilst still being, in an effective sense, derivable from them by systematic "upwards" or "inner" reference. Of course, demonstrating this in detail requires argumentative and technical rigour, rather than mere intuitive poetry, and I leave that to those better equipped than myself. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
