On 30 Jan 2014, at 20:14, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/30/2014 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Is it not that very idea which leads to the notion of zombie?
If consciousness is an epiphenomenon, eliminating it would change nothing in the 3p.

Depends on what you mean by epiphenomenon. Is temperature an epiphenomenon of atomic matter?

Not at all. It is an emerging higher order physical phenomenon. It can be measured, shared, etc.

"Epiphenomenon" is used only in philosophy of mind, and is a sort of last step in the abandon on attempts to solve the mind-body problem. It is the last step before the elimination.

It accepts the "obvious" data of personal consciousness, but it deprives it on any role or relation with matter.

You can compare this with the utimate consequence of the UDA (step 8), which says that consciousness has no possible relation with matter.

Here the comp reversal solves that problem, because we abandon primitive matter, and the relation consciousness/matter becomes a problem of universal machine semantic. Primitive matter becomes an "epi-nomenon", which is what the weakest form of the Occam razor eliminates (like the invisible horses).




I think so, but you can't eliminate temperature; it's a consequence of the atomic structure and the potential for atomic motion.

Exactly. The problem of consciousness, for physicalists which believe that the physical is explanatively close, is that they can eliminate it (and some do). We cannot eliminate temperature in that sense.

With comp, we eliminate consciousness and matter. Of course. At the ontological level. But we recover them from internal indexical modalities, among many things.

You can use numbers or combinators, it is not important. The quasi- primitive notion, but fully fundamental notion, is the notion of person, and even the universal person that you get from Theaetetus + "Dx = xx". (To be short).

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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