On 31 January 2014 02:29, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Thursday, January 30, 2014 12:19:56 AM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> On 30 January 2014 16:00, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> > On 1/29/2014 5:06 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> > >> > On 29 January 2014 22:15, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> The problem that concerns me about this way of looking at things is >> >>> that >> >>> any and all behaviour associated with consciousness - including, >> >>> crucially, >> >>> the articulation of our very thoughts and beliefs about conscious >> >>> phenomena >> >>> - can at least in principle be exhausted by an extrinsic account. But >> >>> if >> >>> this be so, it is very difficult indeed to understand how such >> >>> extrinsic >> >>> behaviours could possibly make reference to any "intrinsic" remainder, >> >>> even >> >>> were its existence granted. It isn't merely that any postulated >> >>> remainder >> >>> would be redundant in the explanation of such behaviour, but that it >> >>> is >> >>> hardly possible to see how an inner dual could even be accessible in >> >>> principle to a complete (i.e. causally closed) extrinsic system of >> >>> reference >> >>> in the first place. >> >> >> >> >> >> Right, because the extrinsic perspective is blind to the limits of >> >> causal >> >> closure. >> > >> > >> > But I'm afraid the problem is precisely that it behaves as if it is NOT >> > in >> > fact blind to such limits. As Bruno points out in a recent response to >> > John >> > Clark, if we rely on the causal closure of the extrinsic account (and >> > which >> > of us does not?) then we commit ourselves to the view that there must be >> > such an account, at some level, of any behaviour to which we might >> > otherwise >> > wish to impute a conscious origin. However, my point above is that the >> > problem is in fact even worse than this. In fact, it amounts to a >> > paradox. >> > >> > The existence of a causally closed extrinsic account forces us to the >> > view >> > that the very thoughts and utterances - even our own - that purport to >> > refer >> > to irreducibly conscious phenomena must also be fully explicable >> > extrinsically. But how then could any such sequence of extrinsic events >> > possibly be linked to anything outside its causally-closed circle of >> > explanation? To put this baldly, even whilst asserting with absolute >> > certainty "the fact that I am conscious" I am forced nonetheless to >> > accept >> > that this very assertion need have nothing to do (and, more strongly, >> > cannot >> > have anything to do) with the fact that I am conscious! >> > >> > I take no credit for being the originator of this insight, >> > >> > >> > But you have explained it well. And it's not at all clear to me that >> > Bruno's computational theory avoids this paradox. It seems there will >> > still, in the UD computation, be a closed account of the physical >> > processes. >> > No doubt it will be computationally linked with some provable sentences, >> > which Bruno wants to then identify with beliefs. But this still leaves >> > beliefs as epiphenomena of the physical processes; even if comp explains >> > them both. >> >> I don't think there is a problem if consciousness is an epiphenomenon. >> If you start looking for consciousness being an extra thing with >> (perhaps) its own separate causal efficacy, that's where problems >> arise. > > > Then you would still have the problem of why there are epiphenomema. They > are already "an extra thing" with no functional explanation.
That statement assumes the possibility of zombies. If consciousness is epiphenomenal, zombies are impossible. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
