Maybe it will help to make the sense-primitive view clearer if we think of sense and motive as input and output.
This is only a step away from Comp, so it should not be construed to mean that I am defining sense and motive as merely input and output. My purpose here is just to demonstrate that Comp takes so much for granted that it is not even viable as a primitive within its own definitions. Can we all agree that the notion of input and output is ontologically essential to the function of computation? Is there any instance in which a computation is employed in which no program or data is input and from which no data is expected as output? This would suggest that computation can only be defined as a meaningful product in a non-comp environment, otherwise there would be no inputting and outputting, only instantaneous results within a Platonic ocean of arithmetic truth. Where do we find input and output within arithmetic though? What makes it happen without invoking a physical or experiential context? As an aside, its interesting to play with the idea of building a view of computation from a sensory-motive perspective. When we use a computer to automate mental tasks it could be said that we are 'unputting' the effort that would have been required otherwise. When we use a machine to emulate our own presence in our absence, such as a Facebook profile, we are "onputting" ourselves in some digital context. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
