On 1 February 2014 10:52, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Right, but that's my point. Computationalism overolooks its own >>> instantiation through input. It begins assuming that code is running. It >>> begins with the assumption that coding methods exist. I am saying that >>> those methods can only be sensory-motive, and that sensory-motive phenomena >>> must precede the first possible instance of computation. >>> >> >> I doubt J.A.W. would have accepted that as a valid crit of "It from Bit" >> and I can't see that it's valid for comp either (or even Edgar's >> whatever-the-hell-it-is). If brains compute, they presumably start by >> boostrapping themselves, and only later get programmed by input from the >> outside world. >> > > When did the world become 'outside' though? If you bootstrap from > immaterial Platonia that has no outside, how and why do numbers acquire > non-numerical dimensionality? > Standard usage. The world is outside the brain. > > >> Likewise one can imagine a self-assembling computer. This is simply >> *incidental* to how humans get computation done - like I/O, it isn't >> ontologically fundamental. >> > > I think that it is meta-ontologically fundamental. Comp just ignores the > question of I/O because it is too superficial of a treatment of reality to > examine it. > So now it's meta-ontologically fundamental. Please make your mind up what question you're asking. > > >> Computation without any output can be observed by examining the machinery >> involved, if necessary. But I bet you'll just redefine output to mean >> whatever the hell you want it to, just as you got around an honest attempt >> to show a flaw in your argument with a ridiculous comment about computation >> being academic without any output, as though a programme that hangs in an >> infinite loop without producing output is somehow not computing, >> > > It's not that it isn't computing, it is that it is impossible for it to > matter whether it is computing or not. Computing is irrelevant to us > without i/o, so why should we expect that it is any more relevant to > itself? I missed the honest attempt to show a flaw in my argument though - > which flaw is that? > The fact that I/O isn't ontologically fundamental to computation, that is to say, computation can proceed without I/O. I mentioned that it proceeds without I/O in various ways. > > >> as is a programme that runs in the background - the "magic" is supposed >> to happen at the moment of output? >> > > It's not magic, it's sensory experience. That which makes anything matter. > This is the sort of ontological assumption you should have stated up front. > > >> A programme that runs for 100 days factoring a huge number "didn't do >> anything" even though it racked up a massive power bill and used 99% of the >> CPU time and 95% of the memory if the plug gets pulled just before it gives >> its output? Sorry, but this is just nonsense. >> > > It's doing something, but what it is doing is completely worthless. There > is no functional difference between what it is doing and just spinning hard > drives. > OK, if that's going to be your view then fine. I will stop here because I don't think you're being honest and sticking to the original question, which I answered as well as I could. There is nothing fundamentally important about I/O to computation (unless you are committed to a certain set of assumptions which make it inevitable that there is, regardless of what anyone else says). Sorry but if you won't be honest or stick to the original point or accept that people trying to discuss something will use a set of normal assumptions about reality, I can't discuss it, because whatever I say, you will just change the rules. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
