On Friday, January 31, 2014 11:03:14 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> On 1 February 2014 10:52, Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>  Right, but that's my point. Computationalism overolooks its own 
>>>> instantiation through input. It begins assuming that code is running. It 
>>>> begins with the assumption that coding methods exist. I am saying that 
>>>> those methods can only be sensory-motive, and that sensory-motive 
>>>> phenomena 
>>>> must precede the first possible instance of computation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I doubt J.A.W. would have accepted that as a valid crit of "It from Bit" 
>>> and I can't see that it's valid for comp either (or even Edgar's 
>>> whatever-the-hell-it-is). If brains compute, they presumably start by 
>>> boostrapping themselves, and only later get programmed by input from the 
>>> outside world.
>>>
>>
>> When did the world become 'outside' though? If you bootstrap from 
>> immaterial Platonia that has no outside, how and why do numbers acquire 
>> non-numerical dimensionality?
>>
>
> Standard usage. The world is outside the brain. 
>

Comp isn't standard usage though. With Comp the brain is an appearance 
within a program (whatever an "appearance" is).
 

>  
>>
>>> Likewise one can imagine a self-assembling computer. This is simply 
>>> *incidental* to how humans get computation done - like I/O, it isn't 
>>> ontologically fundamental.
>>>
>>
>> I think that it is meta-ontologically fundamental. Comp just ignores the 
>> question of I/O because it is too superficial of a treatment of reality to 
>> examine it.
>>
>
> So now it's meta-ontologically fundamental. Please make your mind up what 
> question you're asking. 
>

My mind has always been made up. Fundamental to mean means absolutely 
fundamental. I use ontological or meta-ontological only to emphasize that I 
am not allowing any neat theoretical boxes that Comp can make for itself to 
hide in.
 

>  
>>
>>> Computation without any output can be observed by examining the 
>>> machinery involved, if necessary. But I bet you'll just redefine output to 
>>> mean whatever the hell you want it to, just as you got around an honest 
>>> attempt to show a flaw in your argument with a ridiculous comment about 
>>> computation being academic without any output, as though a programme that 
>>> hangs in an infinite loop without producing output is somehow not computing,
>>>
>>
>> It's not that it isn't computing, it is that it is impossible for it to 
>> matter whether it is computing or not. Computing is irrelevant to us 
>> without i/o, so why should we expect that it is any more relevant to 
>> itself? I missed the honest attempt to show a flaw in my argument though - 
>> which flaw is that?
>>
>
> The fact that I/O isn't ontologically fundamental to computation, that is 
> to say, computation can proceed without I/O. I mentioned that it proceeds 
> without I/O in various ways. 
>

It can only proceed if it begins. How can it begin without input? Not just 
how can the program begin to execute code, but how can "code" appear in the 
universe?
 

>  
>>
>>>  as is a programme that runs in the background - the "magic" is supposed 
>>> to happen at the moment of output? 
>>>
>>
>> It's not magic, it's sensory experience. That which makes anything matter.
>>
>
> This is the sort of ontological assumption you should have stated up 
> front. 
>

I think its an ontological assumption that nature makes, not me.
 

>  
>>
>>> A programme that runs for 100 days factoring a huge number "didn't do 
>>> anything" even though it racked up a massive power bill and used 99% of the 
>>> CPU time and 95% of the memory if the plug gets pulled just before it gives 
>>> its output? Sorry, but this is just nonsense.
>>>
>>
>> It's doing something, but what it is doing is completely worthless. There 
>> is no functional difference between what it is doing and just spinning hard 
>> drives.
>>
>
> OK, if that's going to be your view then fine. I will stop here because I 
> don't think you're being honest and sticking to the original question, 
> which I answered as well as I could. There is nothing fundamentally 
> important about I/O to computation (unless you are committed to a certain 
> set of assumptions which make it inevitable that there is, regardless of 
> what anyone else says).
>

It's not an assumption, it is a question. I am asking, what good is 
computation without input/output and isn't the fact of i/o completely 
overlooked in the ontology of computationalism. Given that, isn't it more 
likely that computationalism is false?
 

>
> Sorry but if you won't be honest or stick to the original point or accept 
> that people trying to discuss something will use a set of normal 
> assumptions about reality, I can't discuss it, because whatever I say, you 
> will just change the rules.
>

I haven't changed anything. "Normal assumptions" are for squares. What is 
the point of talking about something normal unless someone is paying you 
for it? 

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