On 1 February 2014 01:33, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Friday, January 31, 2014 2:15:55 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: > >> On 31 January 2014 17:13, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:32:02 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: >>>> >>>> It isn't *essential. *Technically, I believe I/O can be added to a >>>> computer programme as some sort of initial settings (for any given run of >>>> the programme). >>>> >>> >>> Added how though? By inputting code, yes? >>> >> >> All code has to be input. That isn't input TO the programme, however, >> it's setting up the programme before it is run. >> > > Right, but that's my point. Computationalism overolooks its own > instantiation through input. It begins assuming that code is running. It > begins with the assumption that coding methods exist. I am saying that > those methods can only be sensory-motive, and that sensory-motive phenomena > must precede the first possible instance of computation. > I doubt J.A.W. would have accepted that as a valid crit of "It from Bit" and I can't see that it's valid for comp either (or even Edgar's whatever-the-hell-it-is). If brains compute, they presumably start by boostrapping themselves, and only later get programmed by input from the outside world. Likewise one can imagine a self-assembling computer. This is simply *incidental* to how humans get computation done - like I/O, it isn't ontologically fundamental. > >>> >>>> Obviously this isn't much use in practice, of course! But from a >>>> philosophical perspective it's possible, so it isn't ontologically >>>> essential to the function of computation. >>>> >>>> A trivial example would be my son's Python programme to generate 2000 >>>> digits of pi. It just uses some existing equation which generates each >>>> digit in sequence. It happens to write the output to the screen, but if he >>>> took out the relevant PRINT statement, it wouldn't - but it would still >>>> compute the result. >>>> >>> >>> The existing equation was input at some point though, and without the >>> output, whether or not there was a computation is academic (and >>> unfalsifiable). >>> >> >> That wasn't the point. The question was whether I/O is ontologically >> essential to the function of computation. Quite clearly, the answer is no. >> The function of computation *can* exist without any I/O, so that answers >> the question. >> > > I disagree. I don't think that we know that. There is no possible case > where computation without output is observed, so we cannot assume that > computation is ontologically possible without output. We cannot assume that > theoretical computation is free from the ontological constraints that real > computation is subject to in our experience. > Computation without any output can be observed by examining the machinery involved, if necessary. But I bet you'll just redefine output to mean whatever the hell you want it to, just as you got around an honest attempt to show a flaw in your argument with a ridiculous comment about computation being academic without any output, as though a programme that hangs in an infinite loop without producing output is somehow not computing, as is a programme that runs in the background - the "magic" is supposed to happen at the moment of output? A programme that runs for 100 days factoring a huge number "didn't do anything" even though it racked up a massive power bill and used 99% of the CPU time and 95% of the memory if the plug gets pulled just before it gives its output? Sorry, but this is just nonsense. I gave the answer to your question. The answer was no. If that doesn't fit with some theory, redesign the theory, don't go into an Edgar-spiral of hand-waving and spouting nonsense. > >> I was just answering your question honestly and as accurately as I could. >> If you're going to change the question to something else when I attempt to >> answer it, I won't bother in future. >> > > You're answering it honestly, but you are assuming a universe in which > sensory experience is theoretical and computation is actual. I am pointing > out that this is a theoretical perspective. > > I'm answering it within the bounds of the everyday experience we have with computers. I don't say sensory experience is theoretical, I just assume the standard model of how things work. If you are going to make some weird ontological assumptions I would appreciate it if you stated them up front and kept reminding me that this is the basis you're working on. Otherwise I assume the default assumptions for the field in question, which in this case is computation. I gave an honest answer on that basis, but since it showed the answer was one you didn't like, you immediately moved the goalposts. To be honest, although I think you were asking a genuine question, that is exactly what trolls do. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
