On Friday, January 31, 2014 4:09:38 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: > > On 1 February 2014 01:33, Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:> > > wrote: > >> On Friday, January 31, 2014 2:15:55 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: >> >>> On 31 January 2014 17:13, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On Thursday, January 30, 2014 10:32:02 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: >>>>> >>>>> It isn't *essential. *Technically, I believe I/O can be added to a >>>>> computer programme as some sort of initial settings (for any given run of >>>>> the programme). >>>>> >>>> >>>> Added how though? By inputting code, yes? >>>> >>> >>> All code has to be input. That isn't input TO the programme, however, >>> it's setting up the programme before it is run. >>> >> >> Right, but that's my point. Computationalism overolooks its own >> instantiation through input. It begins assuming that code is running. It >> begins with the assumption that coding methods exist. I am saying that >> those methods can only be sensory-motive, and that sensory-motive phenomena >> must precede the first possible instance of computation. >> > > I doubt J.A.W. would have accepted that as a valid crit of "It from Bit" > and I can't see that it's valid for comp either (or even Edgar's > whatever-the-hell-it-is). If brains compute, they presumably start by > boostrapping themselves, and only later get programmed by input from the > outside world. >
When did the world become 'outside' though? If you bootstrap from immaterial Platonia that has no outside, how and why do numbers acquire non-numerical dimensionality? > Likewise one can imagine a self-assembling computer. This is simply > *incidental* to how humans get computation done - like I/O, it isn't > ontologically fundamental. > I think that it is meta-ontologically fundamental. Comp just ignores the question of I/O because it is too superficial of a treatment of reality to examine it. > >>>> >>>>> Obviously this isn't much use in practice, of course! But from a >>>>> philosophical perspective it's possible, so it isn't ontologically >>>>> essential to the function of computation. >>>>> >>>>> A trivial example would be my son's Python programme to generate 2000 >>>>> digits of pi. It just uses some existing equation which generates each >>>>> digit in sequence. It happens to write the output to the screen, but if >>>>> he >>>>> took out the relevant PRINT statement, it wouldn't - but it would still >>>>> compute the result. >>>>> >>>> >>>> The existing equation was input at some point though, and without the >>>> output, whether or not there was a computation is academic (and >>>> unfalsifiable). >>>> >>> >>> That wasn't the point. The question was whether I/O is ontologically >>> essential to the function of computation. Quite clearly, the answer is no. >>> The function of computation *can* exist without any I/O, so that >>> answers the question. >>> >> >> I disagree. I don't think that we know that. There is no possible case >> where computation without output is observed, so we cannot assume that >> computation is ontologically possible without output. We cannot assume that >> theoretical computation is free from the ontological constraints that real >> computation is subject to in our experience. >> > > Computation without any output can be observed by examining the machinery > involved, if necessary. But I bet you'll just redefine output to mean > whatever the hell you want it to, just as you got around an honest attempt > to show a flaw in your argument with a ridiculous comment about computation > being academic without any output, as though a programme that hangs in an > infinite loop without producing output is somehow not computing, > It's not that it isn't computing, it is that it is impossible for it to matter whether it is computing or not. Computing is irrelevant to us without i/o, so why should we expect that it is any more relevant to itself? I missed the honest attempt to show a flaw in my argument though - which flaw is that? > as is a programme that runs in the background - the "magic" is supposed to > happen at the moment of output? > It's not magic, it's sensory experience. That which makes anything matter. > A programme that runs for 100 days factoring a huge number "didn't do > anything" even though it racked up a massive power bill and used 99% of the > CPU time and 95% of the memory if the plug gets pulled just before it gives > its output? Sorry, but this is just nonsense. > It's doing something, but what it is doing is completely worthless. There is no functional difference between what it is doing and just spinning hard drives. > I gave the answer to your question. The answer was no. If that doesn't fit > with some theory, redesign the theory, don't go into an Edgar-spiral of > hand-waving and spouting nonsense. > Your objections were already factored in before I asked the question. Obviously computer science does not consider i/o to be ontologically necessary, but I am proposing that is because computer science is theoretical and exists within a toy model of itself, rather than a thorough account of what is ontologically required realistically for computation to arise. >>> I was just answering your question honestly and as accurately as I >>> could. If you're going to change the question to something else when I >>> attempt to answer it, I won't bother in future. >>> >> >> You're answering it honestly, but you are assuming a universe in which >> sensory experience is theoretical and computation is actual. I am pointing >> out that this is a theoretical perspective. >> >> I'm answering it within the bounds of the everyday experience we have > with computers. I don't say sensory experience is theoretical, I just > assume the standard model of how things work. > It is usually a mistake to assume the standard model of how things work, IMO. > If you are going to make some weird ontological assumptions I would > appreciate it if you stated them up front and kept reminding me that this > is the basis you're working on. > I assume nothing except what I have no choice to assume from my own experience. > Otherwise I assume the default assumptions for the field in question, > which in this case is computation. I gave an honest answer on that basis, > but since it showed the answer was one you didn't like, you immediately > moved the goalposts. > It's not that I don't like it, it is the one I expected. I'm proposing that it is an incomplete account of reality which makes computationalism seem more plausible than it will ever be. > > To be honest, although I think you were asking a genuine question, that is > exactly what trolls do. > I don't understand trolling. Seems like a waste of time. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
