On 30 Jan 2014, at 21:14, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Jan 29, 2014 at 2:06 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> the external objective environment (the weather, a syringe full
of drugs, a punch to the face) can cause a big subjective change.
> I have no doubt that this is true. The point is that IF you have a
complete 3p theory of the brain-body, you can't prove that the
subjective experience exist.
I don't need a proof because I have something better, I have direct
experience of the subjective.
Nice for you. But that does not invalidate the point that you can't
prove this to an other person, or in the 3p sense. You don't show that
eliminativism is inconsistent.
I don't have direct experience of YOUR conscious experience because
it is a logical contradiction, if I did have it you wouldn't be you,
you'd be me.
> And a subjective experience like a itch can cause a external
objective effect, like moving the matter in your hand to scratch the
matter in your nose.
>Sure. But again, if someone does not believe in that subjective
experience, then a 3p causal description at some level will explain
the external objective effect without mentioning the subjective
experience. I agree with you of course, but that is what makes a
part of the problem.
Problem? What's the problem? If I do not believe in your subjective
experience, as you say above, then I certainly don't need to explain
it. And if I do believe in your subjective experience then I can say
it was caused by the way matter interacts (which can be fully
described by information) just as I already know from direct
experience that my subjective experience is caused.
That mundane explanation might be locally valid, but your own idea
that consciousness is not localized (which indeed follows from comp)
introduces a major difficulty, or an interesting problem.
Indeed, you are presently delocalized into an infinity of
computations, and matter make sense only if it obeys some statistics
on the computations (the FPI on UD*, or the arithmetical FPI, as you
should know by now).
And if I also believe that consciousness is fundamental, that is to
say a sequence of "What caused that?" questions is not infinite and
consciousness comes at the end, then there is nothing more that can
be said on the subject.
Yes, but you have to invoke some non-comp to localize yourself in some
unique reality, with selection principles, etc. Just a lot of
supplementary ad hoc hypotheses to put the problem under the rug.
But, once you believe that your consciousness is invariant for some
"digital transformation", then you can begin to understand that we
have to justify the physical from modalities associated to that those
digital transformations. And the logic of self-reference, together
with the most classical definition of knowledge, paves the way, with
testable statements.
Somehow, you just say that you are not interested in the mind-body
problem.
>>>> I think consciousness is probably just the way information
feels when it is being processed;
>>>In which computations. You admit yourself that consciousness
cannot be localized in one brain,
>> Yes, because computations can't be localized either.
> Excellent. Like the numbers. They don't belong to the type of
object having any physical attributes like position, velocity or mass.
And position not being relevant to consciousness is the reason your
increasingly convoluted thought experiment about where the "real
you" is located is worthless.
But I have never talk about any "real you". *you* have tried to link
the FPI with the identity question, but this has been thoroughly
invalidated more than one time, by different people. This is a bit
gross.
I stay in the 3p, because in UDA we use only the most superficial
aspect of the first person, that you mention above, and which is the
direct access to the personal memory (technically, the one which is
annihilated and reconstituted in the WM experiences).
Your difficulty on step 3 looks like a childish bad faith. I don't
believe it. Ask question if you have a "real" difficulty, but don't
use your traditional irrelevant dismissive and confusing rhetoric
please.
Like you said once, we can't predict, in Helsinki, W or M, and that's
all. It is an arithmetical truth, no number can predict its next
*first person* states in case of multiplication of its computations.
If you believe that a number or a machine can do that, you have to
provide an algorithm, or a proof that such an algorithm exists. It is
a child play to explain that it cannot exist, already with the simple
3p definition of the 1p used in the UDA.
Bruno
John K Clark
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