On 31 Jan 2014, at 20:57, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jan 31, 2014 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> I don't need a proof because I have something better, I have
direct experience of the subjective.
> Nice for you.
Indeed.
> But that does not invalidate the point that you can't prove this
to an other person,
I can't even prove that there is another person that I could present
a potential proof to.
Exactly.
>> Problem? What's the problem? If I do not believe in your
subjective experience, as you say above, then I certainly don't need
to explain it. And if I do believe in your subjective experience
then I can say it was caused by the way matter interacts (which can
be fully described by information) just as I already know from
direct experience that my subjective experience is caused.
> That mundane explanation might be locally valid, but your own idea
that consciousness is not localized
Yes. Do you find a contradiction in that? I don't.
I don't either. Only an interesting problem for the computationalists.
> Indeed, you are presently delocalized into an infinity of
computations,
And if Everett is correct there are a infinite number of Bruno
Marchals , that would certainly be odd but where is the contradiction?
Nobody said there was a contradiction. Only an interesting problem.
>> And if I also believe that consciousness is fundamental, that is
to say a sequence of "What caused that?" questions is not infinite
and consciousness comes at the end, then there is nothing more that
can be said on the subject.
> Yes, but you have to invoke some non-comp to localize yourself in
some unique reality
Fine, then feel free to "invoke some non-comp" or invoke more "comp"
if that floats your boat, I no longer care. I've given up trying to
find a consistent definition of your silly little word "comp" that
is used on this list and nowhere else.
False. You stop at step 3, not step 0, which means that you accept the
definition of comp provided here.
Your endless homemade acronyms that you pretend every educated
person should know get tiresome too.
Childish immature remark.
> once you believe that your consciousness is invariant for some
"digital transformation"
I do believe that.
Good. That's comp.
> then you can begin to understand that we have to justify the
physical from modalities associated to that those digital
transformations.
Although it doesn't necessarily follow the digital transformation of
consciousness is perfectly consistent with the matter in the desk
I'm pounding my hand on right now as simply being a subroutine in
the johnkclak program, and the same is true of the matter in my hand.
Only by a confusion 1p and 3p, that you illustrate the day you are
stuck at the step 3.
> Somehow, you just say that you are not interested in the mind-body
problem.
Well, nobody around here has said anything very interesting about
the mind-body problem.
Because you confuse 1p and 3p, again and again and again, despite in
some post you don't.
Which rise the question of what is your agenda.
And if the sequence of "what caused that?" questions are not
infinite than after a certain point there just isn't anything more
of interest to say about the mind-body problem.
That applies to all problem.
> Like you said once, we can't predict, in Helsinki, W or M, and
that's all.
I can't predict the answer because you haven't precisely formulated
what the question is.
I did. You are the one systematically ADDING confusion, by dismissing
the 1p/3p distinction, or asking for no relevant point on personal
identity. You are the only person stuck in step 3 that I know.
I thank you for making public the kind of hand waving needed to stop
there indeed.
Bruno
> I stay in the 3p, because in UDA we use only the most superficial
aspect of the first person
I've looked yet again but I still don't see it:
http://uda.varsity.com/
John K Clark
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