On 3 February 2014 08:31, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the > significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it > as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs couched in an > impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but you consistently dodge > (or perhaps don't really get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't > merely that physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though > that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes > from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this, > physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of > which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to > behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena. > Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism > that entails that they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly > have any access to them. > > > But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could just > as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically necessary aspect > of the causally-close physics; that it's no more separable than is > temperature from molecular motion. >
Sounds like Max Tegmark's latest notion? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
