On 03 Feb 2014, at 18:04, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 03 Feb 2014, at 14:55, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 02 Feb 2014, at 23:29, LizR wrote:
On 3 February 2014 08:31, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota
the significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy
to disarm it as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-
sequiturs couched in an impenetrable private jargon. You quote
Chalmers, but you consistently dodge (or perhaps don't really
get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't merely that
physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though
that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical
entailment comes from confronting the stark realisation that,
despite this, physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the
appearances in terms of which we interact both with "ourselves"
and with each other) continue to behave *as if* they were laying
claim to such conscious phenomena. Furthermore, they apparently
do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism that entails that
they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly have any
access to them.
But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One
could just as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically
necessary aspect of the causally-close physics; that it's no more
separable than is temperature from molecular motion.
Sounds like Max Tegmark's latest notion?
But from my reading of "Consciousness from Matter" Tegmark
concludes that matter (or physics) does not have enough bits
(EG. 37 classical bits and even fewer quantum bits) to support
human consciousness. Richard
You quote Liz here. And I am not sure what you mean by physics or
matter not having enough bits.
If you can elaborate a little bit (pun included :)
Excerpt from Tegmarks conclusions in http://arxiv.org/pdf/1401.1219v1.pdf
"Information stored in Hopfield neural networks is naturally error
corrected, but 10^11 neurons support only about 37 bits of
integrated information. This leaves us with an integration paradox:
why does the information content of our conscious experience appear
to be vastly larger than 37 bits. We found that generalizing these
results to quantum information exacerbated this integration paradox,
allowing no more than about a quarter of a bit of integrated
information."
I would copy over more of his paper of my computer would allow me to
copy PDFs.
I download it. But when a physicist get close to teh comp solution, it
might be preferable to not read, as it might push me in
surinterpreti,g the universal machine :)
(But here, he seems to contradict his cosmological ideas, I don't know).
The above is a retype of his key result that 10^11 neurons cannot
support consciousness. He goes on to suggest several additional
principles to supplement the integration principle and possibly get
more than 37 bits. Richard
?
Why not just stop betting on Hopfield neural networks?
With comp it is not yet clear neurons filters consciousness or support
it.
I am amazed by that notion of integrate information, because very
little number can support very large amount of information, which
makes me feel that his integration constraints is too strong. Did he
took into account the glial cells, and their complex relationships
they have with the neurons.
37 bits? Well, perhaps, in the early morning, before the first drug
(coffee) :)
Bruno
My remark (just below) was just that the analogy temperature/
molecular-kinetics == consciousness/brain is not valid, as both
temperature and kinetics are 3p, and consciousness/brain is 1p/3p.
That is a general remark which does not depend on number of bits.
Bruno
Then he should read Putnam or any philosophers of mind. The idea
that that mind is to the brain what temperature is for molecular
notion is a well known 3p/1p confusion (which by the way appears
indeed in some of Tegmark frog/bird metaphor (where 3p and 1p are
often mixed).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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