On 02 Feb 2014, at 23:29, LizR wrote:
On 3 February 2014 08:31, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the
significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to
disarm it as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs
couched in an impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but
you consistently dodge (or perhaps don't really get) the point he
is making. His analysis isn't merely that physics seems to make
consciousness causally irrelevant, though that in itself would be
daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes from confronting
the stark realisation that, despite this, physically-instantiated
bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of which we
interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to
behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena.
Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed
mechanism that entails that they neither possess these phenomena
nor could plausibly have any access to them.
But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could
just as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically
necessary aspect of the causally-close physics; that it's no more
separable than is temperature from molecular motion.
Sounds like Max Tegmark's latest notion?
Then he should read Putnam or any philosophers of mind. The idea that
that mind is to the brain what temperature is for molecular notion is
a well known 3p/1p confusion (which by the way appears indeed in some
of Tegmark frog/bird metaphor (where 3p and 1p are often mixed).
Bruno
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