On 03 Feb 2014, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/3/2014 1:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Feb 2014, at 09:24, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/3/2014 12:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 02 Feb 2014, at 20:31, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota
the significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so
easy to disarm it as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-
sequiturs couched in an impenetrable private jargon. You quote
Chalmers, but you consistently dodge (or perhaps don't really
get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't merely that
physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though
that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical
entailment comes from confronting the stark realisation that,
despite this, physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e.
the appearances in terms of which we interact both with
"ourselves" and with each other) continue to behave *as if*
they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena.
Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-
closed mechanism that entails that they neither possess these
phenomena nor could plausibly have any access to them.
But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One
could just as well conclude that consciousness is a
nomologically necessary aspect of the causally-close physics;
that it's no more separable than is temperature from molecular
motion.
That analogy is limited. You can explain temperature from
molecules cinetics by remaining entirely in the 3p account. The
mind-body problem is that if you can explain the whole 3p of the
1p, then the mind seems having no role at all.
Which is analogous. You could explain the cooling of your coffee
entirely in terms of molecular motion without mentioning
temperature. But you would not have eliminated temperature.
Because it is an unavoidable reality, that we can test and verify.
But consciousness of others cannot be verified.
That is why you do indeed seems to believe that consciousness could
go away like the "élan vital" or the phlogiston, but typically, you
do not say that for temperature!
But I don't believe that. I think that consciousness is a necessary
aspect of intelligence,
OK.
and that is functionally observable.
It is not. Leibniz already understood this. You evacuate the mind-body
problem. No 3p observation can detect consciousness. It is pure 1p. We
can detect evidences that some entities behave as if they were
conscious, but materialists would not been tempted to eliminate it if
it was observable.
Now with comp we take the mind seriously and can explain its
necessity and role (like with the hypostases), but we lost any
ontic place for matter, so we lost primitive physics, and we have
to recover it by a statistics on the 1p brought by all
computations.
It is not a problem (except for Aristotelian fundamentalists)
because nobody has ever provided evidences for primitive matter
or physicalism. It is only a big assumption in metaphysics.
I'd say it is a very small assumption. Matter is assumed, but
nothing about it is assumed except that it is independent of us
and we can agree on it.
It is not independent of "us" (when us = the universal machines, or
the Löbian one).
?? So now 1+1=2 is *not* independent of us?
It is. I was referring on the primitive matter, which depends on us
through the FPI, by UDA.
Primitive matter is not a small assumption. It is in contradiction
with computationalism, and the occam abandon of epinoumena (like
invisible horses, élan vitale).
It's like your idea of god: it's just a place holder name for
whatever physicist will use as fundamental in their explanation.
We could call it goar.
It is a place holder name for the transcendental reality
responsible for our existence, and that we can search.
To say that it is a a place holder name for whatever physicist will
use as fundamental in their explanation is to adopt the
Aristotelian Matter God-or-Goar.
You again falsely assume that physicist have already ruled out some
immaterial as being goar - in spite of the fact that it is
physicists who are promoting mathematicalism.
Well, I did it before, and yes, I have had no problem with some
physicists, and big problems with others (who were Bohmian, to be sure).
Also, comp go against physicalism, which is deeper than just
immaterialism.
And physicists promoting immaterialism are rare. Even Tegmark seems to
withdraw from it, at least in his material consciousness paper.
But concerning pour point, all I say is that science has not yet
decide between Aristotle and Plato, and I show that with comp we get
Plato: physics is not the fundamental science: it is explained by the
a measure on all computations, and I ahve tested the measure one, it
does obey a quantum logic.
It's as though you have denominated physicists as the bad guys in a
morality play about the evils of materialism.
Not the physicists. Only the physicalists. It is a big difference.
Physicists just ignore theology, but physicalists use the Aristotelian
theology, and sometimes comp: but that is not going to work.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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