On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 03 Feb 2014, at 14:55, Richard Ruquist wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 02 Feb 2014, at 23:29, LizR wrote: >> >> On 3 February 2014 08:31, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 2/2/2014 5:37 AM, David Nyman wrote: >>> >>> Craig, nothing you have said so far diminishes by a single iota the >>> significance of the paradox to your theory. It's not so easy to disarm it >>> as insouciantly interpolating armfuls of non-sequiturs couched in an >>> impenetrable private jargon. You quote Chalmers, but you consistently dodge >>> (or perhaps don't really get) the point he is making. His analysis isn't >>> merely that physics seems to make consciousness causally irrelevant, though >>> that in itself would be daunting enough. The paradoxical entailment comes >>> from confronting the stark realisation that, despite this, >>> physically-instantiated bodies and brains (i.e. the appearances in terms of >>> which we interact both with "ourselves" and with each other) continue to >>> behave *as if* they were laying claim to such conscious phenomena. >>> Furthermore, they apparently do so by means of a causally-closed mechanism >>> that entails that they neither possess these phenomena nor could plausibly >>> have any access to them. >>> >>> >>> But the "apparently" in the above is not apparent at all. One could >>> just as well conclude that consciousness is a nomologically necessaryaspect >>> of the causally-close physics; that it's no more separable than is >>> temperature from molecular motion. >>> >> >> Sounds like Max Tegmark's latest notion? >> >> > But from my reading of "Consciousness from Matter" Tegmark concludes that > matter (or physics) does not have enough bits > (EG. 37 classical bits and even fewer quantum bits) to support human > consciousness. Richard > > > You quote Liz here. And I am not sure what you mean by physics or matter > not having enough bits. > If you can elaborate a little bit (pun included :) > Excerpt from Tegmarks conclusions in http://arxiv.org/pdf/1401.1219v1.pdf "Information stored in Hopfield neural networks is naturally error corrected, but 10^11 neurons support only about 37 bits of integrated information. This leaves us with an integration paradox: why does the information content of our conscious experience appear to be vastly larger than 37 bits. We found that generalizing these results to quantum information exacerbated this integration paradox, allowing no more than about a quarter of a bit of integrated information." I would copy over more of his paper of my computer would allow me to copy PDFs. The above is a retype of his key result that 10^11 neurons cannot support consciousness. He goes on to suggest several additional principles to supplement the integration principle and possibly get more than 37 bits. Richard > > My remark (just below) was just that the analogy > temperature/molecular-kinetics == consciousness/brain is not valid, as both > temperature and kinetics are 3p, and consciousness/brain is 1p/3p. That is > a general remark which does not depend on number of bits. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Then he should read Putnam or any philosophers of mind. The idea that >> that mind is to the brain what temperature is for molecular notion is a >> well known 3p/1p confusion (which by the way appears indeed in some of >> Tegmark frog/bird metaphor (where 3p and 1p are often mixed). >> >> Bruno >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
