Ta very much :)
On 3 February 2014 23:24, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > I will try to precis Flux at some point - in the meantime, here are a few > comments ("Flux" was written in 1963, by Moorcock and Barrington Bayley - > my favourite fantasy and SF writers, respectively). > > `Flux' is a sardonic retelling of the H. G. Wells classic tale `The Time > Machine'. In a near-future European Union facing economic and social > collapse, the multi-skilled genius Max File is sent 10 years into the > future to try and divine where things went wrong, and how calamity may be > prevented. Unfortunately time travel is a tricky business, and Max soon > finds himself going farther in space and time than he ever expected.... > > ----------- > > When the government of the European Economic Community has no idea what to > do next, they send Marshall-in-Chief Max File ten years into the future to > find out the eventual effects of their actions. > > Although this story was too abstract for my taste, I did enjoy the early > presentation of what today might be called a Boltzmann Brain. [Apr 2012] > > *The world from which he had come, or any other world for that matter, > could dissipate into its component elements at any instant, or could have > come into being at any previous instant, complete with everybody's > memories!* > -------------------------- > > Here is a review... > > > http://www.graemesfantasybookreview.com/2010/07/flux-michael-moorcockbarrington-bayley_07.html > > > > On 4 February 2014 12:12, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 2 February 2014 18:53, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> I will come back on this when I have time >>> >> >> Thanks. >> >> >>> but - to continue my suggestions re SF stories - "Flux" by Michael >>> Moorcock addresses the "momentary frog question" rather nicely. >>> Philosophically, at least, it is always possible that we ARE just momentary >>> frogs. >>> >> >> I can't seem to locate a reasonably priced copy of this. You would be >> doing me a most tremendous favour if you could precise the relevant bits? >> >> Actually, I've had the glimmer of an idea. It's not fully worked out, but >> I'll just dump what I have. When Mad Max talks about the bird view, the >> assumption is that it's a panoptic (god's eye) view that encompasses all >> the momentary frogs together. IOW, all the frog perspectives are available >> "simultaneously" from this extrinsic perspective. When he talks about the >> frog view, it's natural to think of the focus as collapsing right down to >> that of a single momentary frog. But perhaps we should rather think of the >> frog focus as continuing to be fundamentally panoptic (i.e. encompassing >> all the frog perspectives) except that "down there" the extrinsic >> simultaneity is intrinsically broken by the discrete perspective of each >> momentary frog. If so, one could then see Hoyle's heuristic as a frog's eye >> view of the experiential consequences of this broken simultaneity. >> >> David >> >>> >>> >>> On 3 February 2014 03:19, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 2 February 2014 03:42, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> To answer the question about the frogs. We imagine we are an "extended >>>>> frog" because of memory; without it we really would be stuck in the >>>>> present >>>>> moment, a series of individual isolated moments - and completely unable to >>>>> function, of course. (If you haven't seen "Memento" do so because it's >>>>> very >>>>> good AND it shows the illusion of continuity up very nicely.) >>>>> >>>>> Ironically I don't have any more time to write on this! Later... >>>>> >>>> >>>> Actually I was lucky enough to see Memento when it was premiered at >>>> Sundance in 2001, I think. Great movie. >>>> >>>> Yes, I've got the bit about memory - this allows each "momentary frog" >>>> to perceive itself as an "extended frog". But now we seem to have conjured >>>> up a collection of momentary frogs each one of which imagines itself to be >>>> an extended frog with more or less history, if you see what I mean. What >>>> I'm interested in is why or how this could resolve into a singular >>>> momentary frog that has the impression of one history that keeps extending >>>> itself. One can see that this must be true of each of the momentary frogs, >>>> each stuck in its pigeon hole, so to speak, but the logic we are discussing >>>> seems to imply that each such frog is deluded and that its particular >>>> history (memory, that is ) never in fact changes. >>>> >>>> The more I think about this the worse it gets. I realise that I can >>>> never actually prove that I'm not just one of those momentary frogs stuck >>>> in a pigeon hole with my memories of a past history, because that frog >>>> could never observe any "transition" to a future moment (i.e. one not yet >>>> encoded in its memory) in which that proof would occur. But accepting that >>>> "I" am just one such momentary frog seems about as difficult as believing I >>>> am not conscious simply because I apparently can't appeal to consciousness >>>> to explain why I'm having the thought that I'm conscious (another thread!). >>>> I think this is what Hoyle was getting at with his flashlight: we can't >>>> seem to help thinking of ourselves successively as one frog at different >>>> times. His flashlight idea just pumps the intuition that though we can >>>> consider the pigeon holes in any order we like, we can't seem to avoid >>>> considering them in some sort of order, even if that order is merely >>>> logical, not temporal (because the temporal ordering is already in the >>>> pigeon holes themselves). >>>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
