On 04 Feb 2014, at 17:46, David Nyman wrote:
On 4 February 2014 10:14, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
But perhaps we should rather think of the frog focus as continuing
to be fundamentally panoptic (i.e. encompassing all the frog
perspectives) except that "down there" the extrinsic simultaneity
is intrinsically broken by the discrete perspective of each
momentary frog. If so, one could then see Hoyle's heuristic as a
frog's eye view of the experiential consequences of this broken
simultaneity.
I think that is is what happen when we apply the theaeteus
definition on provability, except that provability is already a
symmetry broker, then the Theaetetus makes it even more assymetrical
(irreflexive, even), and the miracle is more in the fact that,
defining the physical reality from that move, we get the core
symmetry back.
Yes, the idea I'm trying to convey is that the symmetry of the
frog's panoptic view is broken, or breaks itself, as a consequence
of its intrinsic non-simultaneity, and this, at least for me, is the
intuition that Hoyle's heuristic fundamentally conveys. This
internal asymmetry of simultaneity obviates any requirement to
appeal to any further extrinsic principle of symmetry breaking, so
Hoyle's selective principle becomes merely a conceptual ladder to be
cast aside once we have used it to imaginatively descend "down
here". In a different but related sense, the "physical symmetry" re-
emerges from any one of the frog's discrete perspectives. I guess
this is what you mean by the miracle, and yes, I do regard this as a
major prize if indeed the comp assumption is correct.
OK.
Thanks for the nice summaries too, in some of your post.
I hope I will be able to clarify this for you with the self-
reference (modal) logics.
I hope so too!
I think the people begin to be prepare for it. Now, there are many
posts, and the things of life, ... ASAP.
Bruno
David
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