On 4 February 2014 10:14, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:

> But perhaps we should rather think of the frog focus as continuing to be
> fundamentally panoptic (i.e. encompassing all the frog perspectives) except
> that "down there" the extrinsic simultaneity is intrinsically broken by the
> discrete perspective of each momentary frog. If so, one could then see
> Hoyle's heuristic as a frog's eye view of the experiential consequences of
> this broken simultaneity.
>
> I think that is is what happen when we apply the theaeteus definition on
> provability, except that provability is already a symmetry broker, then the
> Theaetetus makes it even more assymetrical (irreflexive, even), and the
> miracle is more in the fact that, defining the physical reality from that
> move, we get the core symmetry back.
>

Yes, the idea I'm trying to convey is that the symmetry of the frog's
panoptic view is broken, or breaks itself, as a consequence of its
intrinsic non-simultaneity, and this, at least for me, is the intuition
that Hoyle's heuristic fundamentally conveys. This internal asymmetry of
simultaneity obviates any requirement to appeal to any further extrinsic
principle of symmetry breaking, so Hoyle's selective principle becomes
merely a conceptual ladder to be cast aside once we have used it to
imaginatively descend "down here". In a different but related sense, the
"physical symmetry" re-emerges from any one of the frog's discrete
perspectives. I guess this is what you mean by the miracle, and yes, I do
regard this as a major prize if indeed the comp assumption is correct.


> I hope I will be able to clarify this for you with the self-reference
> (modal) logics.
>

I hope so too!

David

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