On 10 Feb 2014, at 17:36, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Feb 9, 2014 at 2:38 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>>> 1p = the content of the diary of the guy who enter actually the
teleportation box.
>> And what is the unique consistent definition of " the 1p" after
the duplication has been performed?
> For the guy in M, it is the the content of the diary,
That is a great answer, too bad its not the answer to the question
that I asked. My question was "what is the unique consistent
definition of "the 1p" after the duplication has been performed?".
In the 3-1 view, that does not exist, as there are two "unique (from
ther 1p view) consistent extensions (not definition, as the definition
is the same from the start ('1p-view = content on personal diary;
personal = "going in the tele-box")
There are posts which illustrates that you did understand this. The
first person views of the guy in Helsinki differentiates on W and M.
> For the guy in W, it is the same definition, but obviously, the
content is different.
So the definition is the same but its different.
The definition is "content of the diary which go in the box". It is
duplicated. After each copy self-localizes themselves, they write
their unique result and compare with the prediction already written in
the diary.
The definition of "dog" is the same for the different dogs Medor and
Ralph.
The content of the diaries multiplies, but the 1p experiences does not
from the first person points of view. That is as trivial as saying
that no diaries, in the iterations of such experience, will contain
statements like suddenly I find myself being in both W and M.
Everything is well defined, so if you can give an algorithm to the
Helsinki to predict its expectancy.
The guy is Helsinki knows, by comp, that he will survive and that he
will feel to be in only one city, with P = 1 (comp + the default
hypotheses).
But he knows that from the 3p, his body is read, annihilated and
copied in each city. So he knows in advance that any definite
prediction will be refuted by one of the copy, that "W and M" is
refuted by both, and that only "W v M" is satisfy in both extensions.
Indeed, in the iterated case, the first person discours, which get
multiplied exponentially, and can be shown random-incompressible for
their growing vast majority.
<snip>
> The 1p is not unique in the 3-1 view, but is unique in all 1p view.
So the 1p view is the 1p view. Well I'm glad you cleared that up.
Are you faking stupidity or what?
>> Evolution can't see anything that the Turing Test can't, both
only deal in observable behavior. Evolution didn't know or care if
Homo habilis was conscious of the Saber Toothed Tiger in the bushes
nor did it care if it intended to survive its attack or not, it only
cared if it did or didn't, it only cared if it lived long enough to
have offspring or if it didn't.
> Evolution don't care even of that. But it works through that, and
so might care on consciousness as it can help the predator and the
prey is their respective goal and motivation.
If consciousness helps the predator then it must effect behavior and
if it effects behavior then the Turing Test works for consciousness
as well as intelligence.
That does not follow. Consciousness helps the predator in a long
range, with many species selected (relative halting machines). Only in
the sense of killing all machines not succeeding the Turing test, we
could select machines which succeeding the test in a long evolutionary
process.
But the Turing test does not make much sense to me. Some machine can
already pass it relatively to some human, and some human does not
succeed in it.
Zombie can exist in the sense that someday it will be relatively easy
to make a machine imitating perfectly drunk people, or a fanatics or
something.
If Evolution can see something then so can the Turing Test, if the
Turing test can't see something then neither can Evolution.
OK. With nuances of time.
> Consciousness is needed for making sense of pleasant and unpleasant,
Evolution has no need of that,
I cannot make sense of evolution needing something.
I am talking about the persons and person populations selected (among
computational histories).
Evolution can't tell (and wouldn't care if it could) if the animals
it created can make sense out of things or not.
Good. Evolution is not God. Indeed.
So if animals can nevertheless at least sometimes manage to make
sense out of things then that ability can only be the byproduct of
something else that Evolution does care about, like intelligent
behavior that lets the animals genes get into the next generation.
Why byproduct? It could be the real making possible the selection in
the first place.
Unless you select reality by ostension, but then you adopt an
aristotelian theology, which is incompatible with the idea that you
can survive through a digital substitution.
If consciousness is a byproduct of material activity, then
consciousness AND material activity are a byproduct of addition and
multiplication.
But of course you need to go a bit forward in the UDA.
I am sure some meditation on step 4, could unstuck you from step 3.
> We cannot detect it, nor can be detect intelligence. We can detect
competence, relatively to a domain.
Apparently you believe the distinction between the words
"intelligence" and "competence relative to a domain" is important. I
do not.
Your bad luck.
> Comp extends Darwin on the physical laws.
Well good for "comp".
> To get this, though, you need steps 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
First fix the blunders in the first 3 steps.
Which blunders. All the blunders you have shown up to now, are
childish wordplays.
It would be easy to write a bot arguing like you on this.
>> Apparently you think the distinction between Evolution creating
consciousness and Evolution creating " the condition of some
possible manifestation of it" is important. I do not.
> But you have to if you accept comp
Then whatever "comp" is I don't accept it.
That is fundamental right of man and machines. You can say "no" to the
doctor, and you can hope that Church thesis get refuted.
>>> If you assume comp [blah blah]
>> I don't.
> Of course you do.
No I do not. I assume that computationalism is probably true but I
know that your strange made up word "comp" is not just the way a
lazy man can write
"computationalism" and avoid the agony of typing 12 extra letters
because you are constantly saying things like "If you assume comp
then [blah blah]" when I don't think blah blah is true or even
believe that blah blah is coherent. So whatever "comp" means it
doesn't mean "computationalism".
Then you must show the blunders, and stop the handwaving.
> you need to find a flaw in the UDA. (Not just faking a confusion
between 1p and 3p notion
Why on earth would I do that?
Anyone can look in their mail boxes the many times you did, and the
rebuttal by many different people.
I have never found the need to fake it, from the time I was a small
child I realized that I am quite capable of being legitimately
confused all on my own.
So you are confused, and that might be an opening to understand. But
in deductive reasoning, we can locally simplify the definition, and
that is what is done in the UDA. All your rebutal have mocked the
definitions already given.
Bruno
John K Clark
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