On 2/10/2014 1:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Feb 2014, at 06:08, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/9/2014 12:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Even on his argument, that nobody understand but him, against step 3? Then I invite
you to attempt to explain it to us.
I think I understand it. Asking the question "which will you be" in the MW experiment
is ambiguous because "you" is duplicated.
But that question is John Clark's invention. I never ask it. The question asked is about
your FIRST PERSON expectation about 1-your future. It cannot be ambiguous when we assume
comp.
Sure it is. What does "your first person expectation" refer to. Does it ask what will
your 1-p experience be? Or does it ask what is your 1-p feeling about where you will be?
To see in ambiguity here consists in being ambiguous about "you". But I have explicitely
introduced the 1p/3p distinction to make this non ambiguous. Comp says that in the 3p
view you will be at both place, and that in the 1-view, you will (with probability 1)
feel to be at only one place.
I could equally say you will feel to be both places. Either "you" is ambiguous and refers
to either the M-man or the W-man, but we don't know which. Or "you" refers to anyone who
was the H-man, i.e. both the M-man and the W-man.
There is no ambiguity at all. Only uncertainty or indeterminacy. That is the
point.
One can quite reasonably say that neither the M-man or the W-man is the H-man, the
H-man has been destroyed.
The original brain is also destroyed, and if the H-man died here, the guy who accepted
an artificial brain dies too, and comp is false.
But that's the confusing point. So what if they guy receiving the artificial brain dies,
he might still say yes to the doctor since the alternative is to certainly die in some
other way. Why should he not care about someone who is not biological continuous with him
but has the same memories, personality, etc.?
This is exactly the position taken by a professor of philosophy I happen to
know.
He should publish.
This makes the probability questions trivial: What is the probability the M-man sees
Moscow? It's 1.
But the probability is never asked to the M-man. It is always asked to the H-man. Of
course, if he dies, then the probability is 0. But then comp is false, and this shows
that comp implies the indeterminacy.
The difference between John and me is that I accepted the thought experiment as a model
of Everett's wave function splitting in order to see where it would lead.
If the Everett indeterminacy can be explained by the comp indeterminacy, then how could
the comp indeterminacy not make sense?
You lost me, here.
Even if it doesn't make sense it can illustrate how to think about indeterminacy due to
worlds splitting. If the transport booth were set to send its occupant to either Moscow
or Washington according to spin measurement then in the Everett model the |M>+|W> is a
superposition which decoherence quickly turns into a mixture.
Brent
Please, don't quote Clarks fake and ambiguous reformulation of step 3. Reason from what
I say, and not on what some people deforms (apparently to avoid the question asked).
never use "you". Always use 1-you or 3-you, or 3-1-you, etc.
Bruno
Brent
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